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ABSTRACT 
 Since the departure of the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in 1993, 
the Cambodian Muslim community has undergone a rapid transformation from 
being an Islamic minority on the periphery of the Muslim world to being the 
object of intense proselytization by foreign Islamic organizations, charities and 
development organizations.  This has led to a period of religious as well as 
political ferment in which Cambodian Muslims are reassessing their relationships 
to other Muslim communities in the country, fellow Muslims outside of the 
country, and an officially Buddhist state.  This dissertation explores the ways in 
which the Cham Muslims of Cambodia have deployed notions of nationality, 
citizenship, history, ethnicity and religion in Cambodia’s new political and 
economic climate.  It is the product of a multi-sited ethnographic study 
conducted in Phnom Penh and Kampong Chhnang as well as Kampong Cham and 
Ratanakiri.   
 While all Cham have some ethnic and linguistic connection to each other, 
there have been a number of reactions to the exposure of the community to 
outside influences.  This dissertation examines how ideas and ideologies of 
history are formed among the Cham and how these notions then inform their 
acceptance or rejection of foreign Muslims as well as of each other.  This 
understanding of the Cham principally rests on an appreciation of the way in 
which geographic space and historical events are transformed into moral symbols 
that bind groups of people or divide them. 
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 Ultimately, this dissertation examines the Cham not only as an Islamic 
minority, but as an Islamic diaspora – a particular form of identity construction 
which has implications for their future development and relations with 
non-Muslim peoples.  It reconsiders the classifications of diasporas proposed by 
Robin Cohen and William Safran, by incorporating Arjun Appadurai’s conception 
of locality as a construct that must be continuously rendered in praxis to generate 
the socially shared understanding of space, geography and its meaning for 
communitarian identity.  This treatment of Islamic transnationalism within the 
context of diaspora studies can contribute to the broader conversation on the 
changing face of Islamic identity in an increasingly globalized world. 
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Introduction 
The People, their Problem and our Problem with them 
 
0.1 Background 
 On the 10th of October of 2008, an opinion piece appeared in the Phnom 
Penh Post titled ‘A Homeland for the Chams: Find creative ways to connect 
young Chams with their history’.  The title was positively pregnant with 
assumptions about the nature of Cham identity and the predicament in which this 
group finds itself – beginning with autonomous statehood as an antidote to 
statelessness, social change as a product of historical amnesia, and ending with a 
‘creative’ program, never before tried, to supply people defined by their 
deficiencies (stateless and without history) with the requisite tools for living a 
fulfilled and properly ethnic existence. 
 The article itself touches on many problematic themes in the study of 
Cham people in particular as well as of the construction of ethnicity more 
generally.  In particular, it explicitly likens the victimization of a stateless 
minority during the Pol Pot period with the fate of European Jewry under Nazi 
rule and holds that the establishment of an independent homeland is a fair and 
proper compensation for years of collective punishment.  The author goes further 
however, beyond promoting an independent homeland for the Cham, his article 
suggests that the rebirth of Cham political autonomy will be accompanied, or at 
least should be accompanied, by a resurgence of ethnic pride, which, as of late, 
has come under attack by another force that is either indifferent or hostile to 
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Cham customs and traditions – namely internationalist Islam.  Additionally, this 
appreciation of Cham ethnicity should be founded in an understanding of the past 
which places the Cham on par with the Khmer and the Vietnamese as producers 
of a great civilization complete with monuments, ruins, royal lineages and all of 
the other requisite accoutrements of a people that should be taken seriously. 
 These are all questions with which many Cham continue to grapple – even 
if they would not voice their concerns as a justification for a Cham state.  What 
is the relationship between the Cham, the Khmer people and the Cambodian state, 
particularly in light of the events of the Pol Pot period where the Cham, like other 
minorities, suffered disproportionately?  To what degree is being a Cham 
synonymous with being a Muslim?  How can the interwoven strands of belief 
and practice be teased apart and classified as being either a religious proscription 
or a cultural artifact?  What is Cham history and does it matter?  If so, in what 
way is that history understood within the context of the narratives of Cambodian 
nationhood, where they currently reside?  How should the Cham negotiate a 
coexistence as a stateless Islamic minority within an overwhelmingly Buddhist 
country and an officially Buddhist state?  These are the lines of questioning that 
this dissertation will seek to explore and ultimately illuminate so as to begin to 
understand the myriad of factors that currently impel Cham people and Cham 
communities to make choices about their future belonging in the Cambodian state.  
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0.2 The Broad Strokes 
 There are approximately 400,000 Muslims in Cambodia today.  
According to a survey conducted in 2005 by Bjørn Blengsli, there were 417 
Muslim-majority villages in Cambodia with 244 mosques and 313 suraos (prayer 
houses).  Since that date there has been significant construction of new 
institutions as well as the establishment of new Muslim communities, many of 
which still do not have an official status and so do not appear on the national 
registers.  Of these 400,000 Muslims, roughly three quarters are ethnic Cham 
who live primarily in the north and east of the country especially near the 
waterways.  The focus of this work will be primarily the Cham community 
rather than other non-Cham Muslims in the country. 
 Present-day Cham communities exhibit a range of ethnicizing behaviors 
that serve to connect them to Champa, the Islamic world and the Khmer 
dominated Cambodian state, as well as simultaneously distinguishing themselves 
from these same institutions and from each other.   If seen as a spectrum of 
manifestations of "Chamness", we could consider the Imam San, with their heavy 
emphasis on their aristocratic heritage and their ties to Champa, including 
pre-Islamic aspects of the culture such as the Chamic scripts and the spirit cults, 
as distancing themselves from Cham of more vulgar lineage who do not maintain 
a memory of the royal cult of Champa.  These Cham, in turn, place greater stock 
in an Islamic identity that compensates for the lack of royal blood and a Cham 
language that distinguishes them from Khmers and the Khmericized Chvea, who 
are also Muslims, but of Malay stock.  Despite these battles for position among 
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the different Cham, there is still an overarching Cham identity into which each 
group's efforts at distinction fit.  Likewise, each group of Cham has their own 
way of justifying and legitimizing their stay in Cambodia in a ways that seem 
calculated to be non-threatening to the Cambodian institutional mainstream.   
 So that while they cling to the memories of an independent Champa, the 
Imam San also declare their allegiance to the King of Cambodia - the head of 
state.  Many Cham downplay their foreignness in a way that makes their Islam 
seem home-grown and the Chvea, without a distinctive language or any 
connections to Champa, have probably developed a sense of community which is 
most similar to what Khmers think of when they say "Khmer Islam", or Khmers 
who just happen to be Muslim.  This research represents an attempt to 
understand how these divisions among the Cham are created with respect to a 
historical memory of displacement and relocation in Cambodia.  It will seek to 
contrast the Imam San and other Cham of different religious orientations but also 
find threads of commonality that underpin what is, at root, a consciously 
articulated, genealogically grounded narrative of dispossession and loss. 
 Research was conducted from 2008 to 2009 in the capital Phnom Penh and 
the greater Phnom Penh area.  In particular, the areas of Chrang Chamres and 
Chrouy Changvar on the periphery of the city were important field sites - as was 
the area of Kampong Tralach, an hour north of the city and the center of the Imam 
San community.  Other areas of importance were Prek Praa and Prey Pis – two 
important strongholds of the Tabligh movement.  During this time interviews 
were conducted with different members of the community.  Because much 
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previous research had focused on the leadership and Cham hierarchy I 
purposefully chose to invest more energy in the development of relations with 
young men and women as well as with those religious functionaries whose job it 
was to provide services to the community directly.   
 Interviews were conducted in mosques, homes, coffee shops, halal eateries, 
moving vehicles and vehicles that had broken down.  With time, as more people 
knew who I was and what I was doing, I had the opportunity to speak with a large 
number of women who provided me with important insight into how families 
function and to what degree women feel that being a Muslim is an essential part 
of their futures in a country where there is increasing talk (mostly talk) of the 
emancipation of women.  By no means does this mean that I ignored officialdom 
or the older generation of Muslim leaders.   
 To be sure, I always found a warm welcome with the Mufti as well as at 
the Ministry of Cults and Religions, where I was assisted both with paperwork as 
well as with questions I had about the political world in which Cambodia's 
Muslims live, and I count many village elders and religious teachers as my dearest 
friends today.  But fundamentally, my interest was not so much in what the past 
was as it was about the interpretations of that past and what they suggested about 
where people are going.  After-dinner stories told by an octogenarian can be 
compelling, forceful, and weighty with the combined hopes and fears of a nation 
that one day found itself without a land and then suddenly, on the move.  But for 
young Muslims, anxious to maintain a sense of connection to this past but then at 
the same time drawn into a future that is either damply disinterested in these 
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memories of yore or even explicitly hostile to the very existence of a pre-Islamic 
past that does not represent a step forward in the forever onward march of the 
community of the faithful, the meaning and meaningfulness of those stories is not 
always clear.   
 It is this discomfiture with a sense of historicized belonging in a state of 
permanent exile that my research has focused on.  And the center of gravity of 
this cultural dislocation has been place squarely on the shoulders of the young.  
In the course of this dissertation, I hope to show how circumstances for Muslims 
have changed in recent years and how contact with the Muslim world outside 
Cambodia has brought the Cham into an awareness of options their elders likely 
never enjoyed.  It will also examine how these different options are weighed and 
how the choices that result from this consideration have resulted in the splintering 
of the Kingdom's Muslims into multiple factions.  This research will explain 
how history – history of the Cham but also increasingly the history of the 
Muslims – informs new ideologies of communitarian belonging and excludes 
others.  With respect to these ideologies, I will propose that although they may 
differ from group to group they are all at heart diasporic ideologies, marked not 
only by a feeling of displacement but also by a moral anger stemming from a 
memory of dispossession - an outrage that can be assuaged and made meaningful 
only when coupled with idioms of justice and belonging.    
 Finally, this discussion of belonging and rejection will always be placed 
within the bounds of the Cambodian state which is both that same object of 
inclusion and exclusion but also the structure that bookends the realistic options 
7 
of the vast majority of the Cham.  Much commentary and even research on the 
Cham see them as having specifically Muslim problems (illiteracy, poverty) when 
in reality they are conditions prevalent throughout the country and not exclusive 
to Muslims.  At the same time, those calling for Cham autonomy as in the 
aforementioned article, appear at times to not recognize that political movement 
on the part of the Cham would have enormous repercussions, both political and 
social, in the state in which they happen to already be living.   
 A more recent example of this narrative that Islam exists in some type of 
opposition to the law or to established instruments of governance was the 
September 30th 2010 edition of the Economist, which published an article called 
'Courting the Cham: A cultural revival gathers pace.  So do worries about 
fundamentalism.'  In it, it is suggested that while things seem on the up and up at 
the moment, fundamentalism and its never far away companion, terror, can 
always raise their heads in “lawless Cambodia”.  The article even featured a 
photo of a pathetically desiccated cow, perhaps moments from the glue factory, 
doddering in front of mosque with the caption: “New theatre of terror?”  How 
delightfully drôle!  Unfortunately, it's also less delightfully wrong.   
 Cambodia, like other countries, could stand some judicial, financial, 
regulatory and civil society reforms – perhaps more so than most other countries – 
but the country is not lawless, and the Muslims of Cambodia do not feel 
unrestrained by law – quite the contrary, their religious faith of Islam is deeply 
concerned with the problems of law and the correct governance of social affairs.  
Not only are they beholden to the civil law of the Cambodian state but they are 
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morally subject to adat, the customs of the Islamic community – enforced not as 
much by police and judges as by the fear of social censure that one feels living in 
these communities.  Chams like their Khmer neighbors live in a world of laws, 
customs and conventions – much of it shared.  I hope that throughout this work, 
not only my observations but also the context in which they must be understood 
remain clear in order to give a realistic portrayal of a complex and heterogeneous 
community of people who are themselves negotiating a socially multi-faceted 
world. 
 
0.3 The Structure of this Dissertation 
 In order to engage these problems while at the same time taking into 
account the diversity within the group of people that designate themselves as 
Cham, this dissertation will be organized into the following parts focusing on 
each of the most salient elements of Cham and Muslim discourse in Cambodia.  
The chapters, enumerated below, will cover the following issues: 
 
0.3.1 Chapter One 
 The first chapter will tackle three issues that are important if one is to even 
begin the discussion of the present day situation of the Cham and the historical 
trajectory that brought them to this position.  Initially, the chapter will provide 
the historical background related to the rise and fall of Champa as a civilization 
and the subsequent migration into Cambodia of the refugees from Vietnamese 
rule.  It will also review the adaptation of the Cham to Cambodian society 
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through the French Protectorate and the Khmer Rouge régime until the present 
day.  As such, this portion of the chapter is aimed at giving the reader an 
understanding of the history of the Cham as understood by colonial administrators 
and, later, by academics. 
 When one deals with a community so internally differentiated as the Cham, 
the question of how to refer to each group in a way that recognizes their own self 
designation as well as the name by which they are known outside their 
community becomes a necessity.  In this initial chapter, the names of different 
groups along with their most salient characteristics will be lain out and following 
this, a system of nomenclature for running use throughout the remainder of the 
work will be established in order to make manageable the task of keeping straight 
the cast of characters that populate the Cham world. 
 Lastly, this chapter will present the Cham people from a Khmer point of 
view and alongside the other people with whom they share the country.  As the 
dominant ethnic group, the Khmers’ views of the Cham have an enormous 
influence on social relations in the private sphere as well as institutional policy in 
the public realm.  However, this positioning of the Cham must be framed within 
what I have termed the ‘ethnic ecology’ of the country – the whole of positions 
held by the ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of the Khmer people including the Vietnamese, 
the Thai, the Chinese and the assorted peoples of the uplands.  Within this 
discourse of the Cambodian nation, each group receives a position, not always 
favorable, and each member of these communities, including the Cham, must 
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learn to make their way in this web of ethnicized positionalities, much of which 
they will themselves internalize. 
 
0.3.2 Chapter Two 
 With a basic historical framework established and the barrage of names 
and ethno-religious epithets brought into line, the second chapter will approach 
the question of religious change in the Cham community particularly since the 
end of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993.  
The primary new currents in Cambodian Islam will be described and their 
essential tenets and distinguishing characteristics which have lead to new conflicts 
will be made clear.  This chapter will therefore include explication of Islamic 
practices, and terminologies that need be understood in order to grasp the degree 
of change in religious practice as well as the manner of reinterpretation and 
reasoning that underlie these changes.  This must not be regarded as a 
comprehensive exhibition of either Islamic history, creed, practice or 
jurisprudence.  It is merely enough to make the rest of the data legible and 
intelligible for the reader and is strongly focused on the particularities of the 
religion as understood in Cambodia – particularities that may well be at variance 
with the understanding of the faith in other parts of the Muslim world.  
 
0.3.3 Chapter Three 
 If the first chapter relayed the history of the Cham as found in the 
documentary record, the third will seek to explore the lived experience of a 
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historicized identity of a particular sub-set of the Cham people – the Community 
of Imam San.  More than any other group of Cham, these ‘Imam San’ see their 
ethnic identity strongly tied to an identification with the historic Champa polity 
and this implies a certain type of relationship with the homologous institutions of 
the Cambodian state.   
 Through analysis of the beliefs and communal practices of this community, 
including celebrations of the birth of the founder of their community at the site 
where Khmer kings are buried, and the continued celebration of spirit possession 
ceremonies channeling the souls of the Champa king and aristocracy, this chapter 
will present a community that persists in antagonistic relationship to other 
Muslims and the new movements that have entered the country. 
 The way in which this community, however small, has managed to work a 
communitarian ideology outside the bounds of the ‘new Islam’ described in 
chapter two yields yet another example of the creative reinterpretation of ethnic 
history and a strategic deployment of the select commonalities with the Khmer 
dominated state to carve out for themselves a social, ethnic and semi-national 
space. 
 
0.3.4 Chapter Four 
 As the majority of the research was conducted in Phnom Penh and in the 
greater urban periphery, this section will deal with those issues most pertinent to 
the urban community.  Much of this will involve the difficulties Muslims have 
when brought into close quarters with Khmers and so will also recapitulate some 
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aspects of the renewal of interest in the practice and development of Islam in 
Phnom Penh - the epicenter of the nation’s focus on the practice of development.  
The way in which Muslims come to terms with forms of modernity that they find 
unacceptable or at least problematic will reveal much of what being Muslim 
means in the broader world. 
 No longer are Cambodian Muslims merely a minority in a Southeast Asian 
backwater.  They now form a community that, through learning about the 
Muslim world abroad, has itself become visible to that same caravan of donors, 
benefactors and Islamicist ideologues who threaten to criticize the terms of 
accommodations which they have made for living with Khmers.  This chapter 
must necessarily involve an examination of how this visibility has become a part 
of Cham Muslim consciousness.  Through studies and work abroad, and the 
expansion of media services that include daily coverage of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, an ongoing security crisis in Southern Thailand and other indignities 
suffers by their Muslim brethren, the community of the faithful, the Ummah, is 
more real than ever. 
 At the same time, urbanization and the concomitant problems of drugs, 
prostitution and juvenile delinquency figure prominently in this chapter as it is 
one of the vectors by which members quietly leave the community, and is seen to 
undermine the long-term viability of the community in the country – not so much 
because of the people that abandon the faith but because of the ill repute with 
which such individuals threaten to besmirch the name of the community as a 
whole.  
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 Data for this chapter came from extended interviews with Muslim families, 
immigrant workers, religious students and members of what can only be called 
the dark underbelly of the city.  Although this chapter covers many of the same 
themes of chapter two, it is more personal in tone and substance and will present 
the experience of contradiction and dislocation rather than the theoretical 
underpinnings of belonging and exclusion with which the second chapter was 
primarily occupied. 
 
0.3.5 Chapter Five 
 This fifth chapter will depart from the Cambodian warp and woof of the 
earlier elaborations of the field data to explore the literature that I believe most 
relevant to understanding the problems of ethnicity deploying a historicized 
narrative of a spatially organized community.  How can the experience of the 
Cham be understood as being similar or dissimilar to Jamaican Rastafarians, Irish 
Nationalist militants and Hutu militiamen?  How does the data presented in 
chapters one through four fit with this previous work and add to it in a significant 
way?  This chapter will both review the literature and recapitulate the findings of 
the field as necessary to fully integrate the data and theory. 
 This chapter will also seek to justify a reconsideration of the idea of 
“diaspora” especially in anthropology where ethnography has a privileged role in 
the performance of the discipline and the understanding of our subjects.  I will 
propose that population movement alone is insufficient and perhaps not even 
necessary to understand a community as being diasporic.  Historical scholarship 
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especially has taken the template of Jewish history as understood in Europe and 
North America and applied the term “diaspora” to a wide variety of demographic 
dispersions.  However, this treatment of the topic denies the very reason the 
Diaspora captured the imagination of generations of people in the West. 
 The story of the Israelites is more than history or didactic morality tales; it 
is for many a historicizing lens that casts the present in terms of a distant past, and 
the future as an evolution of the present dictated by that past.  The phrase “Next 
year in Jerusalem”, said with a bottle of Manischewitz on the table, is not about 
Jews synchronizing their watches and setting up a rendezvous point.  It’s hardly 
interchangeable with “I’ll see you next year”, “I’ll have my people call your 
people”, or “Same Bat time, same Bat channel.”  As Rabbi Susan Grossman 
explains on the online Virtual Talmud, “I think our Sages who crafted the Yom 
Kippur liturgy in the future tense–speaking of next year rather than this 
year–knew that Jerusalem is not only a very real city but also a prayer and a 
dream.”  The emotive power of the Diaspora narrative comes from the 
transformation of space and time into moral symbols – goals to be striven for, not 
locations to arrive at. 
 I myself, was born in Spain, raised in New York and then spent most of 
my adult life between Japan and Cambodia.  I certainly have gotten around 
enough, but I don’t ever open a bottle of malt liquor and declaim, “Next year in 
the Bronx.”  Nor do I consider that the Spanish victory over the Netherlands in 
the 2010 World Cup, however awesome and well-deserved, was any kind of 
payback or settling of scores for the Eighty Years War.  The rise, then fall, then 
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rise again of Eliot Spitzer is nearer to me than other political scandals because it 
occurred in New York, but it isn’t morally more compelling for that reason.  
Movement in space over time, knowledge of history and an interest in public 
ethics do not result in a diasporic mentality – they have to be combined in a 
particular way.  The need felt by Zionists to establish a Jewish state in no place 
other than Palestine is just the most obvious of many possible examples of how a 
feeling of history can be tied to a sense of mission and yoked to a political project 
which in turn defines a community. 
 In a world where individuals are more mobile than ever before in history, 
it is important to not dilute the power of a term that is conceptually useful due to 
reckless overuse.  If we are to understand how the “webs of significance” in 
which diasporic communities are suspended are different from those in other 
types of societies, then the application of the ethnographic method, with its 
capacity to go beyond mere descriptions of people and places, should be the 
privileged approach, as it permits a more holistic understanding of meaning and 
meaning-making than other types of research. 
 
0.3.6 Chapter Six 
 All things end – even dissertations.  I hope that by the time we arrive at 
this final chapter, the relevance of my findings will become clear at each of the 
levels of understanding that I seek to engage with this dissertation.  This final 
chapter should then be considered a sort of executive summary of the findings and 
their relationship to other scholarship, presenting the content of the dissertation in 
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light of current concerns over migration, identity, citizenship and Muslim 
understandings of community and belonging – all of which extend far beyond the 
province of academia. 
 
0.4 The Fieldwork 
This dissertation is the product of a multi-sited ethnography conducted 
primarily in Phnom Penh and the surrounding areas – those areas roughly one 
hour away from the city by road.  As I was most interested in social change in 
the Muslim community and the way in which the idea of Cham ethnicity was 
changing in response to the broader transformation of the country, I elected to 
focus on the capital where those changes in the economic and social life of the 
country were most evident and where young people from around the country 
found themselves drawn to the opportunity to make some break with the rural life 
of the province.  This is not to say that the countryside remains static.  New 
infrastructure and remittances from family in the city or abroad have contributed 
to the welfare of many Cambodians, while forcible land evictions, population 
pressures on limited arable land and changing climate have presented 
complications.   
Nevertheless, in order to remain multi-sited and still feasible in terms of 
research time and resources, most fieldwork was conducted around the capital 
city, where different types of field sites were reasonably close to each other and 
where better infrastructure did not make work impossible during the rainy season.  
A multi-sited ethnography was essential to the project because it involved 
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comparing different religious communities and different forms of practicing 
religion and ethnicity and there is no single place where all of these ways of 
understanding religion and community come together.  Research at a single site, 
or even two or three could not have yielded the same results.  I also chose 
Kampong Chhnang province as an important area of research, both because of its 
proximity to Phnom Penh, and also because of all the provinces it seems to have 
the most even distribution of the different sects and communities of Chams in the 
country. 
In Phnom Penh, there were four areas of research.  Reussei Keo, an area 
north of the city is an important area because of the large number of Muslims and 
the three important mosques in that neighborhood – KM7, a Salafi mosque and 
KM’s 8 and 9 Tabligh mosques.  The relationship between these communities 
(Salafis and Tablighs) is not always excellent.  Across the river is the community 
of Chroy Changvar, a peninsula in the Mekong River, also with three mosques.  
This peninsula is now very much in the cross-hairs of property developers and a 
compliant state that has big plans for this small spit of land – plans which don’t 
really incorporate the Muslim community.  In southern Phnom Penh, the Tabligh 
center of Prek Pra was also an important site for engaging missionaries and 
understanding their implementation of social programs.   
Just north of the city, in the province of Kampong Chhnang, the sites of 
Chrok Romiet, a village known for its iron working tradition and the fact that a 
large number of people have family members that have immigrated to the United 
States; and Our Reussei, the center of the Imam San community, were the most 
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important sites.  Besides these areas, some fieldwork was also conducted in 
Kampong Cham and Rattanakiri.  Although Rattanakiri has very few Muslims, 
their numbers are increasing both through migration and the conversion of the 
Jarai, a highland group linguistically related to the Cham.  These conversions 
and the politico-historic narrative that underpinned them became an important 
element of this dissertation.  
Many of my interviews consisted of semi-structured encounters with 
people of some position or authority in the community.  This included the staff 
at the Ministry of Cults and Religions, imams and religious teachers at the 
aforementioned field sites, and village chiefs, who, although Muslim, occupy a 
secular position.  These interviews were important not only because of the 
information they provided but because they then legitimized my presence in the 
village, transformed me into a known or at least knowable element, and gave me 
access to the rest of the community.  These interviews typically lasted between 
an hour and an hour and a half and covered their opinions of how their 
community had changed in recent years, the role of religion in local life and their 
relations with neighboring communities.  All informants were presented with a 
recruitment script that explained the nature and purpose of the research as well as 
offering anonymity to the respondent.  Besides people of official standing there 
is a constellation of unofficially important people that need to be engaged in order 
to understand the workings of the community and be considered a person with 
insider knowledge.  Anyone can find a village chief, but can you find the best 
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poet, or the most popular spirit medium?  If you can then you must know your 
way around the block.   
Extended time in these villages brought me into contact with a broad 
spectrum of the population.  At each site, I engaged young people, typically 
between the ages of 18 and 25, and interviewed them on many of the same issues 
mentioned above.  In the course of this, I was frequently invited to attend events 
where I met members of their peer group.  These gatherings included, informal 
meetings over coffee, family meals, spirit possession ceremonies, Islamic study 
circles and the occasional jaunt to the neighboring Khmer village for a drink.  
The opportunity to speak with young Muslims about their life circumstances and 
their networks of friends and contacts was important to developing an idea of how 
they interact with and influence each other, especially on matters such religious 
orthodoxy or visions of the world outside Cambodia’s borders. 
The majority of my interviews were conducted in Khmer.  Although 
Cham is a language that I continue to study, my proficiency in Khmer is far 
greater.  I therefore used Khmer on most occasions in order that our interactions 
not degenerate into language lessons, or worse, that they dumb down their 
language and ideas in order to make them assimilable to my Cham.  I did use 
Cham frequently in casual chats and I even learned to intersperse it into my 
Khmer for comic effect as well as to create a feeling of intimacy.  The difference 
between explaining to a village chief that “I am here to study the Cham 
community” and “I am here to learn more about our brothers and sisters” is 
tremendous.  In many parts of the country it is still common to find children and 
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older people, as well as some persons in middle age, with limited or negligible 
proficiency in Khmer.  And so my Cham came in handy whenever I needed to 
ask a small child where the imam (who was avoiding me) was, or when, at the 
close of the day, I sat on the veranda overlooking the river as the old women tried 
to shock me with their dirty jokes.  
Yet Khmer has the distinct advantage of having a single and standardized 
writing system, which Cham does not.  All notes in the field were taken in 
Khmer.  Writing Khmer by hand is one of the better parlor tricks a white man in 
Cambodia can perform.  On more than one occasion, onlookers have crossed a 
street to bring a chair over and sit down beside me as I worked.  Notes in Khmer 
served a number of functions.  First, it reassured my interlocutor that I actually 
was pretty OK at Khmer – that he could speak without wondering too much if I 
understood what he was saying.  It was also a way of making my note-taking 
transparent to my informant.  He or she could see clearly what I was writing and 
not think that I was in fact writing something different from what was being told 
to me.  Thirdly, relatively few interviews occurred in private.  There was 
always a wife pouring tea, a nosy neighbor listening at the door, a child 
rummaging through my field bag, or that guy who dragged the chair over to gawk 
at my calligraphics.  Field notes proved a useful prop for creating an atmosphere 
of conversation rather than a public examination.  Asking observers for their 
opinions and then writing down their answers in my book made them feel as 
participants.  Asking them for help with spelling helped keep them involved and 
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feeling like a valuable resource all while giving my interviewee some respite from 
questions. 
These formal interviews also set me up for further conversations with 
these informants, members of their family and other persons in their in-group in 
more informal contexts.  Observation and participation in community events lent 
much of the substance to this work.  Time spent with the community helped me 
understand how people relate to each other, the ways in which they practice their 
religion and the discrepancies between the understanding they claim to have and 
the reality of lived experience.  Family gatherings, religious meetings, holidays 
and day to day activities such as working at the shop or walking to the rice fields 
were all moments to interact with the local community and engage in 
conversations where Cambodian Muslims themselves revealed the topics of 
conversation that were interesting and relevant to them rather than depending on 
my interview agenda to drive our interactions.   
All this said, there were some obvious limitations to my ability to 
participate in this community.  The most important was the fact that I am not a 
Muslim.  My southern European physiognomy and facial hair did give the 
impression that I might be an Arab to many, but I at no time claimed to or 
pretended to be a Muslim.  This meant that I did not pray, and I was denied 
access to some places such as the interior of the Tabligh centers.  While for the 
most part people were welcoming and very willing to speak to a non-Muslim, my 
non-Muslimness needed to be established from the outset.  Once identified as a 
non-Muslim, it was frequently necessary to make an attempt to convert me.  
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These were typically one-off attempts as it would be negligent of them not to try, 
but some members of the Tabligh sect made more consistent efforts to this end.  
While I made certain to adhere to social norms, such as dietary prohibitions, 
abstinence from alcohol, and conduct with women, my status as non-Muslim was 
a consistent element of many my relationships. 
This difference did have some advantages.  I was not the only person 
engaged in questioning the Other.  My opinion was solicited on a wide range of 
subjects, among them: substance abuse, agriculture in different countries and 
continents (or how do people live in places that don’t grow rice?), the nature of 
Christ, police corruption, what Arab people are ‘really’ like when you meet them 
in person, the history of Islam in Spain, and the best way to study for school 
exams, to name but a few.  At first, I felt that fielding these questions were 
taking time from my own work, but I made my best effort to take each query 
seriously as, after all, I had the time and resources to visit them in their country 
when none of them were ever likely to have the luxury to come to my country and 
pester my family with questions.  In time, I grew to understand that these 
questions were themselves a source of inspiration for my research since they 
represented expressions of their concerns and anxieties about the changing world 
they find themselves in and the uncertain future that awaits their children.   I can 
only take this willingness to expose their ignorance and insecurities as an act of 
friendship and trust. 
Building trust was key, especially when talking to some of the more 
vulnerable elements of the Muslim population.  In chapter 4, I present interviews 
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conducted with sex workers and drug users from the community.  Like everyone 
else, they were quoted under pseudonyms, but that was not the only kind of 
security they were looking for from me.  More importantly, they wanted to be 
guaranteed that their stories would be taken seriously and that I would refrain 
from judging them for their “mistakes” and “misdeeds”.  Surprisingly, the 
testing of my methods and motivations was not greatest from the imams or 
community elders, but from these young people who wished to be certain that 
they could have a moment to explain the state of their existence and still assert the 
meaning of the religion they betrayed to arrive at this point.  They accepted me 
as a friend, and I accepted them as Muslims, which is what they appeared to have 
wanted all along. 
The bulk of the field work occurred between 2008 and 2009, however, this 
was not my first time in the field and previous stints in the country during the 
summers of 2002 and 2004 meant that I had already established some of the basic 
elements of the ethnographic work, namely, introducing myself to the community, 
identifying sites of interest and issues of concern, and developing an 
understanding of the logistical challenges involved in working in Cambodia.  
With the bulk of the dissertation written, I returned to Cambodia in 2010 for work 
and continue to maintain my relationships with many of the characters that 
populate this dissertation.  The length of time I spent in the field meant that I had 
opportunity to engage the same people over a long period.  This allowed me not 
only to have a deeper understanding of their thinking, their values and their 
concerns, but ultimately, more importantly, I came to see how these aspects of 
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their persona changed over that time as circumstances changed – as they aged.  
Aging ended up being a central component to my understanding of the 
community as well as my acceptance into their lives, and this was not something I 
had earlier anticipated.   
I made a decision early on in the research to make an effort to spend more 
time with the younger members of the different Muslim communities.  In part 
this was because it was among these very people that I expected the 
transformation of social and religious attitudes and lifeways to be most salient.  
It was also because previous researchers, such as Bjørn Blengsli and Emiko 
Stock, had already spent much time with the leadership class of the Cambodian 
Muslim community, and so I thought the issue of social change as perceived by 
the youth to be a more important and original contribution to the study of Cham 
people.  The other important factor behind this decision was that I thought I 
could do it – that is, I thought I could successfully develop contacts and 
friendships with younger Muslims, and thereby observe their social and at times 
anti-social lives.  I was still in my 20’s when my work began, and indeed I feel 
that I succeeded in developing close relations in these communities that permitted 
me to compare and contrast the emic understandings these groups have of their 
religion, their place in the world, and their relationships to each other.   
 This was not a condition that could obtain indefinitely, however.  A 
curious element of Southeast Asian languages is the ubiquitous use of family 
relational terms as personal pronouns.  As a result, you can actually hear 
yourself growing older here.  Today, almost a decade after the start of my 
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fieldwork, the flocks of school children that used to call me “big brother” now 
call me “uncle”.  The ministry officials that once looked at me quizzically as I 
asked for research permissions now smile and pour me tea in anticipation of a 
long chat.  Village women who thought I might make a good match for their 
daughters (provided I converted, of course) now tell me they will pray to Allah 
that I soon marry somebody – anybody.  The youngsters who shared with me 
their hopes and dreams for the future of their communities are now college 
students – somehow still working for a better future but within a very different 
institutional framework.  One of my best friends, a madrasah teacher, rose to 
become the imam of his community.  Other friends of mine passed away during 
the course of my time here.   
In short, this dissertation, like any other I suppose, represents the 
intersection of a certain time in my life with a certain moment in the history of the 
community and while most of this research could be easily reproducible by 
others, the change in my own positionality means that I myself can never revisit 
these moments or these characters again.  By the type of data I was able to 
gather and kind of ethnography I eventually came to write, I feel justified in 
having made the choices I did regarding my selection of field sites and types of 
informants.  Today, I continue to follow my friends and acquaintances in the 
community and, looking back at my field notes, remark on how it all turned out – 
sometimes in accordance with, sometimes contrary to all our expectations. 
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Chapter One 
The Cham – a People, a History, a Religion, an Existence Apart 
 As for the Malays, or Thiâmes, as the Cambodians call 
them, I made endeavours to investigate their origin, and also the 
traces which I supposed to exist in Cambodia of Isrealite 
migrations.  Monsignor Miche told me that he had never met with 
any Jews in the country, but that he had found in one of the sacred 
books of the Cambodians, the Judgement of Solomon exactly 
recorded, and attributed to one of their kings who had become a 
god, after having been, according to their ideas of metempsychosis, 
an ape, an elephant, &c. 
 The Thiâmes are the same as the ancient Thiampois; but 
these Thiampois, whence came they?  What is the origin of this 
strange people, whom the conquests of the Annamites drove back, 
doubtless from the south of Cochin China to Cambodia, but who 
form alliances with neither of the races whose countries they share, 
and who preserve their own language, manners and religion?   
(Mouhot 2000) 
 
 
1.1 History and the Historical Imagination 
 Once an independent and powerful player in the region, Champa was 
extinguished after centuries of conflict with the expanding Vietnamese empire 
and survives today only in the imagination of the Cham people of the diaspora.    
The ways in which the history of Champa is imagined and made relevant to 
present day Cham as well as Khmer shed light onto the development of the 
relations between Khmers, Cham, Vietnamese and Highlanders that one observes 
today.  An examination of the political history of the Cham yields important 
insights into several aspects of their present-day situation.  Namely, that the 
adoption of Islam need be understood as both a product of trade relations and 
cultural bonds between the Cham and the trading states of the Malay Archipelago, 
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as well as an act of resistance against Vietnamese encroachment and relocation in 
Cambodia.  Second, that Champa consisted not only of a federation of coastal 
lowland Cham-speaking city states, but also included the mountainous hinterlands 
of the Annamite chain and the tribal Austronesians and Austro-Asiatics of that 
region, with whom they enjoyed amicable trade relations, and this history of 
interaction is still manifest in the continuum of non-state peoples of Indochina 
that preserve a historical memory of past alliances.  Third, that the identity of 
Cham people, or better put, of particular groups of people who refer to themselves 
as Cham has historically been very malleable but can virtually always be 
characterized by differential emphasis placed on ethno-linguistic, religious and 
political affiliations which distinguish Cham from other Cham as well as from 
non-Cham.   
 
1.1.1 The Rise and Fall of Champa 
 Champa enters recorded history in the 2nd century AD with the description 
of Lin Yi in Chinese sources.  Lin Yi or Indrapura, as the Cham would have 
known it, was a city state north of present day Huế engaged in lowland rice 
agriculture, trade and significantly, piracy.  It appears that the Cham states were 
founded by traders and merchants from the Malay Archipelago who settled along 
the coast and founded trading entrepôts between the archipelago and China as 
well as between the coast and the Annamite Highlands.  Chinese chronicles 
clearly distinguish Lin Yi from Fu Nan in the Mekong Delta, a Khmer state that 
preceded and possibly gave rise to the later Angkorian Empire.  It was Cham 
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piracy off the coasts of Việt Nam (then ruled by the Chinese) and southern China 
that in the 5th century provoked a Chinese retaliation.  The Chinese expedition 
sacked Indrapura and carried off its treasury shifting the center of gravity of the 
Cham world southward to the city of Amaravati in what is today the province of 
Quảng Nam.   
 Amaravati had already been profoundly Indianized.  Stone inscriptions 
from the 4th century in Sanskrit and Cham, representing the first writings in an 
Austronesian language, in addition to a Shiva temple and linga cult established in 
that same period are evidence that Amaravati was already profoundly Indianized 
by the time it assumed the leadership of the Cham city states (Coedes 1968; 
Majumdar 1985).  This contact with the subcontinent continued as demonstrated 
by the continued importation of Indian ideas over the next five centuries.  By the 
7th century, shrines appear to Vishnu as well as Siva and in the 9th century 
Buddhism begins to appear on the religious landscape.  All this suggests trade 
and other relations maintained with India and Ceylon, with the various Malay 
states such as Srivijaya and Mahapajit as intermediaries.  Today, these temples, 
now ruins, at Mỹ Sơn are major tourist destinations for Westerners and 
Vietnamese alike and figure prominently in the Vietnamese literature on the 
Cham, which places heavy emphasis on the historical (read: not present) 
importance of Cham civilization (Lê 2002; Ngô 1994; Ngô 2002; Phan et al. 
1991; Tran 2000). 
 Amaravati thrived as a commercial and cultural center until the 10th 
century when the Vietnamese threw off the Chinese yoke and began the 
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southward push, or the nam tiến, which would eventually extend the Vietnamese 
state to the Mekong Delta at the expense of the Cham and Khmer polities.  
Unlike other states in Southeast Asia at the time, Việt Nam struggled with 
overpopulation.  While warfare in the region typically had at its goal either the 
extraction of tribute or the control over population centers and trade routes, the 
nam tiến was essentially a demographic push for Lebensraum, where landless 
Vietnamese peasant-soldiers would be granted paddy land at the conclusion of 
successful campaigns to settle with their families in fortified towns in a process 
similar to the colonization of the American West.  With a still powerful China to 
the north and the mountainous terrain of what is today Laos to the west, it was the 
Cham and the Khmers of the coastal south, with their alluvial plains that were so 
attractive to the rice-farming Vietnamese, that would absorb the brunt of the 
expansion. 
 In 980 the Vietnamese sacked Amaravati and killed its king, formally 
incorporating what was Indrapura and Amaravati, which included the major port 
of Fai Fo, present day Hội An.  This defeat precipitated yet another retreat by the 
Cham, this time to the city state of Vijaya in what is today the province of Bình 
Dịnh.  It was during this period that Islam began to take hold among the Cham 
gradually as it was introduced by Islamicized traders from Malacca and other 
parts of the Archipelago.  Although poorly documented, it appears that Islam 
spread first among the masses, which were attracted by a relatively simple 
religion promising a direct contact with the deity and dispensing with the 
elaborate Hindu cult. 
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 The ascendancy of Vijaya would end in 1471, when the Vietnamese, 
under the emperor Lê Thánh Tôn, pushed southward once again, capturing Vijaya 
and settling its territory with ethnic Vietnamese peasants.  The fall of Vijaya is 
accompanied by two key developments in the religious culture of the Cham.  
First, there would be no more Sanskrit inscriptions after the conquest of Vijaya, 
marking the beginning a long, slow decline of the Brahmanic cult.  Secondly, 
Islam as a political force emerges and is immediately associated with resistance to 
the Vietnamese.  Although Muslims at this time are still a minority of the Cham, 
it is they that spearhead the resistance to the invasion and later the resistance to 
the occupation, using their relations with the Highlanders to conduct guerrilla 
campaigns against the occupiers (Maspero 1928).  Hindu and Buddhist Cham for 
the most part submitted to Vietnamese rule, although many of them would later 
flee under pressure from their overlords.   
 The demographic character of the nam tiến meant that instead of the Cham 
of conquered provinces being incorporated into the Vietnamese economy, they 
were in most cases forcibly displaced especially from choice paddy lands and 
politically and economically marginalized.  Whereas in previous conflicts, the 
difference between winning and losing a war was often, from the peasants' point 
of view, a difference between sending tribute to one ruler instead of another, the 
Vietnamese invasion threatened the very livelihoods of these people that would be 
physically replaced by ethnic Vietnamese - people for whom Islam had been an 
attractive option.  It is not well understood why Muslims were so 
disproportionately active in the resistance.  It may be because Islam had found 
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converts among farmers, who may have had the most to lose in the new order.  
Although Islam initially arrived by sea, contact with Malay traders and other 
Cham in Cambodia meant that there was also an overland connection and that it 
would no longer be accurate at this point to think of Islam being transmitted 
exclusively or even primarily by merchants.  In any case, it seems that while 
Hindu and Buddhist Cham sought some type of accommodation with the 
Vietnamese, the Muslims, which French scholars and historians would refer to as 
the "patriots", continued to defy the Vietnamese and in so doing made Islam an 
integral part of "true", uncompromising Cham identity. 
 The events of 1471 left the Cham with Kauthera and Panduranga, present 
day Nha Trang and Phan Rang respectively, with the center of gravity at Phan 
Rang.  Within another 200 years, the Vietnamese would be in a position to 
eliminate all opposition from Cham or Khmers in the southern territories.  
Crucial was the 1623 Vietnamese acquisition of a customs house in the Khmer 
city of Prey Nokor, what is today Sài Gòn.  The official Vietnamese presence in 
the Mekong Delta encouraged settlers to come to the delta and stake out their 
claims.  It also meant that Champa was effectively penned in by the Vietnamese 
on both the northern and southern borders.  With Khmer influence on the wane 
in the delta and Champa's room for maneuver reduced, it was only a matter of 
time before the Vietnamese would seek to connect the main part of their empire 
with their interests in the delta.  Indeed, the Prey Nokor customs house gave 
greater impetus to Vietnamese expansion efforts and accelerated the political 
disintegration of Champa.  In 1650, the Vietnamese take Kauthera, leaving only 
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Panduranga, which in 1692 undertook a disastrous campaign to recuperate the 
northern city state.  This in turn ended with the Vietnamese capture of 
Panduranga itself and the end of the Cham polities, bringing to a conclusion, in 
less than 80 years, a decline that had been progress for over a millennium. 
 The fall of Panduranga set off a series of Cham migrations consisting of 
members of all classes of Cham society, from the nobility, which could not 
tolerate the humiliation of defeat, to displaced peasants (Weber 2012).  The 
capitulation of the last of the Cham states not only reduced the options for refuge 
of Cham unhappy under Vietnamese rule elsewhere in the conquered territories, 
but also gave the Vietnamese a freer hand to pursue a more aggressive policy of 
Vietnamization against those Cham who remained under Vietnamese rule - a 
policy which spawned other migrations. 
 
1.1.2 The Cham Migrations 
 Collins (1996) describes the migration of Cham as having occurred in four 
stages, the first being a poorly understood and documented series of resettlements 
after the fall of Vijaya.  In 1471, the king of Vijaya, hoping to avoid the fate of 
the king of Amaravati, fled to Malacca.  His name, Indra Brahma, suggests that 
he was likely a Hindu, who would have then converted to Islam upon reaching 
Malacca.  This initial migration was characterized by settlement in other Cham 
trading centers, of which there were still many, and the Malay Archipelago, rather 
than into Cambodia. 
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 The second migration of Cham was into Cambodia in 1692 and is central 
to our understanding of the divisions among modern-day Cambodian Cham since 
it was likely this migration that resulted in the establishment of a community that 
would be known as the Community of Imam San (or simply, Imam San).  The 
Imam San, who claim to be descended from the royal line of Panduranga, arrived 
in Oudong, the then capital of Cambodia, with their family and retinue numbering 
approximately 5,000 persons, and petitioned king Jayajettha III for refuge from 
the Vietnamese.  The Khmer king allowed the immigrants to settle throughout 
the country, including near the capital, Oudong, where they soon became active in 
royal politics and court intrigue (Clere 1914; Collins 1996). 
 The Tây Sơn rebellion of the final years of the 18th century set the stage 
for the third migration.  With Việt Nam or Đại Việt divided between the Trinh 
family in the north and the Nguyễn in the south, warfare was endemic and taxes, 
including new types of taxes which were applied to non-agricultural activities 
such as trade and artisanal production increased to supply the war effort.  This, 
plus the mass conscription of peasants into both armies yielded a peasant uprising 
led by the Tây Sơn brothers, the eldest of whom was actually a tax collector 
himself, but had a falling out with the Nguyễn lord after gambling away the taxes 
he had collected.  The Tây Sơn brothers fled into the Highlands where they had 
had contacts in the betel trade and, from there, organized a peasant army.  In 
concert with the Trinh, the Tây Sơn brothers made swift gains against the 
Nguyễn, capturing Sài Gòn and killing off the entire Nguyễn family with the 
exception of the lord's nephew, Nguyễn Anh, who escaped and after several 
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attempts to take power, returned at the head of the French expeditionary force, 
who placed him back in power in 1802.   
 It is unclear, exactly what role the Cham would have had in the Tây Sơn 
rebellion, but we do know that there was considerable resistance from the Cham, 
who at the time were led by a Malay and orthodox Muslim, Tuon Set Asmit.  
After several years of fighting, the confessional fault lines made continued 
struggle untenable.  Whereas Hindu Cham and Cham Bani (Shi'ite Cham) 
decided to submit themselves, Muslim patriots opted to flee to Cambodia.  Once 
in Oudong, Tuon Set Asmit was received by the king and awarded the 
governorship of the predominantly Muslim district of Tboung Khmum in what is 
today Kompong Cham.  As in the fall of Vijaya, Islam was politicized as an 
ideology of resistance and ethnic patriotism, intransigent in the face of 
overwhelming odds and in contrast to the less zealous Cham who would live 
under Vietnamese overlordship.  This naturally begs the question of why it is 
intolerable to live under the Vietnamese, but acceptable to submit oneself to the 
Buddhist king of Cambodia.  Certainly the grass was greener on the other side in 
this case.  Although they would not have sovereignty as a state, Cham and 
Muslims were recognized by the Khmer and it was accepted that the governor of 
Cham areas should be a Muslim.  Tuon Set Asmit was only one example of a 
Muslim who achieved high office within a bureaucracy that found a use for these 
refugees.  
 Tuon Set Asmit would meet an unfortunate end however, when, in 1820, 
the king of Cambodia, Ang Chant, sent a delegation to Việt Nam to secure 
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assistance against the Siamese.  The delegation was headed by Tuon Set Asmit, 
who was recognized by the Vietnamese as the author of the Phan Rang resistance.  
The Vietnamese offered the king help in exchange for Tuon Set Asmit, who 
would be executed.  The King reluctantly accepted.  The execution of a loyal 
servant of the king, suddenly made expendable, undercut the loyalty the king 
could command of his Muslim subjects.  The community was divided, with 
some even returning to Việt Nam, more specifically, Châu Đốc, which Việt Nam 
had just recently acquired from Cambodia.  This orthodox Muslim community 
survives there today (Collins 1996).   
 The fourth and final major migration occurred during the 1830's under the 
reign of Emperor Minh Mạng, who concerned with consolidating control over his 
empire in the face of growing French influence, launched a program of 
Vietnamization of the Cham and other lowland minorities.  Until that time Phan 
Rang had largely been spared the attention of the Vietnamese authorities, 
probably because, unlike the agriculturally promising lands of the northern Cham 
states, Phan Rang was drier and had poorer soil.  This may also be why Hindus 
and Cham Bani thought they might be able to continue living in Phan Rang under 
the Vietnamese.  The assimilation campaign suppressed traditional practices and 
reorganized village and district governments along Vietnamese lines.  Cham 
unwilling to assimilate fled, this time to the mountains and among the 
Highlanders.  Cham-Highlander relations had been friendly for many centuries, 
and it appears the Cham were welcomed.  The fact that the Vietnamese, as wet 
rice cultivators, had no interest in the Highlands was also a factor.  Indeed, 
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ethnic Vietnamese would hardly penetrate the Annamite Chain until the 20th 
century, and even then, only with government intervention and support. 
 The Cham Muslims would not go quietly however, and during this last 
migration, Muslims would make two last gasp efforts at expelling the Vietnamese.  
The first of these was in 1833, when Katip Sumat a holy man who had spent 
many years in Mecca raised an army to reestablish Panduranga as an independent 
state.  The second, in 1834, led by the Cham Bani, Ja Thak Va, was an attempt to 
remove the Vietnamese settlers from their coastal enclaves.  Both revolts were 
failures, the first more miserable than the second, which actually enjoyed a series 
of victories; however, they are of interest because of the way the Muslims, once 
again at the vanguard of the resistance, made use of and incorporated the tribal 
Highlanders.   
 Katip Sumat's plan for revolution was two-pronged in that it capitalized on 
the growing Muslim anti-Vietnamese fervor and the traditional connections 
between the Cham and the Highlanders.  Missionization of the Highlanders, 
primarily Roglai and Chru, and the spread of Islam, with a heavy emphasis on the 
notion of the jihad against infidels, was integral to Sumat's designs.  Ja Thak Va 
too sought the cooperation of the hill tribes, but he went several steps further.  
The Ja Thak Va rebellion, only a year after Katip Sumat's failure, had as its goal 
the establishment of an essentially land-based city state in the vicinity of 
Panduranga and Kauthera, moving the locus of power from the coast and nearer to 
the Highlands.  More extraordinary still, he established a tripartite provisional 
government with a Roglai Highlander as the king of the new state, a Chru 
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Highlander as the second king and a Cham as commander of the army.  
Although defeated, Ja Thak Va, made significant gains for a time and forced the 
emperor to address issues of local-level corruption in the provinces that supported 
the rebellion.   
 Both of these events, plus the levels of Cham migration into the Highlands 
during this period, highlight the affinity that these two communities felt with each 
other.  Unlike the migrations of 1471, where safe haven was sought by taking to 
the sea and fleeing to Malacca or Majapahit, this fourth migration found Cham in 
solidarity with the Highlanders.  In part, this may be because of the reduced 
maritime presence of the Cham after the loss of Fai Fo and their political 
marginalization after the fall of Panduranga broke the links between the Cham 
and the Muslim trading states, but the traditional Cham-Highlander relation 
cannot be ignored.   
 Early Cham settlements on the mainland coast seem motivated by the need 
to facilitate maritime trade between India and China, but there were also ancillary 
benefits to be derived from extending the trade network inland, in search of 
tropical hardwoods and especially eaglewood.  Also known as agarwood, this 
fragrant resin was the product of certain tropical trees infected with a particular 
type of fungal disease.  The resin, which is the tree's immune reaction to the 
infection, can be dried and traded as an aromatic on the Chinese and Middle 
Eastern markets.  The acquisition of this product required Highlanders who were 
experienced in locating and diagnosing the promising trees.  Eaglewood 
gathering was always done in partnership with the hill tribes, who were 
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compensated in their turn.  In addition to this, the Cham were able to learn 
construction techniques involving the use of tree resins instead of mortar in the 
construction of their temple towers, which still stand today (Ngô 1994).  These 
relations appear to have maintained a certain respectful distance between the 
Cham and the upland communities as well, where the Cham never attempted to 
extend their sovereignty into the mountains and the Highlanders never saw reason 
to feel threatened by Cham commercial developments on the coast.   
 This special relationship would be sealed in the fourth migration when the 
last vestiges of the Cham aristocracy would flee into Cambodia, leaving behind 
the princess, Po Bia, and with her, the royal treasures, which could not leave 
Champa.  Upon her death, these treasures were distributed in at least nine 
locations in the Highlands for safekeeping (Collins 1996).  These hill tribes 
continue to protect the artifacts of the Cham royal cult.  The fact that the 
Highlands were an acceptable repository for the items as opposed to Cambodia 
where the majority of Cham had fled, gives an indication of the closeness between 
the coastal and Highland Cham - the literature of the period often using the word 
"Cham" to refer to the members of any ethnic group that made up part of the 
Cham federation.  Today, the Cham diaspora is recognized, not only among the 
Cambodian Western Cham and the Eastern Cham of Phan Rang, but also among 
the various Chamic hill tribes of the Highlands - the Roglai, the Rhade and the 
Jarai among others.  In the West, this connection was reconstructed using 
linguistic evidence (Thompson 1976; Thurgood 1996; Thurgood 1999), but for 
the Highlanders and Cham themselves, it is the historical memory of cooperation 
39 
that is maintained in the traditional histories and narratives of the region that 
maintains feelings of solidarity (Collins 1996).  These memories of a special 
relationship will become more apparent in the discussion of Islamic 
missionization of highland people of Rattanakiri province in Chapter 4. 
 
1.1.3 French Colonial Period and Independence 
 The arrival of the French and the establishment of the protectorate in 1863 
had profound effects on the Muslim community which are felt to this very day.  
Although this arrangement only lasted 90 years, it is seen as being key to the 
continued existence of Cambodia as an entity separate from either of its neighbors.  
Apart from safeguarding the nation, the French experience was instrumental in 
creating the modern sense of Cambodian nationhood shared by the intellectual 
classes, which assigns to the modern-day Khmer the title of inheritors of Angkor.  
The French, having lost Egypt with its grand history and glorious monuments to 
the British, had set their eyes on Angkor – an ancient civilization now in the 
process of rediscovering itself under the tutelage of their French protectors 
(Edwards 2007; Muan 2001). 
 Because of their monumental architecture in central Việt Nam, the Cham 
too were of interest to the new colonial administration and Vietnamese 
prohibitions on Cham practices were repealed in Việt Nam.  In Cambodia, where 
there were no such restrictions, the French found a Muslim population that was 
reasonably well integrated into Cambodian political life and where they 
frequently were counted among the governors and administrators of areas with 
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large Muslim minorities.  Under the French, the Cham were frequently classified 
as 'Malays' and little distinction was made among different groups of Mulsims in 
the country (NAC 1937).  For them French rule would spell a reversal of 
fortunes in the public sphere, as they were loathe to send their children to colonial 
schools for fear that they would lose their Muslim faith.  Without the requisite 
diplomas, the Muslims were shut out of the apparatus of administration and the 
opportunities for social and economic advancement that they afforded.  The 
result was a disconnect from the institutions of government and a shift towards a 
sort of cultural and social parallelism that would keep Muslims and non-Muslims 
apart.  Although written in 1941, Marcel Ner's words still have resonance today:   
… the Muslims pay their taxes and are not involved in political 
agitation... they can effectively be ignored as they do not form a 
majority in any province.  This situation is likely to change 
however.  Clearance of the Mekong banks have reduced fish 
catches as has the ever increasing competition from the Chinese 
and Vietnamese.  The economic crisis has hit them hard and 
made them aware of their isolation, their neglect of possibilities 
for careers in the administration and of their ignorance of Western 
technology (Ner 1941).   
 
 While the Cham were not quick to plug themselves into the colonial 
system, they were not completely disconnected from the world outside their 
communities.  This was a period of intense interchange with Muslims abroad 
particularly in Kelantan in the Malay peninsula (Guérin 2004).  Marcel Ner 
noted how the flow of students and teachers led to the development of local 
centers of study, particularly at Phum Trea in Kampong Cham Province, a place 
that today stands as the center of the Tabligh movement in Cambodia 
(Bruckmayer 2007).  During this time, many of the divisions regarding the 
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correctness of particular religious practices and the importance of Islam as a 
guiding force in public life became sharper and better defined.  This was 
accompanied by an increasing level of conflict in areas where preachers began 
speaking against un-Islamic practices (NAC 1935). 
 The Cambodian Muslim community became a field of contention between 
the Kaum Muda (Young Group) and Kaum Tua (Old Group) struggles that were 
occurring throughout the Malay Archipelago.  The Kaum Muda can be thought 
of as the precursors to the contemporary Saudi and Kuwaiti missionaries, who 
seek to purify the religion by attacking traditions and practices that are without 
foundation in the Qur'an or in the sayings and deeds of the prophet.  Kaum Tua 
are those who retain those practices and defend them as properly Islamic.  By the 
1940's and 50's divisions between the two groups lead to strife and violence in 
many communities.  The main exponents of the New Group, Ali Musa and 
Muhammad India, were exiled to Thailand in an effort to maintain order in the 
Muslim community and prevent the further spread of these 'foreign' doctrines. 
 The Sihanouk period that followed independence was a time of national 
consolidation around an ideology that combined state Buddhism and a 
paternalistic conception of socialism.  As with the French, there was concern 
about the involvement of outside elements in the Muslim community and an 
interest in maintaining its relatively quiescent and inoffensive character.  It was 
during this time that the term “Khmer Islam” was coined, along with “Khmer Leu” 
for Highlanders, and “Khmer Krom” for the Khmer speaking inhabitants of the 
Mekong delta (Trankell and Ovesen 2004a).  With these new labels, groups 
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previously outside the imagined collective are given a place within the new 
Cambodian state as a people who are effectively Khmer, even if not quite as 
Khmer as the majority.  The importance of classification will be discussed 
further in 1.3.   
 In 1970, the Sihanouk government fell in a coup d'état directed by Prime 
Minister Lon Nol.  Sihanouk's policy of neutrality during the Second Indochina 
War left the Vietnamese in control of much of eastern Cambodia and Lon Nol's 
coup was meant to rectify that situation.  While his campaign against the 
Vietnamese army met with complete failure, Lon Nol focused on the enemy he 
could defeat, namely, the ethnic Vietnamese civilian population of the country, 
particularly in the Phnom Penh area (Chandler 1996).  What followed was a 
massacre of civilians and the expulsion of many thousands of Vietnamese.  
Muslims were relatively favored as Lon Nol was well disposed to them.   The 
most prominent Muslim during the Lon Nol period was General Les Kosem. 
 Les Kosem was a childhood friend of Lon Non, Lon Nol's brother, and 
both had studied together at Lycée Sisowath, an institution which had become the 
intellectual incubator of Khmer nationalism and anti-Vietnamese fervor.  Lon 
Nol himself was interested in developing a grand narrative of history that opposed 
Mon-Khmer peoples to the invading Vietnamese, and the incorporation of 
minority peoples under the suzerainty of the Khmers was a principal element of 
this vision (Kiernan 1996).  Les Kosem was given command of his own Cham 
battalion.  Considering the independence and irredentist movements that were 
growing at the time among the non-state peoples, with whom Les Kosem had 
43 
close contact, the creation of an all-Cham battalion was seen as a sign of 
confidence on the part of Lon Nol by many Cham with memories of the time. 
 An older Cham living on the Chrouy Changvar peninsula recalls Les 
Kosem's achievements with enormous pride: 
Back then when we were fighting Pol Pot, there was a Muslim 
army.  The commander was Les Kosem – he was a Muslim.  
And they fought all around there... (wagging his index finger 
from north to roughly northeast).  During that time we had no 
problems here.  Sometimes we didn't get along with the Khmers 
before Lon Nol...  One time a Muslim had capsized his boat 
right here and the Khmers only looked and they laughed, but they 
didn't help.  Only when a monk came out of the temple – he 
chastized them and told them to help and they helped.  But with 
Lon Nol it was OK because Lon Nol respected Islam and the 
Muslim soldiers helped fight the Khmer Rouge and defend the 
government...  Later they changed and they didn't have a 
Muslim army any more... I'm not sure why not, but still with Lon 
Nol and Les Kosem, we were safe and we had respect from the 
government. 
 
 These types of memories are not uncommon among people who 
remembered the revolution, and typically, they all take the same care to avoid 
points of contention.  While Lon Nol is praised, Sihanouk, his predecessor under 
which the Cham were less well treated, remains unnamed.  While he admits that 
there were grievances with Khmers, he points out that the monks, the 
representatives of the nation's official religion, were sympathetic.  And even as 
he beams with pride with the mention of these Muslim soldiers and their 
commander, he always couches their exploits in the context of the wider war in 
which the Muslims were loyal defenders of the state.  As for the dissolution of 
the Muslim battalion, he may or may not have known that Les Kosem's troops had 
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gained such a reputation for brutality that they eventually became a liability, 
leading to the reassignment of Cham soldiers to other units (Vickery 1984). 
 
1.1.4 Pol Pot Régime and Post Civil War Period 
 A casual glance at a bookshelf in the Cambodia section of any library or 
bookstore will reveal the Pol Pot period as a major concern of writers and 
historians.  Aside from Angkor, no other period of Cambodian history receives 
even the most basic treatment outside of the specialty press.  This dissertation 
will not dwell on the particulars of the régime's treatment of its population, which 
has been well covered in other works, except to illuminate what the effects were 
on the Muslim population and how the consequences are understood today. 
 During the civil war, the Khmer Rouge maintained a policy of integrating 
Muslims as a part of the movement.  Soldiers and cadres were sent into Cham 
villages to be helpful to the population.  They were respectful and well thought 
of (Osman 2006).  Yet, upon achieving victory, the Khmer Rouge government 
ordered the immediate depopulation of Phnom Penh and the resettlement of urban 
people into the countryside.  Those in the countryside were classified as the 
“base people” and those resettled from the cities were the “new people”.  The 
base people, being purer and less corrupted than the city dwellers, were privileged 
over the new people – with better living and working conditions.  Muslims, 
although a majority were in the countryside already, were classed “deportable 
base people”.  They too would be moved internally and denied the prerogatives 
of the base people.   
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 During this time, religious observance was prohibited, as was the use of 
the Cham language.  Religious texts were destroyed and mosques and temples 
were turned into pig pens, granaries or warehouses (Kiernan 1996).  Many 
stories are told of people being forced to eat pork or work with pigs, of Islamic 
books and religious items being collected and destroyed, and of Cham being 
persecuted as disloyal.  Like all Cambodians, Muslims find the Khmer Rouge 
period to be particularly painful and difficult to talk about.  Apart from the 
distress of reliving memories there is the added problem of how to pose the 
suffering of the Muslims in this period in relation to the hardship endured by 
Khmers.   
 Older Cham who lived through the events of the civil war are, especially 
when first addressing this topic with an outsider, quite adamant about the fact that 
they and the Khmer suffered “exactly the same”.  They point out that the Khmer 
Rouge was officially an atheistic régime, that apart from destroying mosques and 
killing the imams they also destroyed Buddhist temples and slew monks.  This 
emphasis on the “exact sameness” of the suffering usually weakens over time as 
the person becomes more open about the ways in which the Khmer Rouge singled 
out Muslims for particularly harsh treatment.  Oftentimes, this is then followed 
by a repetition of how they suffered “exactly the same”, suggesting a high degree 
of anxiety that they not be seen trying to cast themselves as victims deserving of 
more sympathy than their Khmer neighbors.   
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1.2 Contemporary Cambodian Islam  
The Cham that have entered Cambodia settled primarily along the Mekong 
and Tonle Sap Rivers in what are today the provinces of Kratie, Kompong Cham, 
Pursat and Kampong Cham, just north of Phnom Penh and Phnom Penh itself, 
where many became particularly active in fishing.  Since then they have moved 
onto other provinces where they find coreligionists among the Chvea a group of 
Muslims who are not ethnically Cham.  Cambodian Muslims may be divided 
into two distinct groups: the Cham and the Chvea.  Khmers virtually always 
refer to all Muslims as Cham although the term Khmer Islam gained currency 
among some members of the older generation as a more politically neutral term 
that explicitly classifies them as a kind of Cambodian rather than foreigners.  
This politically useful nomenclature is echoed in the incorporation of the various 
hill tribe groups as Khmer Leu, or upland Khmers.  The Cham are further 
subdivided into the Cham (with no other modifier) and the Community of Imam 
San or simply the Imam San for short.  
 Of these groups the Imam San are the smallest and considered the most 
culturally conservative.  The Imam San group includes roughly 20,000 people.  
The total Cham population of the country is near 300,000 and there are an 
additional 100,000 Chvea (non-Cham Muslims), so they are numerically at a 
disadvantage and this is a cause of great anxiety in the community.  They trace 
their ancestry directly back to the royal court of Champa that fled from the 
Vietnamese army.  This community was given its current land holdings by royal 
decree from the king of Cambodia and to this day consider themselves loyal to the 
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Cambodian royal family.  The Imam San are considered aberrant by more 
mainstream Muslims, as they do not subscribe to the authority of the Mufti, but 
rather consider themselves to have an unmediated connection to the law of God.  
This brings them into conflict with Muslims who do recognize religious law as 
expounded by clerics and imams.  The Imam San identify strongly with Champa, 
the Cham language and the Cham script, which they preserve for religious 
manuscripts, yet, at the same time, they derive their status as a community from 
the recognition of the king of Cambodia, a Buddhist, that the Imam San are the 
true descendants of the royal family of Panduranga.  How exactly this apparent 
contradiction between an "authentic" Islamic sect propped up by a traditionally 
Buddhist institution has not been addressed adequately in previous research, but 
Collins (1996) suggests that in some way, the Imam San distinguish themselves 
from Cham and Buddhist Khmers alike by emphasizing the directness of the 
unmediated relationship that the Imam San enjoy with the ultimate sources of 
authority - the king on earth and God in the heavens.  While this is true in a 
sense, in Chapter 3, I will also show specifically how the Imam San construct a 
historicized world view that casts them as a people related to the Khmer through 
bonds of culture and common history which are made manifest through a 
relationship to the royal family of Cambodia. 
 The Cham who are not of the Imam San group, who also trace their 
origins to Champa are considered more orthodox by foreign Muslims.  They are 
open to Malayo-Islamic influence and have adopted Malay and Arabic as 
liturgical languages.  Although they also speak Cham, they typically write it 
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using the Jawi (Malay-Arabic) script.  Many Cham emphasize their faith as an 
identifying factor rather than their ethnicity, which they believe might lead to 
conflict with Khmer over their status within Cambodia.  The Chvea on the other 
hand, represent a mixed population of Cham and Malays, that although Muslim, 
are mono-lingual in Khmer.  They are recognized as Muslims by Cham, but 
often looked down upon for being excessively assimilated.  The Chvea typically 
consider themselves descendants of both Cham and Malays who have become 
Khmericized.  The research presented here deals overwhelmingly with the Cham 
rather than the Chvea. 
 All three of these groups have come under significant pressure in past 
years to bring their practice of Islam in line with the demands of foreign patrons 
in the Middle East and Malaysia.  Communities, in order to gain access to 
funding and developmental aid, must prove they are observing Islam in a 
sufficiently orthodox manner.  For this reason, the Imam San are outside the aid 
circuit and are becoming still more marginalized than before.  The Imam San 
have resisted attempts to change traditional practices and, for the moment, the 
older generation of community leaders is unwilling to compromise with what they 
see as a foreign Islam and an imposition.  Unlike the Imam San, Cham and 
Chvea generally feel that practices originating in Malaysia or Indonesia have been 
endorsed as properly Islamic and that the Islam of the Middle East is in some 
sense an ideal goal.  Whether the younger generation in the Imam San 
community will continue this estrangement from the rest of the Muslim world 
remains to be seen, but it seems that the expanded opportunities for education, 
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vocational training and travel offered by Islamic charities is becoming 
increasingly attractive to young Muslims who are marginalized in what is already 
a difficult economic situation.  
 
1.3 Notes on Nomenclature 
 The previous section suggests some flexibility in the ways in which these 
groups are designated, by themselves, other Muslims, Khmers and Western 
academics.  To begin, it should be noted that apart from a very small number of 
Khmers who have close contacts with the Muslim community or who are 
involved with the Ministry for Cults and Religions, virtually no Khmer 
distinguishes between Chams and Muslims.  For this reason many Chvea will 
also refer to themselves as Cham when speaking in Khmer to an outsider since 
this is understood to mean 'Muslim' as a general term.  When speaking Cham 
this distinction is always maintained, however, since the Chvea do not speak 
Cham at all but only Khmer and therefore the synonymy of the terms 'Cham' and 
'Muslim' is only tenable when speaking Khmer.   
 Amongst Muslims, the distinctions are somewhat finer.  All Cham 
recognize themselves as ethnically distinct from the Chvea.  The primary marker 
for this is language.  Even in areas where Cham and Chvea live near each other, 
they typically live in different villages and have rather separate social lives.  
While each regards the other as a brother in faith, the issue of language and 
solidarity can be touchy, particularly for Chvea who resent being left out of 
conversations because of their inability to speak Cham.  Some Chvea along with 
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Khmer converts to Islam have become quite vocal in recent years about the need 
to bring Muslims into line with the rest of the country in speaking the national 
language – a discourse which is resisted by those Cham who see their language as 
a mark of separation from the rest of the non-Muslim society.  This issue of 
language ideologies will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.6.2 and 4.7. 
 Within the Cham, we have already encountered the Imam San.  This is 
the name that the Imam San themselves use to designate their group.  Other 
Cham will refer to them alternately as Cham Jahed, Cham Boran or Cham Daem.  
The word Jahed is considered pejorative by the Imam San.  According to one 
informant, “That is the word they use to insult us.  Jahed means wrong – it 
means we are doing things the wrong way.”  For unknown reasons, this term, 
'Jahed' is the term most commonly applied to the Imam San by Western 
academics and researchers, including Collins.  As far as I can tell there is 
nothing to suggest that the use of this term by scholars was ever meant as a way to 
demean the community, rather I suspect that they learned this term from other 
Cham and were not made aware of its negative connotations. 
 When friendship and collegiality need to be engendered in a conversation 
or social gathering, the Imam San will be referred to as Cham Boran (Ancient 
Cham) or Cham Daem (Original Cham).  Both terms bring to mind the greater 
age of their traditions and their more powerful connections to the memories of the 
old Cham country.  When talking of the Cham Daem, more than a few Cham 
will admit to being charmed by their supposedly old-school attitude towards 
religion, made visible in the odd construction of their domeless, minaretless 
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temples, their white robes, and their linguistic archaisms.  However, they do also 
recognize that this was very much a mistaken path – a holdover from a time when 
the Cham did not understand Islam correctly – and so take pains to explain how 
much farther along they are on the path to being a truly Islamic community than 
the Imam San. 
 Finally there are the vast majority of Cham who are not Imam San.  The 
term they use for themselves often depends on their religious orientation.  For 
those of the Salafi and Tabligh sects the terms ‘Salafi’ (or 'Kuwait') and 'Tabligh' 
are used respectively.  Although, very frequently they may simply insist that 
they are Muslims and that no further qualification is necessary.  Cham who do 
not subscribe to one of these internationalist currents do not seem to have a 
specific name or self-designation.  In the scholarly literature they are sometimes 
referred to as Sunni-Shafi'i.  This merely indicates that they are not Shi'a and that 
they subscribe to the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence, and so are rather like 
the majority of Muslims in the Malay world.   
 Sunni-Shafi'i is not a term they normally ever use for themselves however.  
Absolutely every attempt I've made to ask a non-Imam San Cham to give me the 
name for his community has been met with some kind of laughter.  They find it a 
surprising and odd question and always take a few moments before answering that 
they really do not have a name, but if they did have to have one they would 
choose either Cham Thoamadaa or Islam Kampuchea.  These terms have traction 
in different communities.   
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 The term Cham Thoamadaa literally means Normal Cham – regular, not 
special or particular, certainly not deviant.  The word Thoamadaa contrasts with 
the word khos – a word whose semantic range encompasses the meanings of 
'different' and 'wrong', a distinction that will be addressed in Chapter 2.  'Cham 
Thoamadaa' may be used by Muslims who subscribe at least in principle to the 
superiority of the Islam taught in foreign countries and who view the adoption of 
this form of the religion with favor.  Thoamadaa then also implies that they are 
normal with respect to the practice of the religion.  With the most Thoamadaa or 
normative practices being found in the Middle East, Cham are more normal, more 
thoamadaa and less khos as they approach this ideal. 
 Islam Kampuchea, on the other hand, is typically encountered by those 
Muslims who are not Imam San, but who are also uninspired by the promise of 
foreign Muslims to bring any kind of positive change.  Frequently this term, 
meaning simply “Cambodian Islam”, is used in the Phnom Penh area, especially 
Chroy Changvar, by young Muslims who aspire to some type of professional or 
NGO career in the city.  Many are suspicious of the foreignness of these 
missionaries and the inapplicability of their ideas to the Cambodian context.  
This term is different from 'Khmer Islam' discussed earlier, in that it does not 
negate the ethnic difference between Chams and Khmers, but instead emphasizes 
the indigenous quality of the Islam they practice. 
 Among the Imam San, other Cham can be called Cham Changvang.  This 
is a rather neutral term that implies little value judgment or adversarial attitude.  
It is simply a reference to their leadership structure, which is distinct from the 
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Imam San.  More often the Imam San refer to them as Khaang Arab (the Arab 
group) or more simply “the Arabs”.  This notion of non-Imam San Cham as 
Arabs will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2.  The other term encountered 
among younger people of a secular inclination is 'Muslim' as opposed to 'Cham'.  
This will be further treated in Chapter 3. 
 For the purposes of this study, 'Cham' will refer to those Cham who are 
not Imam San.  'Imam San' will be used for the members of the Community of 
Imam San.  'Chvea' will be used for those Muslims who are not Cham and who 
consider themselves descended from Malay immigrants.  And the term 'convert' 
will be used to refer to those Khmers who have converted from Buddhism 
relatively recently.  The ‘Cham’ will then be subdivided by sect into Salafi, 
Tabligh and the less heavily influenced Sunni-Shafi’i – a convenient, if bulky, 
exonym. 
 
1.4 Cham in the Ethnic Ecology of Cambodia 
 The public discourse about ethnicity in Cambodia is a complex affair.  
To a great extent minorities in the country are treated quite deliberately in an 
effort to portray a certain image of the country as a whole and of the position of 
the Khmer people in the nation as well as in the wider region.  The position of 
the Cham within the national narrative is difficult to understand and impossible to 
appreciate without placing the Cham within a framework that includes the 
Vietnamese, Thai, Chinese and upland peoples that also reside in the country and 
who each impart one piece of the mosaic that is the ethnic ecology of Cambodia.  
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This is a collage of peoples and not merely a list of the people in the country 
overlain with some idealized notion of national citizenship.  It is highly 
hierarchical, with each group occupying a different position and function within 
the greater national narrative as understood by Khmer Buddhists and promoted by 
the national government.  What follows is a brief discussion of each of these 
groups and the way in which they contribute to the national space that the Cham 
occupy. 
 As a prelude to this, one should remark on what is perhaps the principle 
distinction made when discussing the place of non-Khmer peoples, and that is the 
division between peoples who are internal to the Cambodian state and can 
therefore be called 'minorities', and those peoples who are from outside the 
borders of Cambodia.  The Cambodian social science textbook for the 11th grade 
presents the minorities of Cambodia as being of these two types:  the indigenous 
minorities and the foreign residents who properly speaking are not minorities, 
since they come from somewhere else and ostensibly form a majority in that 
country.  This textbook included the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cham in one 
group – that of foreign residents – and placed the upland hill tribes in the group of 
indigenous 'minorities'.  This tension between the foreignness and rootedness of 
the Cham in Cambodian society leads to certain contradictions that become 
apparent only as the treatment of other groups by Khmers is understood.    
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1.4.1 The Upland Minorities  
 Upland groups represent an unambiguously 'internal minority'.  This is to 
say that they are within the borders of the Cambodian state which is dominated by 
Khmer people.  This is not to say that they are internal to Cambodian society.  
At first glance this appears somewhat contradictory - they are within the state but 
apart from society.  The post-colonial period saw efforts to domesticate the 
uplander and reclassify him as a Khmer (Trankell and Ovesen 2004b), but this did 
not substantively transform a pre-colonial mindset that saw the upland tribes as 
lacking in the marks of civilization, most notably rice agriculture and Buddhism 
(Davis 2009).  This is not in any way unique to the history of Cambodia, in fact, 
it is a common trope in the discourse of “civilizing the margin” (Duncan 2004).  
However, the spatial metaphor implied by the word 'margin' obscures the degree 
to which these 'marginal people' are very much within the body politic even if 
separate and inferior.  The Cambodian state after all only seeks to civilize 
Cambodian uplanders and not Karen in Burma or Hmong in Laos.   
 In a conversation with a prominent American lawyer with close ties to the 
Cambodian government, he remarked that at all of the ruling Cambodian People's 
Party (CPP) events, Muslim members of the party were seated separately from 
other members.  Not in the back or off somewhere near the kitchen, but usually 
in a quite prominent place near the center.  He then explained that many 
government officials had told him that what they are truly afraid of is that the 
Muslims would make themselves separate from the Khmer and that they might 
not be counted on to remain as part of Khmer society.  I suggested to him that 
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what those officials feared was not so much that they be separate, since they 
already were, but that they should be outside – that is to say separate outside the 
system and possibly within a wider Muslim world rather than separate and 
internal, tame - captive even.  Upon reflection he agreed this made more sense. 
 This feeling of ownership of one's tribals is also not unique to Southeast 
Asia, where this phenomenon is frequently discussed.  A close analogue can be 
found in the early United States, where after independence from the crown, the 
indigenous inhabitants of the colonies, such as the Cherokee, were classified as 
domestic dependent nations (Wilkins 1997).  What this effectively meant was 
that the native people did have their own societies and administrative structures 
which in turn interacted with the organs of administration of the new American 
state.  They were therefore, outside of the American society, and yet they were 
not permitted to contract trade or other agreements with the French, Spanish or 
English as an independent polity might be expected to do.   
 This status of domestic dependency is not dissimilar to what is found in 
Cambodia in attitudes toward upland peoples.  Geographer Ian Baird, who 
conducts research among the Brao people, a population that straddles the border 
between Cambodia and Laos, explains that in both countries, literacy programs 
are in development in order to render the local language in text.  However, in 
both countries there is an insistence that the national script be used rather than a 
new script or one based on Latin characters.  The result is that, since the Laotian 
Brao and the Cambodian Brao are marginal within different states, they will be 
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unable to implement a writing system that might have currency on the other side 
of the border. 
 There is, we shall find, a great deal of ambiguity with respect to whether 
the Cham represent such an internal minority or whether they are best understood 
as a foreign element in Khmer society.  These contradictory feelings are at the 
heart of Cambodian discourse about the Cham, where the need for the orderly 
state comes into conflict with fears of an enemy within as we shall see when 
discussing the Vietnamese.   For another fruitful comparison we may return to 
the early United States, where the domestic dependent relationship proved 
unsustainable as whites coveted Indian lands, resulting in the forced migration of 
the Cherokee and other groups out of the states of the United states and into the as 
of yet undeveloped Oklahoma territory.  After this point it became untenable that 
Native Americans and whites could live in the same society and 'Indian Country' 
becomes synonymous with the wilderness and lack of civilization of the west of 
the continent.  If we in turn examine the other 'Other' of the early republic, the 
African slaves, they were most certainly domestic and internal and no expense 
was spared to ensure that they remained that way.  While Indians were shoved 
outside the borders of the colonies, runaway slaves were seen as a direct threat to 
white society and way of life.  Slave recovery expeditions were organized, 
invasions of Florida mounted, and preparations for revolution were made upon 
hearing that Haiti, the sugar colony and milch cow of the French Empire had 
suddenly declared itself the world's first Black republic after a successful slave 
insurrection (Davis 2006). 
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 Whether the Cham are Indians, a distinct people who are by their essence 
unassimilable to the state and therefore exterior, or whether they are Blacks, 
which as property must be kept within the family, is the question that will drive 
both Cambodian policy towards Muslims and Cham behavior with regards to 
Khmers. 
 
1.4.2 The Vietnamese 
 That the Khmers have an irrational hatred of the Vietnamese is commonly 
taken as fact by many a Cambodia watcher (Berman 1996).  Human Rights 
Watch concluded that it was “almost pathological” and attributed it to the history 
of rivalry and conflict between the two nations (HRW 1993).  The Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia that finally brought down the murderous Khmer Rouge 
government is rarely talked about with any sense of gratitude for having been 
liberated.  Indeed, most Khmer see that invasion as just one of a series of 
violations of sovereignty and affronts to national dignity that have been visited on 
the Cambodian people in the modern era.   
 The feeling that Việt Nam was in reality seeking to colonize Cambodia 
remains a common understanding of those events.  This fear continues to 
manifest itself in a belief that many Vietnamese soldiers did not actually return to 
Việt Nam at the end of the occupation but instead donned civilian clothing and 
remained – as farmers, fishermen, city dwellers and government officials – the 
Vietnamese are still feared as the enemy within, remorselessly working to 
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undermine the Cambodian state until their masters in Hà Nội see fit to unleash 
their armies on Cambodia once again.  
 In web publications and political cartoons, Cambodian opposition groups 
frequently use the letter 'x', which is not used in transcription of Khmer but 
common in Vietnamese, to replace the 's' in names like Hun Xen (the prime 
minister), Heng Xamrin (chairman of the National Assembly), Xihanouk (the 
former king) or Xihamoni (the current king).  This is meant to indicate that these 
political figures are actually Vietnamese agents working for a foreign agenda and 
so disloyal to the Khmer nation.  The notion that Vietnamese agents are 
everywhere pervades political discourse and naturally creates an environment 
hostile to those people easily identified as Vietnamese - people who represent 
fairly easy targets.   
 Unfortunately, many of those easily identified people are prostitutes and 
pushers.  The Vietnamese are typically associated with sex work, drugs, 
gambling and other vices.  It is on the one hand part of their vile nature and on 
the other, a calculated plot to bring down Khmer society from within by attacking 
it at its sources of familial and financial strength.  This designation as being 
noxious to the health of the body politic is a large part of the public rationalization 
of depriving the ethnic Vietnamese of citizenship rights regardless of how long 
they have been in the country (Berman 1996; Ehrentraut 2009).  The Vietnamese 
therefore play an integral part in the discourse of morality and virtue in present 
day Cambodia since apart from being a foreign aggressor, they are also an internal 
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threat which can at times assume the form of those who are supposedly charged 
with the protection of the Khmer nation. 
 To be fair, these fears are rooted in a historic reality – that of the 
expansion of the Vietnamese state beginning in the 10th century.  The political 
and demographic expansion of the Vietnamese eventually ended the 
independence of the Cham people and instigated their flight into Cambodia.  It 
also resulted in the annexation of Khmer territories in the Mekong delta, where a 
sizable Khmer minority continues to live.  These Khmer, known as Kampuchea 
Krom as well as the Cham, are important touchstones for Cambodian public 
opinion as they demonstrate the fate that awaits them should their lands fall into 
the hands of the Vietnamese.   
 Phnom Penh bookshops are always well stocked with books on the issue 
of Kampuchea Krom, ranging from legalistic texts regarding national boundaries 
to more polemical texts that vividly depict the cruelty of the Vietnamese.  
Through these stories, Cambodians are all familiar with the suffering of their 
brethren.  They retell stories of Vietnamese soldiers enslaving Khmers to 
produce canals and earthworks in the Mekong delta and how the Khmers were 
buried up to their necks in the earth to provide a surface on which the Vietnamese 
could place their steaming tea kettles.   
 That the Khmers should become cogs in the engine of a Vietnamese 
juggernaut is a common theme and belies a feeling of inferiority that Khmers feel 
when compared to their neighbors.  It was not until the Vietnamese arrived that 
these infrastructure projects were undertaken and the fear of the Vietnamese is 
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also one of enslavement to a form of modernity embodied in new relations of 
production and distribution that Cambodians little understand.  This aspect of 
this anti-Vietnamese anxiety need also be seen in the context of the French 
colonial period.  The establishment of the French Protectorate over Cambodia in 
1863 effectively checked the expansion of the Vietnamese state, but it led to an 
influx of Vietnamese administrators and laborers whom the French preferred to 
the Khmer, who were regarded as a less industrious race by the French (Chandler 
1996).  
 This lead to a period when Phnom Penh was dominated by the Vietnamese 
and Chinese under a colonial administration – leading to the impression the 
Phnom Penh is somehow not really a Khmer city, or that real Khmerness can be 
found in the countryside but in the city it can only become manifest in some 
hybridized amalgam with foreign elements. The city as a place of strangeness and 
potential danger is still a part of both Khmer and Cham culture today, and this has 
effects for how Muslims perceive the city and its attendant perils. 
 
1.4.3 The Chinese 
 The Chinese minority of Cambodia is regarded as being a predominantly 
urban population.  Since the bulk of the research took place in the Phnom Penh 
area the presence of Sino-Khmers was always strongly felt.  As in other parts of 
the region, many Chinese migrated to Cambodia and became active members of 
the merchant classes.  Today, Phnom Penh is considered by many to be a 
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Chinese city, where the Chinese not only dominate commercial life, but their 
holidays and cultural practices are also observed.   
 Much in the same way that many Americans remark on the Jewish 
character of New York, Phnom Penh is a bastion of Sino-Khmer culture.  In 
recent years, Mandarin has become an increasingly popular school subject as it is 
seen as key to advancement in an economy that is increasingly dependent on 
Chinese investment as evidenced by the new crop of businesses that have 
emerged to serve the Chinese expatriate population, including a Chinese 
micro-brew pub – Cambodia's first. 
 Sino-Khmers are not in any sense a uniform block.  Families have origins 
in different parts of China speaking different Chinese languages and to a great 
extent, they have intermarried and assimilated into Khmer society while still 
retaining a sense of ethnic distinctness (Chan 2005; Edwards 1996).  In Phnom 
Penh, virtually all businesses are run by Sino-Khmers, the most visible of these 
are restaurants and hotels, making the Sino-Khmers the brokers between Khmers 
and the millions of tourists who visit each year.   
 The entrenchment of Sino-Khmers in Phnom Penh, along with a long 
history of employing Vietnamese administrators during the French Protectorate, 
gives the strong impression the Phnom Penh is somehow foreign and not really a 
very Khmer place.  Lecturer in Khmer language and literature, Frank Smith, 
observes that Sophat, considered to be the first Khmer language novel, is 
remarkable in that, although it was written and published during the French 
Protectorate and it is set almost exclusively in Phnom Penh, it has no Vietnamese 
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or Chinese characters.  Set against the backdrop in which Khmer literature 
evolved, where, even in Cambodia, the Vietnamese were publishing books and 
newspapers before the Khmers, it seems that the novel Sophat was more than a 
work of fiction – it was also a way of re-imagining a Khmer urban space 
(Klairung 1998).  This increasing Sinicization of the city is problematic for 
Muslims in the urban area, due primarily to the Chinese penchant for “putting 
pork in everything”.  This matter and other issues related to the particular 
problems of urban Muslims will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
 
1.4.4 The Thai 
 During the period of research, relations between Thailand and Cambodia 
grew ever less friendly as the dispute over ownership of the 11th century temple of 
Preah Vihear flared up into intermittent border skirmishes resulting in casualties 
on both sides.  The temple, built in the Dangrek mountain range that forms the 
northern frontier between the two countries, was found by the International Court 
of Justice to lie within the borders of Cambodia (ICJ 1962).  The more recent 
conflict beginning in 2008 stems from the declaration of the Cambodian 
government that the temple would be proposed as a UNESCO World Heritage 
Site.  This in turn enraged those in Thailand who thought it should at least be a 
joint proposal, claiming that the demarcation of the border was not yet complete 
and that some related archaeological sites were found on the Thai side of the 
frontier. 
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 The result was a long dispute involving the mobilization of both armies 
and the transformation of the temple into a political football in the internal politics 
of both countries.  Owing to the complexity of the events that surround what 
passed for diplomacy between the two nations, I will spare the reader the details 
of the case.  What is important here is that the overwhelming feeling in 
Cambodia was that the Thais were 'once again' attempting to steal the history of 
the Khmer people.  This notion of the Siamese as thieves is very important to 
how contemporary Khmer nationalists understand their relationship with their 
larger neighbor (Hinton 2006). 
 On the surface, this would appear to be the same brand of rabid 
xenophobia with which many Westerners have diagnosed the Khmers in their 
relations with the Vietnamese.  In reality it is something altogether distinct.  
The Vietnamese threaten to invade, enslave and steal those things of value that 
they might find.  The rich soils of the Mekong Delta, the best fishing grounds 
along the rivers, the most profitable prostitution rings – these are the things that 
interest the Vietnamese.  The Thai on the other hand are after something else.   
 In 2003, riots broke out when the Reasmei Angkor newspaper published a 
report that Thai actress Suvanant Kongying had said that Angkor Wat, the 
emblem that has graced every version of the Cambodian flag since independence, 
was in fact Thai and that the Khmers had stolen it.  It was later determined that 
there was no evidence for her having said anything like this, but the damage was 
already done.  Young men took to the streets attacking Thai businesses and 
setting fire to the Thai embassy, but unlike 2008, there was no military conflict.  
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The Thai air force sent some planes to evacuate their citizens and tough talk was 
engaged in by all sides, but the fear caused by the article was not of an invasion 
but rather of an annihilation – a disappearance from history and from the world.  
Thailand, like Cambodia, but unlike Việt Nam (but like Champa) are the 
inheritors of a civilization brought to Southeast Asia from India.   
 The Theravada Buddhism, monumental architecture and languages of the 
Khmer and the Thai, contrast with the Mahayana Buddhism, East Asian 
architectonics and Chinese inspired literary history of the Vietnamese.  In an 
earlier time, it was the Khmer who held sway over most of the mainland of 
Southeast Asia – a position that was chipped away at, piece by piece until finally 
Cambodia found itself a buffer state between the two giants that had grown on 
either side of it.  The sacking of Angkor by the Siamese in the 15th century lead 
to the capture of the Khmer leadership class as well as their artists and 
intelligentsia.  With this, The Thais refashioned their own state on the model of 
Angkor and in a sense stole it – moving it to a new country. 
 Talking to a group of Khmer archaeology students at a bookshop by the 
Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh, one of them explained: 
Sometimes I take tourists around.  I used to do it more before 
but even now I do it.  The tourists, they like to see culture shows.  
You know, dancing in the apsara style.  They want to go to the 
royal palace... but many of them are not so impressed.  If they 
come from the US or France they say “it's wonderful”, “this is 
something special”.  But if the tourist was in Thailand before 
then they say “oh, yes, like in Thailand...”  You see the royal 
palace here and it is beautiful.  But if you go to Thailand first 
and then see our royal palace, then you don't really care because 
you already saw the bigger one.  The royal palace in Bangkok 
must be very large... have you been there? 
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 The Vietnamese may lie, cheat and steal their way into every Khmer 
wallet, but there is no way that they are ever going to be able to claim to have 
built Angkor Wat – it's simply preposterous.  The Vietnamese are after all, if the 
cab drivers of Phnom Penh are to be believed, already in control of Cambodia's 
national treasure.  It is the Sokimex Group, Cambodia's largest business 
conglomerate that has exclusive rights to collect entrance fees from foreign 
visitors.  And Sokimex is lead by a certain Mr. Sok Kong, an ethnic Vietnamese 
with close ties to Prime Minister Hun Sen.   
 Tell a Khmer this and he may become infuriated at how the wily Viets 
have once again found a way to suck the blood out of the Khmer people.  But 
there is no talk of theft per se.  The Vietnamese cannot steal Angkor Wat.  They 
can use a combination of force and trickery to profit off the hard work of the 
Khmer and even their ancestors, but they lack the cultural legitimacy necessary to 
threaten the historic and intellectual underpinnings of the Khmer nation.  The 
Thai are different. 
 Many Khmer know that there are many Thais who consider that Angkor 
and other sites like it were built by a vanished race called the Khom.  As they 
disappeared, the Thais took up the mantle of civilization and the degenerate race 
that issued from the decay of the Angkor Empire became the Khmer – wholly 
distinct from the Khom.  The common history and culture shared by the Khmer 
and the Thai become the source of a sort of civilizational death anxiety in which 
the people, the land and even the state may remain intact, but the foundations that 
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made the combination of those things meaningful can be stolen by an enemy that 
is all too similar for comfort. 
 This shared cultural legacy is important for many Cham as well.  For 
those Cham, notably the Imam San, that identify with their Indic origins.  The 
Thai threat to Cambodia is felt in a way that informs an understanding of history 
in which the Cham people too, built a society based on the principles of Indian 
culture and therefore can live comfortably among the Khmer as brothers.  
Fraternity of this type is something not to be enjoyed with the Vietnamese, who 
are a separate people.  It is interesting to remark that many Cham believe that the 
cities of Champa are still there – inhabited with Cham people.  Although they 
are under the Vietnamese yoke, it seems logical to them that they would live apart 
from each other and continue to maintain a parallel society – like oil and water, 
Indians and Chinese don't mix.  Although there were no ancient Cham 
settlements in what is now Thailand, stories of ill treatment of Chams who go off 
to work in Thailand at the hands of police or exploitative bosses also colors their 
view of their relationship to the people that arrogate to themselves the ownership 
of the Indian inheritance of the region.  This notion of the similarity of Indic 
peoples and what that means for Cham-Khmer relations will be explored more 
fully in chapter 3.   
 
1.4.5 The Cham 
 Khmer attitudes towards the Cham vary greatly, and my investigations 
suggest that they are strongly conditioned by class, education and gender, but on 
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the whole, it is safe to say that these attitudes are not positive.  Cham are 
frequently portrayed as foul smelling because of their association with fishing or 
odd because of their refusal to eat pork.  However, it is in issues of the 
supernatural that Cham truly inspire fear in many Khmers.  Cham are frequently 
associated with the use of magic and Cham magic is thought to be especially 
potent.   
 While Khmers may take advantage of this when they purchase protective 
amulets or love magic for their own use, but they are also afraid that they might 
be cursed or poisoned by a Cham sorcerer.  The best way to protect oneself from 
this is to not have contact with any Cham of any kind, since this way they will not 
be selected as a target.  One female informant claimed that after having spoken 
to a Cham woman once at the market, a twig appeared in her vagina.  She now 
wonders if this will affect her ability to have children in the future. 
 The Muslim religion is also an issue.  Few Khmers have any meaningful 
knowledge of Islam and its tenets.  Frequently one hears that in Buddhism it is 
considered sinful to kill another human being, while in Islam this is positively 
encouraged and is an important way in which a Muslim can make merit.  Some 
Khmer claim that, apart from prayer, mosques are places where Muslims practice 
group sex on Fridays, and that the reason they do not eat pork is because they 
recognize the swine as their ancestor.  Media images of Muslims as terrorists 
especially since September 11 have not helped matters.  Having a different 
religion also reduces the opportunities for meaningful interaction during holidays 
and festivals and segregates them for much of their education. 
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 Some Khmer, often because of some personal experience or relationship 
with a Muslim, feel rather differently, claiming to like Muslims or at least not to 
have any problem with them.  In the public sphere, it has been Prime Minister 
Hun Sen's policy to emphasize the peaceful relations between Muslims and 
Buddhists as a contrast to the situation in the south of Thailand and to decry all 
forms of Islamophobia.  In recent pronouncements he has advocated the 
installation of Muslim prayer rooms in Cambodia's airports and the reformulation 
of school dress codes to accommodate headscarves.  Hun Sen has argued that 
Muslims are citizens like any other and must participate in society and 
government.   
 Hun Sen is himself from Kampong Cham Province, the demographic 
center of the Cham population, and where his older brother, Hun Neng was 
governor until 2009.  Although Hun Sen's declaration that Muslim girls should 
be permitted to wear a head covering in state schools has not come into legal 
force, many Muslims sincerely feel that Hun Sen is sympathetic to them and 
respects the Muslim politicians and advisers that form a part of his entourage.  
However, Hun Sen's Muslim policy is not mere sentimentality.  Cambodia's 
border row with Thailand span off into a number of other bilateral scraps.  One 
was the accusation on the part of some in the Thai government and military that 
Cham from Cambodia had infiltrated Thailand and were engaged in terrorist acts 
on behalf of the Muslim population of Thailand's restive south.  Part of Hun 
Sen's public relations campaign against Thailand is to portray the Thais as 
intolerant and uncompromising such that there should be no wondering why its 
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Muslims feel oppressed and resentful.  Cambodia by contrast is a land at peace, 
in which Muslim citizens are free to practice their religion openly without fear of 
exclusion from public and national life.  If one keeps in mind that Muslim 
Malaysia is an important source of foreign direct investment and that part of Hun 
Sen's strategy for attracting further dollars is to convince Persian Gulf states to 
make investments in Cambodian agriculture and infrastructure, then the prime 
minister's Muslim-friendly agenda is also a vital component to a savvy national 
marketing plan. 
 The prime minister's inclusive policies notwithstanding, the tendency is 
for Cham to be seen as a foreign element in Khmer society.  As was discussed in 
the previous sections and will be further elaborated in the chapters that follow, the 
notion of the 'foreign' only really makes sense in comparison to the ideal of the 
national self, and just as importantly, to other images of foreignness that become 
salient in different contexts.  The Cham can be reviled as dangerous practitioners 
of witchcraft.  They can be embraced by middle-class medical students eager to 
show the foreign researcher how worldly he is by dropping the names of a few 
Muslim friends.  They can be looked down upon paternalistically by Khmers as 
a people without a homeland and without a state to govern.  They can in turn 
themselves look down on their own 'little brothers', eking out a living in the 
wilderness, untouched by the light of Islam and with only imperfect memories of 
a past as a civilized Cham people.  They can represent, through their peaceful 
integration into the body politic, the triumph of the multi-cultural Cambodian 
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state.  Or, by their increasingly deep and frequent interactions with coreligionists 
in the wider Muslim world, they can pose a threat to the security of that very state.
72 
Chapter Two 
Us against them… and them, and them, and them… 
…“يدح اسح ادم اكواي يترفس َكَرَت ْنَم : ٴيلا ادبسرب تيڬ دمحم ياغد يبن ٴياڬ ث
ياح  :وپ دوصقمرب  .اًرَاهِجََرفَك َْدَقف اًد ِّمََعتُم َةَلا َّصلَٴا۲   .نيهك ڠه ڠايمس ياول وپ ڠوك اي
 ٴايبس كم۲ .هيل هيفج ڠه رفاك نن وپ” 
 
The words you just read, you understand them? 
 
Yeah, the Cham anyway, not the Arabic part, but the Cham is just 
a translation of the Arabic so it should all mean, “He whoever 
neglects the prayer, that person is a Kafir.” 
 
That’s correct.  And this word ‘Kafir’, you understand its 
meaning? 
 
Yeah.  A Kafir is a non-believer. 
 
(Sitting down on the stool before my desk and putting his hand on 
mine as if to reassure me of something) Really, a ‘Kafir’ is a 
person who denigrates or disrespects the religion.  If they are 
not Muslims but respect Islam then we shouldn’t say ‘Kafir’. 
 
 
2.1 New Movements, New Conflicts 
 The Cham Muslims of Cambodia are today in a period of religious and 
political ferment in which new forms of religious practice are being introduced 
via foreign missionaries resulting in increasing factionalization of the community 
as different groups adopt or reject foreign interpretations of Islam.  This chapter 
will address the issue of inter-Cham relations and explain them in terms religious 
change tied to other ideologies of morality, purity and development.  This 
chapter will then also set the stage for an understanding of notions and 
constructions of Cham ethnicity as a diasporic identity with various ways of 
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legitimating relations between Cham, Khmer and foreign Muslims, which will be 
detailed in chapters three, four and five. 
 Recently, the Cham community of Cambodia has found itself in 
transition from being a local Muslim minority in an overwhelmingly Buddhist 
country to being connected to the wider, internationalist Islamic community.  
Missionaries from Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have been active in promoting 
orthodox and fundamentalist Islamic practices among the Cham who, during the 
Pol Pot regime, had lost most of their religious leaders.  This wave of 
missionization has also been accompanied by Islamic charities providing 
opportunities for education and business.  These institutions have enabled 
engagement between Muslims across Southeast Asia and the Middle East and 
have offered new ways to envision the relationship between individual, 
community and state.  As a result of this, it has become important to reexamine 
the ways in which Islamic missionization has altered the Cambodian Muslims' 
sense of identity vis-à-vis Khmer Buddhists, the Cambodian state and in particular, 
other Cham.   
 For some time in Cambodian studies the terms 'Cham' and 'Muslim' were 
largely coterminous (Setudeh-Nejad 2002; Trankell and Ovesen 2004a).  In 
Khmer discourse this is still broadly the case and even among many Cham there is 
a tendency to equate the two and refer to Cham food as Islamic food and Cham 
language as Muslim Language.  Yet the expansion of missionization from 
abroad has undermined the legitimacy of Chamness as a marker of membership in 
the Muslim community.  The disdain with which Wahhabi missionaries in 
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particular hold local customs and the power they wield by virtue of their access to 
foreign benefactors means that for many Cham who would seek to improve their 
material circumstances, they must undergo a purge of their unacceptable customs 
- customs which many feel are essential components of Cham identity. 
 Explanations for changing religious practices have largely ignored 
ideologies of Chamness as something that might be distinct from and inform 
Islamicity.  The explanations for the expansion of Wahhabi and other 
conservative forms of Islam is mostly talked about in term of 2 elements – access 
to economic opportunities and an Islamic revival after the Khmer Rouge period 
(Blengsli 2003; Féo 2004).  
 Clearly money is an important factor.  Today, Cambodia has 
approximately 250 mosques.  Only about 20 survived the Khmer Rouge period 
and the majority of the buildings constructed since then were built with foreign 
assistance.  With these mosques often come madrasas and then opportunities to 
study abroad so that today, there are over 400 Cham students studying in 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.  Islamic charities such as Manar al Islam provide 
funds for those Cham that wish to perform the Hajj.  Orphanages provide care 
for abandoned children or children whose families cannot care for them.  In 
addition to providing this public service, these children are brought up according 
to the principles of the donors, and will presumably grow up to be members of 
that community as adults.  Besides all this, Islamic charities provide for more 
mundane matters like food and health care and so the effect of money is 
something that is palpably felt by many Muslims. 
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 The other explanation frequently given is that the Cham are reconstituting 
their religious life after the Khmer Rouge holocaust and that they are doing this 
with the help of foreign missionaries.  With most of the religious leaders of the 
Cham community having perished during the KR period, the indigenous Cham 
Islam is no longer viable in the face of other sects from Malaysia and the Middle 
East that style themselves as purer and more authentic.  While both of these 
explanations contribute to our understanding of the changes occurring in 
Cambodian Islam, they are still incomplete.   
 Firstly, not every group accepts foreign money - or better said, not every 
group is willing to make the appropriate lifestyle changes necessary to ensure 
eligibility for aid.  If money is the operative factor, why are not all Cham 
converting to Salafist Islam to receive their portion of the bounty?  As for 
explanations involving an Islamic reawakening, they tend to downplay or deny 
the value that a Cham identity may have, and that this form of ethnic 
communitarian identification also influences and colors their practice of Islam and 
their perception of foreign missionaries.  In this conception, Chamness is 
something that is simply wiped away as individual Cham make rational choices to 
maximize their access to aid. 
 In order to complete this picture I would propose an examination of how 
Chamness is being understood not as a free standing notion, but in relation to the 
Khmer people as well as the Cambodian state and its institutions.  The Cham are 
normally treated by academics and journalists as an Islamic minority which 
happens to originate in the now defunct Champa, rather than as an Islamic 
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diaspora, with a particular kind shared consciousness or consciousnesses.  For 
many Cham, but not all, Champa is still very much present in the contemporary 
discourse about dislocation and belonging.  If we take the categories of 
Orthodox, traditionalist and Salafi, we see very different types of imagined 
relationship with Khmer Buddhists, the state and the Muslim community abroad.  
It is this spectrum of diasporic ideologies that this dissertation will ultimately 
illuminate.  
 
2.2 Meeting the 'Real Cham' 
 Sitting in the courtyard outside the madrasah of Chrok Romiet, a Muslim 
village located an hour’s drive north of Phnom Penh, Ysa informed me that we 
would be joined by a special guest.  Ali would be coming and I certainly needed 
to meet Ali since he was from California and incidentally also a scholar of Arabic 
literature who had spent many years studying in Saudi Arabia.  Either because he 
thought that Ali would be a real resource for my research, or because Ali might 
absorb some of the questions that I had been showering upon Ysa, or perhaps 
simply because he thought speaking to someone from the US might relieve 
whatever homesickness he imagined I might be experiencing, he was visibly quite 
pleased with himself about being able to make this introduction. 
 Ali’s car pulled up around the mosque and down the sandy path that leads 
to Ysa’s house and the madrasah where he teaches.  Ysa and I both stand to greet 
the unassuming middle-aged man that emerged from the Toyota Camry and after 
the obligatory assalam-aleykums and handshakes, we sat down for an afternoon 
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tea.  Ali is Cham, but not Cambodian.  He was born in Central Việt Nam and 
later moved to An Giang in the Mekong Delta to study religion.  There he 
became acquainted with the Western Cham language spoken in Southern Việt 
Nam and Cambodia and which is not quite mutually intelligible with his native 
Eastern Cham of the Vietnamese Coast.  He also had the opportunity to further 
his education in Saudi Arabia and later settle in the United States where he would 
meet his wife, a native of Chrok Romiet.  He was in Chrok Romiet overseeing 
the construction of his new house and planning to move his family to his wife’s 
natal village – the kind of matrilocality for which the Cham have always been 
known. 
 Ali and I conversed in English as he had not yet learned any Khmer (Four 
years later, he still hasn't).  At a certain point Ali decided to ask me what I was 
doing there in Chrok Romiet.  I answered that I intended to study Cham culture – 
a direct translation of my Khmer answer to that question.  Upon saying this, Ali 
and Ysa looked over at each other and exchanged knowing smiles.  Ysa says: 
"Well, if you really want to learn about Cham culture and Cham 
history then you need to visit the Cham Daem (Original Cham).  
You can't learn it all here.  Here, we're Muslims, like in Malaysia, 
so it's different here.  But over there, you can see the original 
Cham people and their Champa traditions." 
 
At this point, other people present nearby nodded approvingly at the idea and took 
turns chiming in with interesting fun-facts about these traditional Cham: 
"You know, they only pray once a week... we pray 5 times a day 
but for them only on Fridays." 
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"They know the old Cham language and they write it with the 
Champa letters.  It's very difficult so we never learn it, but they 
write like they did in Champa." 
 
"Don't forget to take note of their clothes.  They wear real Cham 
clothes..."  
     
Once at the Cham Daem (Imam San) village, I was introduced to the 
village elders as a foreign researcher who was interested in Cham culture – real 
Cham culture.  Children were quickly trotted out for the performance.  While 
the girl sang, the boy wrote the complete Cham alphabet on a small blackboard 
giving the phonetic value of each character as he wrote.  It clearly was not the 
first time these children had put on an impromptu Cham culture expo.  Alphabet, 
language, song, clothing - all the hallmarks of traditional Cham culture were 
simultaneously put on display.  Ysa grinned and said: "Now you see that this is 
original Cham culture.  It's very different from us."  
 I remarked that the boy was actually writing two different sets of scripts – 
one variant being sharper and more angular.  This is the alphabet typically used 
in Cambodia.  “This is Cambodian Cham” an older man explained.  Then 
pointing to the other set of characters, more gently rounded and somewhat 
reminiscent of Burmese script, he said “and this is what they use among Cham 
who live in Việt Nam.”  I thank him for the explanation and, just to make sure I 
have it straight, I repeat what I thought I heard: “So, these characters here are 
Cambodian Cham and those over there are Vietnamese Cham, right?”  The 
reaction was swift and severe: “No, this is Cambodian Cham and this is Champa 
Cham!  There is no Vietnamese Cham.”  Calm soon returned.  The old man 
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seemed embarrassed, perhaps taken aback by the strength of his own reaction.  
He offered me a smile, some more tea and a piece of cake and thanked me again 
for my interest in his community. 
 Our encounter ended with me being prodded to give a short speech to the 
community on the importance of this visit to my work.  At the conclusion, Ysa 
and our Cham-American companion made a cash donation to the community.  
Ali commented that the modern latrine facilities were his own personal 
contribution to the community, and explained in a tone of human empathy that, 
while genuine, did little to mask his feelings of paternalistic condescension. 
“These people need hygiene.  Before, they were going to the 
bathroom in the forest like animals.  You can’t allow people to 
live that way.  They need to have some dignity.” 
 
 Ali, familiar with the language of ethnic politics in the US, then talked to 
me at length about not forgetting one's roots - that “we must strive for a future in 
which Islam is a progressive force, but we must also cultivate our heritage.”  “If 
these people stop the way they live or change the way they live, then we will lose 
Cham culture forever.”  The Imam San are not found in Việt Nam, but the 
Mekong Delta Cham, who keep ties with Cham in Cambodia and to which Ali 
had been exposed, hold similar beliefs about the authentic Chamness of the 
community in Cambodia (Taylor 2007).  Now in Cambodia, Ali was projecting 
those beliefs 'further upstream' on the Imam San. 
 Without appearing to change the topic of the conversation, Ali explained 
that he was also in the region scouting out Islamic high schools for his sons to 
attend and told me he had found one in Malaysia that he liked, where they could 
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study proper Islam and still maintain their English language skills.  Ali then 
waxed lyrical about Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi and his Islam Hadhari 
program (a Malaysian movement that promotes Islam as the basis of a civilized 
and sophisticated people). 
Islam needs to be civilized.  We need to think about education and 
technology and protecting the environment.  Islam teaches these 
things if we do it right. 
  
 Within Ali and Ysa's discourse, we find some key elements of what it 
means to be Cham and the kind of value that this should have.  For many Cham, 
that do not subscribe to Salafist or Tablighi teachings, Imam San are Muslims 
even if their practices are not quite right, but the cachet of maintaining authentic 
Cham culture, developed at a time when Cham people were sovereign and free is 
undeniable.  Not only should these Cham practices not be eliminated, but they 
should be conserved so that future generations of Cham scientists, engineers and 
doctors will be able to visit Imam San and recapture the heart of the Old Champa 
culture which they, as fully modern Muslims, can no longer practice themselves.   
 
2.3  Fighting Unorthodoxy: Imam San against the World 
 The Imam San have in recent years found themselves on the losing side of 
the conflicts over religion in the Cham community.  This is borne out by what 
everyone considers a dramatic, and possibly inexorable, demographic decline.  
Today they make up less than eight percent of the total Cham community at 
roughly 20,000 people.  If the Imam San and the rest of the Muslim community 
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can agree on anything it is that once upon a time, the majority if not all Cham 
practiced Islam as the Imam San do today. 
 In Chrok Romeat, a village close to the Imam San community, one of the 
village elders relates to me the history of his family thus: 
Before, my family was in Kampong Cham.  When they came from 
Champa they stayed there and then they came down here and they 
settled.  At that time we prayed once a week like the other village 
(Imam San).  We did things in the old way.  But then when we 
encountered other Muslims my family changed to praying five 
times a day.  That is important because that is the correct 
practice.  I can know this in the history of my family because we 
have all the names.  My grandfather was named Ibrahim.  That 
is a Muslim name.  Muslims should have Muslim names.  Before 
we only had Cham names but when my grandfather accepted the 
correct Islam he became Ibrahim and since then we have prayed 
here five times every day, because that is what it says in the 
Qur'an. 
 
 The elder took time to explain to me the significance of this 
transformation and how much it meant to him to know that his practice was 
correct, it would please God and, ultimately, it would lead to him entering 
paradise.  He took so much time in fact that he missed both the dhuhr (noon) and 
'asr (afternoon) prayers. 
 
2.3.1 Cham Naming Practices 
 A critical element in this story is the adoption of an Arabic name.  By 
doing this, Ibrahim made a break with the past and ensured that both he and his 
progeny would tread the path that Muhammad and his companions had 
themselves followed.  The practice of naming in the Muslim community today, 
reveals something about how comfortable Muslims feel about representing 
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themselves as members of a religious minority.  This man's grandfather, Ibrahim, 
was also known more commonly as just 'Him'.  The shortening of Muslim names 
so that they sound more like the typically monosyllabic Khmer names is very 
common, especially among members of the older generation.  Thus, Muhammad 
and Ahmad are rendered as Mat, Usman as Sman and so on. 
 Among the Imam San, the practice is still to have a Khmer or Khmer 
sounding name for official purposes and a Muslim name for use in the village.  
Actually, it would be better said that this is the practice of men in the Imam San 
community as women are sometimes only given Khmer-style names.  The 
Khmeresque names are typically a combination of pronounciation changes due to 
the significant differences in Cham and Arabic phonologies, paired with the 
weakening of syllables to better match the Cham (and Khmer) pattern of 
monosyllabic or sesquisyllabic (iambic) words.  In this way Yusuf becomes 
Yusos or Soh, Ismael becomes Smael or El and Abu Taleb Abu Bakr becomes 
Leb Ke.  Within the village, men will be known by either name.  Outside the 
village, they take on the Khmer name or a Khmer version of their Muslim name.  
It is not uncommon for people to go by three or four different names depending 
on the environment and circumstances – a practice that is also found among 
Khmer, who may have an official name, but then go by another name within the 
family and then have another nickname for school or work. 
 Outside of the Imam San community, such as in Chrok Romiet, the 
younger generation is increasingly willing to use their Muslim names in public 
interactions with Khmers and to use them for the signing of official documents of 
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all types.  This reflects not only a greater willingness but also a greater desire to 
be identified officially as Muslims and to make their religion legible to the state.  
The first time I asked a Muslim whether his national identification card indicated 
that he was a Muslim, he responded that indeed it did, religion is marked on the 
national identification.  When I asked to see it, we both realized, to his surprise 
more than mine, that in fact there was no such indication.  During the course of 
fieldwork, I had this conversation roughly 20 more times. 
 After turning his own ID card over several times and trying to catch the 
sunlight at different angles as if trying to view a hologram looking for an 
indication of his religious affiliation, a Muslim taxi driver explained: 
No, OK, it's not there... but that doesn't matter because you can 
read my name: 'Usman'.  If I have a traffic accident and I die, the 
police will see my card read my name and know that I am a 
Muslim...  also, it has the name of my home village, and everyone 
knows that's a Muslim village. 
 
 In the absence of an explicit marker of religion, name and, in the case of 
Usman, home village will suffice to make clear that he is a Muslim.  Of course, 
for Usman this is not merely a question of whether or not the people around him 
know that he is a Muslim.  Cambodian roads and traffic have a way of bringing 
mortality to mind and the thought that his body might go unidentified and thus, 
not properly treated, is intolerable.  The issue of the treatment of the dead has 
been a touchy issue since at least colonial times when the practice of conducting 
autopsies was introduced (NAC 1924). 
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2.3.2 Orthodoxy and Prayer 
 When talking about the Imam San, the most conspicuous (and 
problematic) characteristic of the group according to other Muslims is their 
practice of praying once a week rather than five times a day.  Prayer, or salah in 
Arabic, is the second of the pillars of Islam – only the shahadah, the declaration 
that there is no god but God and that Muhammad was his prophet, is more 
important as an article of orthopraxy. 
 The five daily prayers are fajr (just before sunrise), dhuhr (just after true 
noon), 'asr (afternoon), maghrib (just after sunset) and 'isha' (evening).  The 
times for prayer depend on the progress of the sun across the sky and so changes 
from day to day.  The times are calculated and published in prayer calendars and 
indicated on prayer clocks in mosques.  If this resource is unavailable, a Muslim 
is permitted to estimate the time on his own, so long as he avoids praying at 
sunrise, sunset or true noon as these might be understood as acts of sun worship, a 
form of paganism. 
 In the vast majority of cases however, the Muslim will have the prayer 
times at hand and if he is in his village he will have ample time to prepare himself 
for prayers at the local mosque.  These preparations, as in all Muslim countries 
involve the making of ablutions – washing the hands, feet and face to achieve a 
state of ritual purity or wudu.  In Cambodia, preparations will also include 
changing one's clothes from pants and shirts to a sarong and a longer shirt that 
hides better the form of the body.  Some minutes before prayer, one can see the 
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procession of village men adjusting their sarongs and headgear which they just 
put on moments ago in an effort to look properly Islamic.  
 The power of prayer as a bonding experience cannot be underestimated.  
Worshipers express that prayer not only brings them closer to God, but, when 
done together in a mosque, it makes them feel closer as a community.  This is 
true of visiting Muslims as well.  A visiting Malaysian benefactor in Kompong 
Chhnang explained to me that when he arrives at a Muslim village he is always 
warmly welcomed.  He cannot speak Cham or Khmer and so depends on 
whomever on hand may know enough Malay or English to make communication 
possible.  However, after prayer, he feels like he begins to know the heart of the 
people in the mosque and that an understanding develops that is outside of 
language, namely the understanding that their common love of God is what binds 
them before any other interests they may share. 
 The fact that such a deeply felt experience occurs five times a day means 
that for any visiting Muslim, be he a donor, missionary or businessman, it will 
never be very long before he has the opportunity to engage in this ritual and enjoy 
the feeling of community with the people that share the mosque with him that day.  
Some Muslims who visit the Imam San communities have the opposite 
experience.  As one missionary recounts: 
We go to the Imam San to teach them the correct way.  We explain 
that these are the teachings and these are the proofs that what we are 
saying is true.  They never listen.  They talk about their history or 
their culture... they say they believe, but how do you believe and then 
also disobey?  We sit there for many hours and we talk and then it is 
time to pray.  And it is sad because we cannot pray with them.  Also 
we do not pray in their temple... we don't want to do that we prefer to 
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pray outside and then we come back and talk some more.  But while 
we pray they are just sitting there.  They continue talking but no one 
thinks to pray.  For me it is sad and prayer should not be sad.  It 
should make you feel good. 
 
 The deviation in prayer practice means that not only can they not establish 
that bond through prayer, but the fact that they themselves must pray at the 
appointed times then takes them further away from the people they are trying to 
reach.  The missionary makes no effort to hide his disappointment at the failure 
of the Imam San to see the truth, or his revulsion at the thought of praying in their 
'temple', using the Khmer word 'vihear' which also indicates a Buddhist temple, 
rather than the word mosque (masjid).  The association of Imam San practices 
with Khmer and Buddhist practices will be further covered in 2.4. 
 When asked about the practice of praying only once a week, the Imam San 
explain that it was their tradition from Champa.  They add that they are perfectly 
aware that five times a day is the practice established by the prophet, but reserve 
for themselves the right to continue as they had in the past since this is also an 
established method of worship.  As one younger Imam San explained: 
We received Islam from Ali.  Ali came to Champa and taught the 
religion, but Ali did not pray five times a day.  He only prayed 
once on Fridays.  When he was doing this in Arabia, many people 
complained to Muhammad, asking why he is not turning up to all 
the prayers.  Ali explained to Muhammad that he only thought he 
needed to pray once a week, on Fridays when the rest of the 
community gathers together.  According to my young informant, 
Muhammad permitted the practice of Ali, because Ali was of such 
excellent character that for him weekly prayer would be sufficient.  
This is the practice that he then brought to Champa. 
 
 To many Muslims, this might well constitute an act of blasphemy.  To 
my knowledge, there is no evidence from the life of the prophet to suggest that 
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this may have happened, and the Imam San themselves are not always in 
agreement as to what weight this story should have.  There is a sort of ambiguity 
in the Imam San position in that unique practices are understood as a culture 
practice rather than a religious practice (more on this in chapter 3). 
 Although the Imam San themselves accept the validity for the argument 
that prayer should be five times a day, they hold fast to the position that for them, 
once a week is acceptable.  In both cases, there is a question of tradition.  For 
Imam San it was the tradition of their ancestors to offer weekly prayers, for those 
Muslims who accept the authority of Saudi or Malay types of Islam it is in the 
tradition (sunnah) of the prophet that the prayers be delivered at the times given 
above. 
 The question becomes, were those Cham who came over after the 
Vietnamese conquest of their homeland truly Muslim or were they practicing 
something else?  For Muslims throughout the world dedicated to the study of 
their religion, history or tarikh is an essential component of their studies, since it 
is through the development of the history of Islamic peoples that God's will is 
revealed.  The history of other peoples has no such meaning (Lewis 2003).  
This is important to keep in mind when examining the conflicts between the 
Imam San and everyone else, because the degree to which the ancestors of the 
Imam San were fully Islamized can be called into question and in so doing, their 
tradition can be disregarded.  We will see in other sections how Islamic history 
is interpreted in the modern period under the assumption that it contains messages 
and signposts for the believer today. 
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2.4 Khos vs Khos – Imam San vs Arabs, Muslims vs Khmers 
 On a share taxi from the Imam San village back to Phnom Penh, my phone 
began to ring: 
Hey big brother!  We forgot to tell you.  You must come to Eid 
al-Fitri (end of Ramadan celebration) 
 
Eid al-Fitri, yeah, I know.  Don't worry.  I'll be there tomorrow. 
 
No, not tomorrow.  The day after.   
 
Oh, OK. The day after. Got it.  See you then! 
 
 Overhearing this conversation, an older Muslim woman in the back of the 
van began to laugh, “Oh, those guys over there... you're talking to the Imam San, 
right?  Yes they are always doing things khos”.  She continued to laugh. 
Do you know the Imam San, Grandma? 
 
Yes of course.  I've lived here for a long time.  I remember when 
we were young we all knew each other.  When we were children 
we knew other people from school and from neighboring villages. 
 
And today you still visit them? 
 
No, I'm busy.  When I was a girl it was OK but adults are busy.  
But I knew them.  I know how they do things khos over there.  If 
you compare it to us, those people do many things that are khos. 
 
 The woman was in her 60's and took great pleasure in telling me exactly 
how khos my friend on the phone and his entire village are.  The word khos is 
tricky since it encompasses the semantic range that in English is covered by the 
words 'different' and 'wrong'.  In the sense of 'different', it is not meant in the 
sense of 'a different one', there is certainly a substantive difference although that 
difference is not necessarily negative.  When it means 'wrong', the word is the 
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opposite of 'correct' as in a true or false examination – in this case it is the 
opposite of trew, meaning true, or what must be.  Many older Cham Thoamadaa, 
while recognizing the ancient origins of the Imam San culture consider the Imam 
San to be khos in the sense of 'different' and are generally happy to take a 
live-and-let-live attitude with respect to what moral or ethical consequences that 
khos practice may have. 
 Among many of the younger generation, there is no longer nearly so much 
leeway in what is meant by khos.  On that very same route, an Imam San friend 
of mine remembers being surrounded by a number of younger Muslims and their 
teacher.  Unaware that he was a Muslim and that he understood Cham, the 
teacher explained: “You see this village here that we are passing?  Those people 
are khos.  In the days of Muhammad he would have killed all of those people.”  
My friend was dressed much like any regular Khmer since he was outside the 
village (see 2.4) and so managed to make it through the rest of the ride without 
arousing suspicion, as the young Muslims from his neighboring village railed 
against the people of his home village. 
 In another case, I traveled to the village of Prey Pis, a Tabligh stronghold 
very near the Imam San community.  It was Eid al-’Aḍḥā, the holiday that 
commemorates the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael (not Isaac 
as in the Jewish tradition).  The day is commemorated with a feast.  In 
Cambodia this means that foreign benefactors arrive, purchase the livestock, and 
arrange for the slaughter of the animals and distribution of the meat among the 
needy.  On hand were a number of Malaysians whose Islamic charity has been 
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returning here year after year to organize the ceremony.  Apparently they used to 
simply send money to the officiating imams but then it turned out that the money 
was not being spent as it should and so now they make the trip every year to 
guard against corruption. 
 As the meat was being divided into three kilogram bags, I asked a young 
man who was a student at the local Quranic recitation school about what would be 
done with the meat.  He explained: 
They will divide the meat to all the poor people here. 
 
Here in Prey Pis? 
 
Not only Prey Pis.  Other Muslim villages.  They are doing the 
ceremony here but it will help all the Muslims in the area. 
 
Is Our Reussei (Imam San village) covered by this ceremony or do 
they get a different one? 
 
No!  (face darkens) They do khos!  We don't help them.  They 
are not Muslims and they are khos!  
 
I don't understand.  Those people are Muslims.  Don't they 
believe in Allah like you? 
 
No, they do not believe and they are doing things khos.  They do 
as the Khmer do.  They worship statues and the women don't 
cover their hair. 
 
(letting the statue issue slide for the moment)... but they do cover 
their hair.  I was there.  I saw it with my own eyes. 
 
No! (angry and a little confused).  They don't cover their hair.  
They use a krama.  But a Muslim woman uses a hijab... in Prey 
Pis you will see hijab.  In Our Reussei you will see krama.  Like 
the Khmers they wear krama. 
 
 This young man was far less politic than his elders and his strident 
commentary on women's head covering revealed feelings about the Imam San that 
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an older person might have phrased very differently – more carefully.  First, we 
should take a look at some of the vocabulary that appeared in this dialogue.  
Khos this time means something different from 'different' – it means wrong and it 
refers to a damnable offense in this case 
 The word hijab in most contexts refers to the head covering that women 
wear to cover their hair and protect their modesty.  It can be used more broadly 
to mean modesty in general, but the exact nature of the fabric is not indicated in 
Islamic legal sources.  The krama on the other hand, is 'the best friend of the 
Khmer farmer'.  It is a length of red and white checkerboard cloth which can be 
used as a tablecloth, a hammock for young children, a towel, an ad hoc sarong 
when nothing else is available, a lunch bucket, a way of connecting the towed 
motorbike to a towing car (not recommended), and even as a way to cover one's 
head while working in the field.   
 Older Muslims remarked that the krama is in principle an acceptable head 
covering.  It fulfills the function of hiding one's hair perfectly well, however, it 
just isn't very Islamic.  Not only is it not very Islamic but it is actually 
quintessentially Khmer.  It is not used by any of Cambodia's neighbors and is 
considered an emblem of the Khmer peasant.  In fact, during a period conducting 
fieldwork in the Mekong delta of Việt Nam, I could distinguish ethnic Khmer and 
Vietnamese by how they reacted to the krama I had tied to my field bag.   
Back in Our Reussei I spoke with a group of young Imam San women.  
All of them covered their hair but none with a krama.  Instead there was an 
eclectic mix of shawls, hijabs and handkerchiefs.  As one girl wearing her 
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favorite American flag bandana explained: “No, we don't wear the krama, but my 
mother does.  I guess when I'm old, I'll wear one too.”  Even among the Imam 
San youth there was an aversion to the use of the krama as a head covering, 
although in this case, it was for a very different reason – not for fear of being too 
Khmer, but rather because they were afraid it would make them look frumpy – 
something to which at least some of the girls had already resigned themselves.  
This association with Khmers and Khmerness is rarely spoken of directly, but is 
central to the critique of the Imam San by other Muslims.  In a conversation with 
an older man whose son worked for the Ministry of Cults and Religions he made 
clear his problem with the Imam San. 
They are Brahmanists, not Muslims.  They don't pray as we do – 
the correct five times a day.  They only pray once a week and 
when they pray they pray to stones.  This is not Islam, it is 
Brahmanism. 
 
I've been in their temple.  They don't have any stones there. 
 
The stones might not be in the temple, but they have them.  
Maybe they don't show you because they are embarrassed and 
they want to say that they are Muslims.  But they are 
Brahmanists... like the Khmer, you understand? 
 
But Khmers are Buddhists. 
 
Yes.  Now they are Buddhists, but before they worshiped in the 
old style and that is called Brahmanism.  Even today, the Khmers 
they worship statues – the Imam San also worship statues.  
Muslims don't make statues.  That is forbidden... It is other 
things too... like when they greet you.  They do it in the Khmer 
way – with the hands together.  They do the sampeah. 
(traditional Khmer greeting where hands are pressed together in 
front of the body accompanied by a bowing motion.) 
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 Over and over again, critiques of the Imam San would include references 
to Brahmanism.  The older man I cite above was much more direct than most 
about relating this to Khmer practices, but in each case the subtext was not only 
that the Imam San are bad Muslims, but that they are in fact a variety of Khmer – 
a people whose notions of the sacred are derived from a pre-Islamic inheritance.  
This coupled with the tendency of the Imam San to adopt Khmer dress and 
manners when they encounter Khmers makes them suspect and effectively places 
them outside of the community of Muslims who should guard against being 
mistaken for unbelievers. 
 The Imam San for their part, are fiercely proud of what they term their 
independence and grow increasingly suspicious of the motives of foreign 
missionaries and those Muslims who choose to abandon Cham culture and 
become Arabs.  This is usually expressed as 'choul Arab' or 'choul Chvea'.  This 
expression is an analogue of 'choul Khmer', or 'to become Khmer' – typically said 
of upland peoples who adopt lowland culture.  It is a phrase that implies not only 
entering a culture, but also leaving another behind.  These Muslims who 
abandon their Cham heritage are seen as having become Arab, and Arabs are not 
native to Cambodia – they are a type of foreigner.  The Imam San freely ascribe 
all of the negative attributes that are associated with Arabs in the wider culture to 
their neighbors. 
 When walking from Imam San villages in the direction of other Muslim 
villages, people on the road would warn me, in jest of course, that I should be 
careful over there, that the Arabs are liable to cut my head off if they become 
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angry.  Old men in the village complain that foreign donors are more interested 
in giving aid to 'Arab communities' because they are terrorists and the Americans 
would like to pacify them.  The Imam San are ignored because they are a 
peaceful people whose good behavior can be taken for granted. 
 
2.5 The Imam San and their World 
 The Imam San community and their way of understanding their belonging 
in Cambodia will be covered in depth in chapter 3.  The important idea for the 
moment is that they regard themselves as being both internal to Cambodia and 
also autonomous.  When I related the first conversation of 2.4, regarding the 
timing of Eid al-Fitri to the Imam San, they replied quite emphatically that they 
had the correct date.  After all, Islamic holidays are determined by the sighting 
of the moon and so this will differ from place to place.  As the Imam San 
understand it, they make their own sighting and then declare the holiday to have 
begun.  This sighting is made from Cambodia.  Other Muslims use a different 
date because they do not sight the moon themselves.  Instead, they wait for a 
phone call from Malaysia to tell them when the moon has been sighted.  The 
Imam San then are not khos, but rather they are independent, unlike the 'Arabs' 
who prefer to take orders from abroad.  The Imam San by contrast, maintain that 
only sightings from Cambodia can be valid – at once an act of defiance and 
citizenship. 
 The experience of working in the Imam San community is utterly different 
from that of conducting fieldwork in other Muslim communities.  For one, there 
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is absolutely no attempt ever to engage visitors in a conversation about religion 
with a view to converting them.  There are cases of Khmers entering the 
community and adopting their religion but this is always done in the context of 
marriage.  Otherwise, conversion is not only a non-issue, but also a 
non-possibility, since being Cham and practicing the religion in the Imam San 
fashion is a function of having been born into the community and being 
recognized as a descendant of the original Cham who fled their homeland all 
those years ago.  Because of this unity of ethnicity and religion, foreign visitors 
are not so much targets for conversion as useful allies in their struggle to preserve 
their culture and traditions – an issue that will be dealt with in further in the next 
chapter. 
 Fundamentally, what appears to make Imam San behave very differently 
from other Muslims is the way in which they conceptualize the national space.  
Imam San culture practices, norms, customs and religious rulings are effective 
within their villages – those places where they were given permission to settle by 
the then highest authority in the land, the king of Cambodia.  Older men will 
gather to debate whether dancing is permissible in Our Reussei, but they 
understand that their rulings do not have effect outside of this district.  This 
makes, for example, the holding of dances at the border of the community legally 
permissible. 
 When traveling outside the village or going to Phnom Penh, Imam San 
women often do not cover their heads and do not wear any clothing that would 
distinguish them.  The religious prescription regarding head covering is also 
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unenforceable outside the village.  Occasionally, the Imam San will jokingly 
refer to their villages as 'Srok Cham' or 'Cham country' as opposed to 'Khmer 
country' (Cambodia).  Initially, I believed this was some sort of rejection of the 
Cambodian state, but to the contrary, it represents and embedding of one 
community within the other. 
 Time spent in the village is done according to Cham custom and law.  
Time spent outside is spent in the Khmer way without any feeling of resentment 
or consternation about whether or not interacting with Khmers in any way 
diminishes their own ethnic identity.   One teacher of English recounted that 
during his time studying in Phnom Penh, he befriended a monk who allowed him 
to lodge with him at the wat.  This is a common practice, for Khmer youth from 
the countryside seeking education in the city, but no Muslim outside of the Imam 
San community would ever consider this.  In fact, every other Muslim with 
whom I discussed this case was positively revolted by the thought of living 
among Buddhist monks.  The teacher was unfazed by the experience and no one 
in the community thought less of him for it.  However, this would be an 
impossibility for any other group of Muslims who subscribe to an understanding 
of their religion that is less tied to race and ethnicity and instead linked to a 
feeling of belonging to the community known as the Ummah.   
 Outside of the Imam San community, Muslims feel themselves bound by 
Islamic law and custom at all times, whether they are in their home village or 
shopping in downtown Phnom Penh.  Correct dress, adherence to dietary 
restrictions and other aspects of conduct that make them different from Khmers 
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remain in force regardless of one’s location.  This indifference to geography is 
an essential component of the newer forms of Islam that have been brought to the 
country, which promote a global and universal view of religion rather than a local 
and particularist understanding.  
 
2.6 New Issues in Cambodian Islam 
 In Cambodia today, there are two important groups of foreign Muslims 
engaged in mission activities.  On the one hand is the Salafist movement.  Most 
of the support for this movement comes from the Persian Gulf, and it promotes 
the practice of Islam in that region, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  The 
other is the Tabligh movement, whose spiritual heartland is found in the Indian 
sub-continent and is also popular in Malaysia. 
 
2.7 The Salafist Movement 
 The Salafists are, along with the Tabligh movement, an increasingly 
influential force within the Islamic community in Cambodia.  In essence, the 
movement is interested in purifying the Islamic faith so that it is practiced in the 
same way as the prophet Muhammad and the members of the three excellent 
generations that succeeded him.  These “salafs” or “ancestors” set the example 
for religious belief, religious practice, scriptural interpretation and personal 
behavior.  Much of the support for these teachings emanates from Saudi Arabia, 
where the Salafi version of Islam as expounded by Muhammad Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab and his successors is the religion of the state.  Kuwaiti and other Gulf 
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sources are also typically of this stripe of Islamic puritanism.  Salafi thought has 
changed the way many Muslims, even those that do not consider themselves 
Salafis, regard their own relationship to the religion.   While the ideal of 
‘living and worshiping as the ancestors did’ is, broadly speaking, the ultimate goal 
of the movement, it is not merely left at that level of abstraction.  Muhammad 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab proposed a methodology for achieving this.  Namely, that 
Muslims should return to the scriptural sources of the religion – the Qur’an and 
the Hadith, the sayings and deeds of the prophet.  This means subverting the 
authority of legal rulings and commentaries that had come to be regarded as 
having weight on par with the Qur’an and the Hadith, to the extent that in many 
cases, people did not bother to return to these primary sources in the event of legal 
disputes but instead relied on the voluminous body of legal writings, which were 
man-made artifacts and therefore inadequate as an ultimate source of law.   
 What Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and other Salafists argued was that individual 
Muslims must be able to engage the Qur’an and hadith and practice ijtihad, the 
personal interpretation of the scriptures.  The former practice of taqlid, the 
imitation of the judgments of past scholars, divorced Muslims from full 
comprehension of what they were doing as well as the underlying principles that 
led to those actions.  For this reason, the expansion of Salafi thinking on matters 
of theology and jurisprudence impacts every aspect of Muslim life.   
 For one, it immediately changes the relationship between individual 
Muslims and religious scholars, since now ordinary people can, with the benefit 
of study, draw their own conclusions regarding the interpretation of scripture and 
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the application of law.  Also, it greatly increases the importance of the language 
of the prophet as the only legitimate vehicle for comprehending the primary 
sources, all of which are recorded in Arabic.  Malay language religious books, 
long the backbone of Islamic instruction in Cambodia, are demoted to a secondary 
status, no longer held in quite the same regard.  With this in mind, it is useful to 
discuss the life and teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the way in which Salafi 
thought is being understood in Cambodia today. 
   
2.7.1 Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab 
 The term “Wahhabi” derived from the name of Muhammad Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab has come to be used as an epithet by Muslims critical of Salafists and 
the Salafi movement.  Salafists themselves reject the term as it appears to imply 
that they either worship Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or that what Ibn Abd al-Wahhab left 
as a legacy was a madhhab, a new school of Islamic jurisprudence.  For Salafists, 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not found a new school of Islamic thought at all.  Instead 
he returned to the roots of the faith and the law, stripping away generations of 
accretions to the perfect religion revealed by the prophet Muhammad.  For this 
reason they prefer to refer to themselves as “Salafists” or “Salafis” – those that 
follow the teachings of the ancestors.  In Cambodia the words “Kuwaiti” or 
“Saudi” are typically used for these same groups, as these are the primary sources 
of funding for mission work and the preferred destination for study for students of 
Salafi leanings. 
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 These terminological differences notwithstanding, the influence of Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab on the foundation and development of this movement was 
without question greater and more elemental than any other religious thinker.  
That he was influential is uncontested.  What exactly the nature of that influence 
was is a more complex matter.  In recent years, the central participation of 
Saudis in the financing, planning and execution of the September 11 attacks in 
New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, has brought the spotlight onto the 
relationship between political terror and Islam, and especially the Saudi brand of 
Salafi Islam.  As a result much has been made of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of the notion of jihad and the degree to which his development of 
Islamic theology and jurisprudence was a necessary, even sufficient condition, for 
the rise of violent Islamist politics (Allen 2006).  Other, more sympathetic 
scholars, paint Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a reformer of the faith, interested not in 
strict literalism or Procrustean application of the Qur’an but with correct 
understanding of the faith (orthodoxy) which when combined with sincerity of 
intent leads to correct living of the faith (orthopraxy) (DeLong-Bas 2004).  
 
2.7.2 Ijtihad – Independent Reasoning 
 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in the region of Najd on the Arabian 
Peninsula in either the year 1702 or 1703.  He is said to have memorized the 
Qur’an by the age of ten and to have displayed devotion to scholarship and 
religion from an early age as well.  As he grew older, he became dissatisfied 
with the many aspects of religious life.  Firstly, as discussed above, was the 
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reliance by scholars on works other than the Qur’an and hadith to come to judicial 
conclusions.  The texts that the scholars depended on were the compilations of 
past rulings, opinions and judgments on matters jurisprudential.  While Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab did not disregard these documents as worthless, he found it impossible 
to consider them as the sources of law.   
 Since all law must be derived from the Qur’an and hadith it is incumbent 
upon each generation to return to the sources and interpret them anew by 
understanding not only the scripture, but also the principles behind the law, and 
the context in which the law was revealed so that each mujtahid, or practitioner of 
ijtihad, can derive for himself the productive legal principles of the Qur’an and 
hadith and apply them to new circumstances.  Earlier scholarship and 
commentary, has its own cultural and historical baggage and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
found much of it to reflect the culture of the time or the interests of particular 
groups and factions rather than the eternal word of God.   
In the Sunni world, scholars of law typically subscribe to one of four 
madhhabs, or schools of law.  These are the Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafi’i 
schools.  It is the Shafi’i madhhab that is dominant in Muslim Southeast Asia.  
In principle, each of these four schools is an acceptable institution for the 
handling of legal matters.  However, because each school had distinct standards 
and methodologies for producing and evaluating juridical findings, any given 
scholar would only be trained within one madhhab and would restrict himself to 
that body of work in order to arrive at judgments.  According to Ibn Abd 
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al-Wahhab, a competent Muslim must not be limited to one school or another, 
since these divisions are but historical artifice.   
 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab replaces the system of imitation, or taqlid, with a 
methodology for uncovering and interpreting the meaning of the Qur’an and 
hadith.  His jurisprudence builds on the axiom that the Qur’an, as the revealed 
word of God, is perfect and does not contradict itself.  Moreover, the hadith, a 
body of literature that includes the deeds and words of the prophet Muhammad is 
also a primary source, as many topics about which the Qur’an is silent are 
discussed in the hadith.  Muhammad’s sayings are not the word of God in the 
way that the Qur’an is, but as the last messenger and prophet to humanity, 
Muhammad is the ideal man and so his pronouncements on religion, law and 
government are considered authoritative.  That said, it is also an axiomatic 
assumption that the hadith must also be in harmony with the Qur’an, and may not 
contradict it.  Readings and interpretations of hadith that contradict the Qur’an 
are faulty, either because the hadith is inauthentic, that is the chain of witnesses 
that recorded and passed down the hadith was compromised; or because the 
hadith is authentic, but the interpretation of it that contradicts the Qur’an is wrong 
and so understanding of it must be corrected to bring it into line with the Qur’an.  
 For this reason Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is frequently tied to Ibn Taymiyya, an 
Islamic scholar of the 12th and 13th centuries – a time when the Muslim world was 
shattered by the invasion of the Mongols and their sacking of Baghdad.  Among 
other juridical determinations, Ibn Taymiyya found the traditional division of the 
jihad between the lesser jihad of armed struggle and the greater jihad of moral 
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perfection to be an error.  Although there is a hadith supporting this view, Ibn 
Taymiyya found that it contradicted the God's commandments in the Qur'an, 
where jihad is presented as the violent struggle against the unbelievers (Allen 
2006).  Ibn Taymiyya himself called for jihad against the Mongols as an 
obligatory duty for all Muslims – this despite the fact that the Mongols had 
themselves already converted to Islam by this time. 
Although the Mongols professed Islam, they continued to govern 
themselves using laws and traditions outside of the shariah they should still be 
resisted until they adopted the religion completely and correctly (Perry and 
Negrin 2008).  Modern-day jihadists consider these rulings to legitimate political 
violence even against Muslim rulers if there form of government is in fact 
un-Islamic and so the philosophical connections between Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab are a source of concern to those monitoring the influence of 
Saudi missionaries and religious institutions.   
 While scholars such as De Long-Bas, contend that there is nothing 
particularly aggressive or militant in this tradition of Islamic scholarship, no one 
doubts that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was instrumental to legitimizing the conquests of 
Muhammad Ibn Saud as he set out to bring most of the Arabian Peninsula under 
his control – a process that would end with the foundation of the modern state of 
Saudi Arabia, the only country in the world named after the family that owns it.  
It is this association with state power that makes many American and European 
observers uneasy at the thought of this faction wielding broader influence in the 
future. 
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2.7.3 Shirk and Bid’ah 
 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's seminal text, Kitab Al-Tawhid, set down his most 
fundamental concerns regarding the practice of Islam in his time.  Firstly there 
was the problem of shirk, or the act of assigning partners to God.  This included 
any beliefs in the capacity of Muhammad or the saints to intercede on one's behalf.  
By offering prayers to Muhammad or any other intermediary, the Muslim is 
denying the primacy of God and therefore in a state of incorrect belief.  Since 
prayer is an act of worship, these people are effectively worshiping the 
intermediary and that is contrary to the spirit of tawhid, the unity and oneness of 
God.  As Ibn Abd al-Wahhab gained currency, he and his followers undertook to 
destroy those places of veneration such as saints' tombs and sacred trees in order 
to prevent the practice of shirk and to make the people aware of the inefficacy of 
these idolatrous practices. 
 The second problem of bid’ah is particular to Islam among the Abrahamic 
religions.  Ibn Abd al-Wahhab notes that Muhammad’s message to humanity is 
different from that of Moses or Jesus in that, earlier prophets were sent to teach 
the religion of God to an ignorant people.  Muhammad, on the other hand, 
transmitted the teachings of Islam to people who for the most part already 
worshipped the God of Abraham, but did so only imperfectly (DeLong-Bas 2004).  
They worshipped God but also revered idols.  They petitioned not only God, but 
also holy men.  They prayed to God for succor and consolation and yet, did not 
cease using talismans and worshiping at sacred trees in the hope of being granted 
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favors.  Muhammad’s charge was to teach the message of God once and for all.  
He would reveal the perfect religion after which no changes could be tolerated.  
 Muhammad’s prophecy is as much about forbidding incorrect acts of 
worship as about promoting the correct ones.  As Ahmad, a man in his late fifties, 
explains as he packs to leave on a mission the next morning: 
The important thing is to do what Muhammad told us to do.  He 
gave us the religion from Allah – directly from Allah.  Do it this 
way… pray five times a day… pay zakat…  He didn’t say do 
other things.  He didn’t say make new holidays or new prayers… 
that is bid’ah.  Islam is the perfect religion.  When something is 
perfect, there is no more and no less.  You can’t add and subtract.  
If Allah tells us to pray five times a day, does that mean six times 
is better?  No!  Never!  If six were better, Allah would have 
said six times, if seven prayers were better Allah would have said 
seven times.  Allah said five because five is best.  Of course if 
you pray less that is bad, but there are people who think that if 
you pray more that will be better.  They are wrong… they are 
equally wrong as the people who don’t pray enough.  No more, 
no less… no more no less… no bid’ah… 
  
 In Cambodia much of a Salafi missionary’s work is focused on prohibiting 
a slew of practices that are not explicitly set out in the Qur’an and hadith but 
which have, over time, come to be understood as Islamic – either because these 
deal with religious questions or because they are associated with Muslim people.  
The visitiation of grave sites in order to pray for the blessings of the deceased is 
common in the Muslim world but frowned upon by Salafis.  The same is true for 
communal meals in remembrance of a recently passed member of the community 
where prayers are said to safely conduct the person’s soul to heaven. 
 These have long been practices in the Muslim community of Cambodia 
and efforts to end them have met with mixed reactions.  While some communities 
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have embraced the new and more streamlined teaching others have found it more 
difficult to break with these traditions.  These gatherings were both an important 
part of Muslim culture and an opportunity to feel community solidarity.  
Moreover, the fact that they are not present in the authoritative texts does not take 
change the fact that the participants feel a deep sense of piety and connection to 
their religion when they perform these ceremonies.   
 Because of this tension, many have sought a form of Islam which can be 
authentic but also incorporate the “Islamic traditions” that Salafis find so 
problematic.  The Salafis’ most important rival for influence, the Dakwah Tabligh 
movement, has embraced many of these traditions. 
 
2.8 The Tabligh 
 The Tabligh (also: Dakwah Tabligh or Jamaat Tabligh) trace their origins 
to the Deobandi movement in Urdu-speaking northern India of the 19th Century.  
Unlike the Middle Eastern forms of the religion which arose in an 
overwhelmingly Muslim and Arab environment, the context in which the Tabligh 
formed was that of being a religious and ethnic minority on the subcontinent, 
albeit a very sizable minority.  In Cambodia, Tabligh missionaries have stressed 
maintaining difference from non-Muslims.  Just as Muslims in India must keep 
separate from Hindus as well as the influence of the British establishment, 
Cambodian Muslims must take care not to mix with Khmers and to remain 
recognizably distinct at all times. 
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 This preoccupation of the Tabligh movement is most visibly manifest in 
clothing.  While Salafis are content to go about town in a button shirt and a pair of 
slacks, Tablighs prefer to wear long shirts and turbans as might be found in South 
Asia or the Middle East.  Men who work may have to tone this down somewhat, 
but the ideal of dressing as the prophet and his companions did and thereby 
distinguishing themselves from the masses of unbelievers is still held.  The 
veiling of women is also practiced by some members of the community. 
 A teacher of religion, who identified himself as a Salafi, explained the 
Tabligh movement in this way: 
 They spend all their time praying.  If they have a choice between 
praying and studying or working, they will pray.  If you already 
prayed at the appointed time, why do you need to continue 
praying?  You can watch them they are always doing mission 
work and they sit in the mosque together and they read the 
Qur’an.  But if you ask them if they can read Arabic they will say 
“no”.  They do not know what they are saying or doing, but they 
think that just doing is enough – you don’t need to know anything.  
Sometimes you go to a Tabligh village and you see that their 
teacher doesn’t know Arabic and only got a few years of regular 
school.  He can barely read Khmer but he teaches anyway and 
people listen and that is a problem… He cannot know what the 
shariah is.  He does not know how to make decisions.  He does not 
tell the people to stop praying to Muhammad or to the dead or 
practicing magic – these things are unbelief.  If you do things like 
that you will go to hell, but when your teacher is ignorant how can 
you advance? 
 
 Certainly this is a harsh characterization of the Tabligh movement by an 
avowed critic, but elements of his philippic are important for understanding the 
adversarial relationship between these two proselytizing movements as well as 
some of the appeal that the Tabligh sect has for many Cambodian Muslims.   
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 Critics of the Tabligh movement make much of their inattention to the 
kind of scholarship and book learning that make Islam superior to other religions.  
After all, if the Qur’an is the revealed and literal word of God, should not every 
effort be made to understand it and its meaning?  Tablighs do have a number of 
important educational centers were Arabic language and Islamic sciences are 
taught, but they are rarely well funded and the quality of education is considered 
deficient even by Tablighs themselves.  However, to focus on this issue is to miss 
the point of what the Tabligh movement is meant to achieve.   
 Firstly, the separation of Muslims and non-Muslims – few things will 
prevent one from meeting non-Muslims like spending long days reciting Qur’an 
in the mosque or walking around town dressed like a Pakistani sheikh.  Secondly, 
there is the return to life as lived in the times of the prophet which the Tabligh see 
as a physical, energetic exercise of the body and not merely as an intellectual 
pursuit.  When I asked Tablighs about underqualified people going out to perform 
missionary work the response was always that missionary work (dakwah) is 
meant to add to the knowledge of both individuals and that the missionary is as 
much a student as the person receiving the word is.  What Salafis find to be 
incompetence, Tablighs have understood as a kind of humility. 
 The other criticism leveled at the Tablighs is that they do not prohibit the 
unlawful but instead happily join in activities that are not permissible in the 
Qur’an and hadith.  Unlike villages that have accepted Salafi teachings, Tabligh 
villages for the most part maintain all of the old customs surrounding religious 
practice that are not approved by Saudi and Kuwaiti-trained imams.  Apart from 
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the death rituals mentioned above, the problem of mawlud (Prophet Muhammad’s 
birthday) also divide these communities.  According to Salafi’s, Muhammad 
never celebrated his birthday, nor did he instruct anyone to celebrate his birthday 
or any other birthday for that matter.  It is not the practice is prohibited only that it 
was not a practice at the time of the prophet and since the prophet practiced the 
religion perfectly, the mawlud cannot be said to be a properly Islamic practice. 
 A Tabligh imam preparing to celebrate the mawlud with a communal feast 
explained otherwise: 
Those people (Salafis) come around and make problems at this 
time of year.  They tell us that we can’t have mawlud. But Muslims 
have been celebrating mawlud for a long time.  Everybody likes it.  
We get together and we eat.  We feel solidarity and we feel like a 
community.  In Muhammad’s time they did not celebrate the 
mawlud, but they joined together and he was there.  He was 
present so there was no need for mawlud – they had the prophet 
himself…  No one says we must celebrate.  It is not the law.  But 
we choose to celebrate.  It reminds us of our religion and we feel 
close to the prophet and to God when we do this…  The feeling is 
important.  The feelings in the heart – that is important.  If the 
action increases imaan (faith) then it is good.  The people who 
criticize us are of another thought.  They are from outside and 
have received other influences but we don’t criticize the 
community.  We encourage them to do more and to have more 
faith. 
 
 The fact that the Tablighs have been more amenable to pre-existing 
practices, provided that they reflect piety and devotion has gone some way to 
allowing the Tabligh movement to become more indigenized than the Salafis who 
would seek to erase such practices in the name of correctness and perfection 
instead of ecstatic experience.  
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 Salafis will capsize these arguments by calling into question the notion 
that continuity of practice has anything to do with its acceptability.  Only the 
revelation of the prophet and his singular example can serve as the basis for 
practice and law.  This argument lies at the heart of what separates these two 
movements in Cambodia, which at least in principle, both seek to inspire today’s 
Muslims with the example of the prophet and his companions.  For the Tablighs, 
the history of Muslims is central as a way of deriving the meaning of 
contemporary circumstances.  Not only is the story of Muhammad and his 
followers meaningful, but those meanings have been endlessly recapitulated in 
Muslim history since that time.  Understanding this is important for reasserting 
that connection to the past which leads back to the prophets, and critical to 
discerning the correct path of action at this point in history. 
 
2.9  New Islams and Muslim History 
 While the Tabligh movement is frequently considered apolitical because 
they are disinterested in electoral politics or political mobilization, it should be 
noted that for many active missionaries this is only a preliminary step.  This lack 
of outward ambition is understood by many active missionaries as a period of 
preparation, of steeling the spirit of the Muslims so that they can someday 
transform the world around them and establish the perfectly Islamic society on 
Earth.  Muhammad himself did not succeed immediately in spreading the word.  
He meditated, he preached to a small band of followers and he even had to leave 
his community of Mecca to take up residence in Medina until he was ready to 
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return triumphant.  The following are some examples of various historical events 
that are understood by Tablighs as having value in guiding the growth and 
development of the community. 
 
2.9.1 The “Conversion of Lenin” and the Perfection of the Self 
 Sitting at a mosque in Phnom Penh, a number of Indian missionaries were 
having a discussion with their Cambodian hosts.  As I sat, they turned to me and 
explained that they were trying to instill the importance of personal faith and 
unshakeable belief.  He thought this was fundamental to the entire enterprise of 
Islam especially in the field of spreading the word to non-Muslims.  The Indian 
man addressed me and asked: 
Have you heard of Lenin? 
  
Lenin? 
 
Yes.  The King of Russia, Lenin. 
 
I’ve heard of him. 
 
You know, many years ago, there were three Tablighs from India 
who traveled to Russia.  They arrived there and Lenin wanted to 
meet them so they met at his palace.  The Tablighs explained their 
religion to Lenin for many hours and Lenin was interested in their 
teachings.  Lenin had an entire country and so he needed to know 
how to live according to the Islamic way.  He asked the 
missionaries, “Can you show me an example of a country where 
this religion is put into practice?”  The missionaries responded 
that they could not – that no nation had yet accepted true Islam as 
their one and only guiding cause.  Lenin replied, “Well, can you 
show me a community where these principles of Islam are the law 
of the people?”  Again the missionaries were forced to admit that 
even on that level, the commandments of God have not been 
perfectly applied.  Finally, exasperated, Lenin asks, “Can you 
show me one single human being that lives the life of a true 
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Muslim?”  With this the missionaries hung their heads and 
returned to India. 
 
 The strong feeling among Tablighs that the community’s failures are 
really an aggregation of personal failures writ large is what is at the heart of this 
story.  As this story was told to me and translated for the benefit of others in the 
group, more examples of the same principle were offered: “My cousin had a 
problem with drugs. He tried to stop many times but only when he became a real 
believing Muslim did he stop.”, “There was a woman here.  She could not find a 
husband.  But then she asked God with ikhlas (sincerity) and she finally found a 
husband and now they have children, thanks be to God!”, “There are many 
disobedient children, that run around doing drugs and crime, but if you put them 
in the madrasah and they learn the right way then they become good children.  
You can see them here in Prek Pra.”…  This went on for some time. 
 In the end, Tablighs consider spiritual perfection to be the sine qua non of 
social and political transformation.  If those missionaries had only been as 
righteous and upstanding as the law that they preached then perhaps Lenin would 
have converted, the Soviet Union would have been some sort of Caliphate, 
Russians and Afghans would have lived as brothers in faith, and the rest of the 
world would have been overawed by this example of excellent living and 
followed Lenin into the fold of Islam.  This was not to be. 
 For the time being, the Tablighs of Prek Pra, Phnom Penh are reinventing 
their community and their mosque as a kind of addiction center.  Visits to the 
mosque are typically received by a number of men, smiling hysterically, rolling 
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back their sleeves to reveal a veritable Union Pacific of track marks as evidence 
of years of abuse.  They credit the mosque and the religion with helping them 
quit.  The frequent prayers and recitations plus the fact that they are encouraged to 
spend time with others rather than in solitary study or contemplation create an 
environment where it would certainly be more difficult to score a hit and indulge 
one’s addiction.  
 The personal transformation brought about by the power of true belief is a 
common thread among many Muslims, but Tablighs in particular.  Salafis will ask 
drug addicts to stop using so that they can enter into the path of righteousness.  
Correct living is pragmatically related to the practice of the faith and the search 
for a place in Paradise.  Among the Tablighs, this is turned on its head and the 
correct belief is held as the foundation of establishing the correct life – just 
believe the right way and God will provide the rest, be it money, a wife or 
willpower.  The faith of the individual is paramount and its importance can be 
found in the history of the community. 
 
2.9.2 The Battle of Uḥud and the Decadence Within 
 In the year 625, the prophet Muhammad and his forces suffered a grave 
defeat on the battlefield against the Meccan army that sought to crush them and 
end their nascent religious movement once and for all.  The Battle of Uḥud came 
only a year after the Battle of Badr in which the vastly outnumbered Muslims 
managed to wrest victory from a well armed and equipped Meccan force.  This 
Battle of Badr immediately came to be seen as a sign of God’s favor on the 
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Muslims, who by dint of faith and dedication to the cause overcame 
overwhelming odds.  To this day, the word “Badr” appears frequently in the 
names of military units and operations in the Muslim world. 
 The Battle of Uḥud on the other hand was little short of a disaster.  A 
young student returning from Malaysia related the story as follows: 
Muhammad led the troops to the battle.  Everyone felt that they 
would be victorious, like they were at Badr.  They had imaan 
(faith) and they wanted to beat the Quraysh to protect their 
religion.  The Quraysh did not believe and they tried many times 
to kill the prophet.  When they met the army Muhammad could see 
how to achieve victory.  He placed some troops in the front and 
told the others to stay in the back.  He needs to fight on both sides 
the – the front and the back.  The Muslims went forward and they 
were beating the Quraysh, but then when they came close to the 
Quraysh camp the soldiers could see that they had gold and silver 
and other treasures.  The soldiers hurried forward to get the 
treasure including the soldiers from the back.  They left the back 
and ran for the treasure.  Prophet Muhammad told them to protect 
the back but they disobeyed!  After that everything was chaos.  
The Quraysh came from behind and the Muslims lost.  Even the 
Prophet Muhammad was injured and almost killed.  If the soldiers 
had obeyed Muhammad’s orders the Muslims would have won, 
but they could not control themselves and they disobeyed and the 
Muslims lost. 
 
 This story is told throughout the Muslim world as a way of understanding 
how Islam, once ascendant, is now in a subordinate position to non-Muslims.  If a 
Muslim accepts that no event may occur in this world except that God should 
permit it, then the question becomes “Why did God permit his people to fail?”  
The answer must be found in the relationship with Muslims and God and the way 
in which Muslims have failed to live up to the expectation that the religion puts 
upon them.  As an older man, recently convinced of the rightness of the Tabligh 
path explained the problem of the Middle East thus: 
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How can Israel defeat all the Arab countries?  The country is so 
small.  (thumb pressed to the first joint of the index finger so as to 
suggest something small.)  Egypt is large.  Syria is large.  Saudia 
Arabia is large.  Kuwait is large.  Libya is large.  Pakistan is 
large. But Israel is small and Israel defeated all of them.  The 
Muslims cannot defeat Israel because they don’t have faith.  They 
leave the religion.  They do not follow the shari’ah.  Israel is a 
punishment from Allah for this.  So you cannot defeat Allah’s 
punishment.  If the Muslims worshiped correctly, then Israel 
would disappear.  Allah would stop punishing the Muslims and 
Israel will disappear. 
 
 The personal faith component of the religion culminates in social and 
political consequences that may not be apparent to the individual Muslim.  Here 
personal failings can bring loss and humiliation on the community as a whole and 
so therefore, the way to address social ills is to focus on personal standards of 
behavior and conduct.  Attempts to resolve the problem by engaging the 
proximate cause are misguided and meaningless if they are not based in a 
complete embrace of the faith.  It is this failure to recognize God’s punshment and 
the submission that it demands of believers that permits social failure to persist.  
This narrative of individual frailty leading to communal penury has resonance in 
the histories of both Champa and Cambodia. 
 Chapter 3 will enter into more detail on the Cham story of the Kerik Tree, 
in which the Cham king willingly fells the sacred tree that guaranteed the security 
of the Cham people in a bid to please his beautiful, young Vietnamese bride, and 
the Khmer story of Preah Ko Preah Kaew, in which the Khmers themselves cut 
down the magical bamboo barrier that protected them from the Siamese in an 
effort to get at the gold coins the Siamese general had scattered into the bamboo.   
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 In both cases, as in the Battle of Uḥud, the germ of failure lies in the heart 
of the people themselves.  The antagonist, whether he be Quraysh, Vietnamese or 
Thai is understood to be powerless to harm the community until the moment 
when the members of the favored community betray the moral underpinnings of 
its superiority.  The Cham history of failure as a people finds expression in each 
of these stories whose fundamental lessons are very much the same. 
 
2.9.3 Islamic Spain and the Lost World 
 At a roadside eatery in the far northwest of Cambodia, I spotted and was 
spotted by Abdul Karim, a prominent member of the Tabligh movement in 
Ratanakiri Province.  I had attempted to engage him in conversation several times 
before but his handlers from Phnom Penh had made that difficult.  This time he 
was without his minders.  He saw me from across the market, smiled, waved and 
began to walk over.  Scanning the table, I quickly grabbed the plate of grilled 
pork I had ordered and tossed it under the table, where a ravenous herd of felines 
made short work of the incriminating evidence.   
 Abdul Karim took a seat beside me and began asking questions of his 
own: 
 
Where are you from? 
 
From Spain. 
 
Oh! Al-Andalus!  I know Spain.  I’ve read about it.  I’ve heard 
about it.  Are you from Córdoba? 
 
No, from Galicia.  It’s far from Córdoba.  You know Córdoba? 
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Yes, Córdoba is the most important place in Al-Andalus.  Have 
you been to the mosque there – the one with the columns? 
 
I’ve never been to Córdoba.  My city is far to the north. 
 
Are there many Muslims in your city? 
 
No.  We don’t really have Muslims there. 
 
But Córdoba has many Muslims.  Al-Andalus has many Muslims… 
 
In the past there were many Muslims, but today there are few.  
Some Muslims from Morocco or the Middle East live there, but 
they come from abroad. 
 
 (perplexed) Al-Andalus was the most important Muslim country.  
For a long time it had the best mosques and best madrasas.  They 
have mosques and madrasas and students. 
 
The mosques have become churches.  The Muslims left Al-Andalus 
when it fell. 
 
Why did they leave? 
 
Where did you learn about Al-Andalus?  And who told you about 
the columns? 
 
When I do dakwah, I talk to Tablighs from many countries.  Al-
Andalus was the best Muslim country… but the people started 
drinking and doing other things that were against the shariah.  
Then it fell. 
 
Well, when it fell, the Muslims had to leave.  The new kings of 
Spain forced the Muslims to leave.  Muslims in Spain today come 
from outside Spain mostly. 
 
(crestfallen) And you’re not a Muslim? 
 
No.  I think I told you that before. 
 
Yes, yes.  (looking back at his table)  
 
 The conversation wound down awkwardly.  I explained that my 
ancestors had evicted his from the closest thing to paradise on Earth that humans 
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had ever created.  The fact that this was centuries ago and that he is unlikely to 
have had any biological ancestors residing in the Iberian Peninsula at that or any 
other time did little to assuage the feelings of discomfiture between us.  Abdul 
Karim politely thanked me for my time, wished me well and returned to his 
companions. 
 Being known in the Muslim community as a Spaniard elicited different 
reactions in each of the different communities.  Among the Imam San, Spain 
was little more than a soccer team with passports.  For the Salafis, Spain was a 
country in Europe, where one could study and receive a degree recognized in the 
US while also playing some soccer.  Among the Tablighs Spain represented 
something altogether different.  Spain, or Al-Andalus, was, if not the highest, a 
high point in Islamic civilization.  It was the shining example of what could be 
achieved by a community of the perfectly faithful – the apotheosis of the Islamic 
will to order and justice now brought low by human weaknesses to become a 
profane country remarkable only for drinking and soccer. 
 Tablighs would frequently ask me to recount the history of Al-Andalus, to 
translate documents found on the internet about Islamic Spain, and to explain the 
reasons behind the fall of the Caliphate.  For Abdul Karim, Al-Andalus was not 
just a country that existed in the past.  It was then a perfect land which was the 
product of the combined faith of all good Muslims, and it remains today a 
memory to be redeemed through the realization of God’s plan for humans on 
Earth.   
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 To learn that this land no longer has an appreciable Muslim population is 
very jarring for many.  It is still very common for Chams in Cambodia to believe 
that the cities of Champa in Việt Nam are still inhabited by Cham people.  These 
cities are now under Vietnamese occupation, but the Cham population is still 
there, and although they suffer hardship and oppression, they still exist.  Perhaps 
someday they can be found again and their community can be restored. 
 The story of Al-Andalus encapsulates the earlier explored themes of 
spiritual perfection undone by man’s imperfect nature, and to this adds an element 
of historical interpretation, which in Cambodia is particular to the Tablighs.  
Salafis in Cambodia study history.  They must – it is a compulsory subject in 
state schools which they recognize as important to their advancement.  
Nevertheless, the dominant strand among Salafists holds that the assimilation of 
Middle Eastern and Arab models are the most correct course of action, and for 
that reason, the Muslims of Cambodia need to learn and understand the Arabic 
language and the correct practice of Islam without accretions.  The history of the 
Cham, Champa and other peoples who are now Islamic matters little.  These are 
not sources of inspiration or guidance, and cannot be seen as homologous to the 
history experienced and made by the prophet and his companions. 
 Tablighs on the other hand, are a group of Muslims who accept the Salafi 
message of practicing the religion as it was practiced by Muhammad, but they do 
not reject the particularities of their history as a community within the Ummah.  
Instead, this history is incorporated and made legible in the light of previous 
events in other parts of the Muslim world.  Abdul Karim and others like him feel 
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a strong connection to any aspect of the past that can be known as Muslim.  To 
think of the Islamic ideal made reality in social life, education and sacred 
architecture strikes a chord of longing for a community to which anyone who 
professes the Muslim faith can claim belonging in.   
 Cham history has useful parallels that help Tablighs feel that they too are a 
part of the Islamic mission to unify humanity in a single religion.  However, not 
all Cham that value their history have entered the Tabligh movement.  The 
community of Imam San also hold their ethnic history dear – other Muslims will 
say that they do so to the detriment of their religious lives.  Among the Imam 
San, we find a people who have privileged history and tradition such that religion 
is itself seen as an ethnic signifier as much as a confessional orientation.  It is the 
Imam San that will be explored in detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three 
Muslim Independence under the Norodom Parasol 
Don’t forget to come to our celebration next week.  We will have 
some music and dancing… don’t worry, the party is outside the 
village so we can dance.   
 
Won’t the elders get angry? 
 
Cham law is for Cham villages only.  We’ll be outside the village 
so no one will get angry… If we are outside the village, they can’t 
tell us what to do.  We will only be under Khmer law. 
 
 
3.1 The Community of Imam San 
 On one of my first days in the Our Reussei community of the Imam San, I 
asked a young man what was the difference between the people of his village and 
the other Muslims in the surrounding settlements.  He answered, 'Those are the 
Arabs.  We are the Cham.  We are different because we have a palace.' 'And 
where is this palace?' I asked.  After some hesitation he replied, 'I'm not sure.  I 
think it's in Việt Nam now.'  He was proud that his people had a palace, a 
‘weang’, which is the same word used for the royal abode of the Cambodian king.  
It was not merely a memory of an earlier age but a present-day marker that 
separated him and people like him from people like the Mufti.  The fact that they 
could not return to the palace was sad but it did not diminish the original 
accomplishment of having achieved greatness as a people. 
 This strong attachment to a sense of history and in particular to the royal 
institutions of Champa are what, for most Imam San, legitimate them as the 
authentic Cham community.  Other Muslims frequently refer to them as 'original 
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Cham' because they are said to maintain the old traditions, but this on its own is 
insufficient to understand how the Imam San regard these practices.  For the 
Imam San, the traditions of Champa are part of a broader ideological framework 
that both valorizes their experience as a people and connects them in the present 
to their Khmer neighbours.  This bond to the land and people of Cambodia is 
seen to begin when the Cham royals, fleeing persecution, were given permission 
by the Cambodian king to settle and remain in his country.   
 
3.2 The Story of Imam San 
 Sometime in the mid 19th century, Imam Hassan ('San' for short) appears 
as the leader of a group of Cham people.  His story is told and retold in various 
versions, and below is a recounting by an elder in Our Reussei commune. 
Before, all the Cham were in the north in Kampong Cham.  They 
settled their after leaving Champa because the Vietnamese took all 
the land.  They were living there but there were many problems.  
The Cham fought amongst themselves and then the Khmer also 
fought with the Cham.  There was disorder and it was terrible.  
It was hard to farm rice and there was no law.  Then the king 
learned of this.  And he called the Cham to his palace and he told 
them to stop fighting and he said that they should live nearby, 
because if they are far away he cannot be sure of imposing order.  
Imam San was the leader of the community and the king allowed 
him to choose the land for his people.  And so he chose this land... 
you see all these rice fields around here?... that land is ours 
because the king gave it to Imam San. 
 
 The king in this story is Ang Duong, considered possibly the most 
important Cambodian monarch of the modern era.  Ang Duong emerged at a 
time when Cambodia had almost completely ceased to exist under the pressure of 
Thailand and Việt Nam.  The War between the two countries was fought in 
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Cambodia as each side attempted to gain mastery over what remained of the 
rapidly decaying kingdom.  During this time Cambodia came perilously close to 
suffering the same fate as Champa, as the Vietnamese attempted to impose their 
political and material culture on the population in an attempt to permanently 
assimilate them into their realm.  Ang Duong was finally installed by Thai forces 
who managed to oust the Vietnamese from Phnom Penh. 
 What followed was a brief respite in the bitter struggle of the Khmer to 
maintain an independent state in the hostile region.  The king embarked on a 
program of re-Khmerizisation of the bureaucracy and purging of Vietnamese 
influences.  Ang Duong was a patron of letters and himself gifted with the pen.  
Most importantly for the future development of the country, it was he who began 
making the necessary contacts with the French to involve them in the region and 
relieve Cambodian dependency on Thailand.  Although this resulted in  
Cambodia becoming a French protectorate, in the long run it prevented Cambodia 
from being completely absorbed by its neighbours and and so permitting the 
eventual establishment of an independent Cambodia in 1953. 
 Association with King Ang Duong lends a certain type of legitimacy to the 
Cham presence.  Firstly, Ang Duong was a great king, not only because of his 
political accomplishments but also because of the flourishing of culture that 
occurred during his reign.  This was an Indian culture, which Ang Duong could 
preserve because he resided in Bangkok, unlike his rival, Chan, who was a client 
of the Vietnamese.  Secondly, his program of removing Vietnamese elements 
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from Cambodian life passed over the Cham community.  Thus, the Cham are 
recognized as another Indic people who share with the Khmer a common enemy. 
 The story continues: 
Finally, the Cham people came and lived here in Oudong.  
Oudong was the capital.  This was the where the king was.  
Imam San at that time started praying a great deal and he would 
go away for a long time to pray.  Sometimes in the forest.  
Nobody could find him.  One day the king wanted to find him and 
he could not.  They looked everywhere and some people said that 
maybe Imam San was plotting against the king.  When Imam San 
appeared they took him to the king and he was asked what he was 
doing.  He said he was praying – that he did not want to cause 
any problems.  Imam San was not plotting against the king.  He 
told the king that he respected him and that he was his king, but 
that he needed to have a good place to pray – a quiet place.  
When he is praying nobody can find him.  The king then offered 
to give him a good place to pray.  He gave him a hill in Oudong.  
That is where we have the temple of Ta San. 
 
 This part of the story affirms the relationship between the Cham and the 
Cambodian monarchy.  It is a patronage association whereby the Cham submit 
to the king and the king in turn cares for the particular needs of his subjects.  
King Ang Duong takes a personal interest in Imam San and, recognizing his 
special requirements, gives him a place on the hilltops of Oudong.  The hills of 
Oudong are the resting place for the Cambodian royal family.  The Imam San 
understand the significance of this moment to be the recognition of their 
community as royals, worthy of taking a place among the former regents of the 
country.  As the Imam San frequently mention, the mosque atop Oudong is their 
mosque and it can be claimed by no other group of Muslims in the country since 
they are not of royal lineage.  When Imam San died, it is said that although his 
body was buried elsewhere, his spirit returned to the mountain.  In a dream he 
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communicated to an elder that he wanted his grave to be at Oudong at the site of 
the mosque as a reminder of the special bond his people enjoy with the royal 
family. 
 Today the mosque of Imam San is located in the same place.  The older 
wooden structure was replaced by a concrete temple after the civil war.  It is a 
simple rectangular white-washed building without domes or minarets, 
commanding a view of the rice fields and Buddhist temples below the hill.  Just 
below the mosque are a series of shacks inhabited by the guardians of the mosque 
- older men and women in white robes who dedicate themselves to contemplation 
and entertaining visitors.  This temple is the common focus for all Imam San in 
Cambodia as it is the place of veneration for their founder and their link to the 
king. 
 
3.2.1 Mawlud Phnom  
 The story of Imam San is commemorated during the Mawlud Phnom, a 
holiday particular to the Imam San community.  Typically the word 'mawlud' 
refers to Mohammed's birthday and is celebrated in various forms throughout the 
Muslim world.  The Mawlud Phnom  takes place at Oudong and brings together 
Imam San from Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, Battambang as well as a contingent 
from Kampot province.  This yearly event is the only opportunity for a large 
scale gathering of Imam San from different communities.  Apart from the Imam 
San, representatives, both Muslim and Buddhist, attend from the Ministry of Cults 
and Religions as well as a representative from the royal household.  A small 
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number of other Muslims also show up.  Their reasons vary, but usually they 
attend out of curiosity about the practices of these real Cham – a sort of heritage 
tourism. 
 The ceremony consists of a procession of cakes made by local women 
which are then arranged in front of the mosque, where the Ong Knur, other elders 
and visiting dignitaries gather.  Inside the mosque, the religious functionaries 
know as the Ong Chav chant songs in praise of Imam Hassan.  Just outside, at 
the 'grave' of Imam San himself, a number of elders wrap the grave in a burial 
cloth and say prayers over it.  Then, when it is ready, they begin cutting the 
fabric into strips and tying them onto the wrists of the visitors.  The wristbands 
are said to bring blessings for the coming year and are worn until they fall off of 
their own accord. 
 In the open space in front of the mosque, I was invited to sit with the Ong 
Knur as well as a Muslim parliamentarian and another secretary of state.  They 
lavished praise on the Ong Knur and the other elders around him.  “These are the 
protectors of real Cham culture”, they would say.  “If you really want to learn 
Cham, you will have to learn it from them”, they advised.  The Ong Knur smiled 
sheepishly as the two men launched into paeans for the Ong Knur's people - 
lamenting the loss of traditions which only this community preserves and looking 
forward to how sad it will be when it is all finally gone.  Considering both of 
these men have been working rather actively to encourage the kind of 
missionization that threatens to make these traditions gone, their words quickly 
began grating on all of us.   
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 The need to maintain a sense of civility on this solemn occasion prevailed 
however, at least long enough for the counterfeit encomium to be mercifully 
interrupted by a representative from the Ministry.  The speaker, a Khmer, stood 
before the assembled, thanked the Ong Knur and the community for allowing him 
to attend this special day and began a short speech on the Prime Minister's 
commitment to the free practice of religion and the importance of this freedom as 
a cornerstone of the new Cambodia.  He then explained to the audience that the 
money that comes from Muslims abroad will be used for the development of the 
community and not wasted - Prime Minister Hun Sen would see to this himself.  
The speech finished, he thanked the attendees once again and returned to Phnom 
Penh. 
 For the vast majority of the arrivals, the politicians are little more than a 
side show.  They are far more interested in meeting each other and trying to feel 
like a community.  The Mawlud Phnom provides a chance to get together with 
other Imam San from around the country and for the Ong Knur to touch base with 
his people outside the Kompong Chhnang area with whom he is not always in 
regular communication.  On the one hand this creates a feeling of solidarity and 
relief that there are still others that maintain the traditions as they do.  On the 
other hand, as the Imam San are by far numerically inferior to other Muslims, the 
question of how many adherents remain is never far from anyone's mind at these 
events.  As one elder laments: 
There used to be more people.  Many people have started 
praying five times a day.  They want to be like the Arabs or they 
want to get money from them.  In the past all Cham followed the 
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way of Imam San, but today very few are left.  We have some old 
people here on the hill and they remember the customs.  But the 
young people do not know as much.  They are busy.  They have 
work and school.  Some of them start praying 5 times a day.  
Maybe in the future there are no more Cham. 
 
 This sharp disconnect between older and younger members of the 
community becomes more apparent during holidays.  The Mawlud Phnom, 
because it is particular to the Imam San, serves as a sort of barometer, constantly 
falling, of the fortunes of the community.  Explanations for this vary, but for 
many of the older generation, it is the young who are failing to preserve Cham 
culture because of the nature of modern life, where employment, education and 
social networking compete for their attention.  The younger Imam San will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  Suffice it to say for now, celebrations such as the 
Mawluds and the Chai Ceremonies mean somewhat different things to the older 
and younger generation, with older Imam San regarding them as recreations of a 
better past and young Cham seeing them as a foundational element of a broader 
ethnic nationalism which encompasses the professional and educational pursuits 
which the elders see as a distraction. 
 
3.3 Mawlud 
 Although the Mawlud, or celebration of the prophet's birthday is not 
practiced exclusively by the Imam San, it is only in this community that this 
remains a major production.  There is a great deal of controversy over whether 
or not the observance of Muhammad's birthday is properly Islamic, an innocuous 
cultural practice, or a dangerous form of bid'ah, innovation beyond the perfect 
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religion taught by the prophet.  For this reason, many other Muslim communities 
have either stopped holding these celebrations or toned them down significantly 
to a communal meal shared by the men after prayers.  In the Imam San 
community there is no such discussion as to whether this is a party-worthy event. 
 The Mawlud is much like the Mawlud Phnom except that each community 
holds it at the local mosque rather than atop Oudong.  There is a long procession 
of different families bringing the cakes fried in the days leading up to the festivity.  
Each group announces it's presence before entering the mosque grounds and are 
welcomed by a cry of 'Lo Mlai' (hurray), by those already inside.  The cakes 
come in the shapes of dragons and peacocks representing male and female 
elements respectively and are arranged on a stick into a tower-like structure.  
The stick itself is stuck into a hard-boiled   egg, which, like the dragons and 
peacocks, is another symbol of fertility, an ever-present concern for a community 
that fears further demographic decline. 
 Around the perimeter of the mosque itself, but well within the mosque 
grounds, wait bands of hungry Khmer children.  They've walked from the 
neighbouring Khmer villages and are now settling in for the long wait that lies 
ahead of them.  They don't know much about Islam or the prophet, but they do 
know that if they wait until the end, they will get some of those cakes.  As far as 
I know, this is the only Muslim event in the country that has any kind of Khmer 
attendance aside from government or party representatives dutifully showing up 
to shake hands and kiss babies.   
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 The Imam San welcome them.  They are after all neighbours, they go to 
school together and they run into each other on the paths between village and rice 
field, and so have a right to show up and grab some cakes for themselves.  It's 
good PR, but more importantly, there is no issue of 'contamination' among the 
Imam San regarding contact with Khmers in the first place.  The presence of 
Khmers at holidays and in mosques is not in any way problematic as it is 
becoming among many other Muslims in the country.  This connection between 
Cham of the Imam San stripe and Khmer becomes more apparent during the Chai 
and Areak ceremonies and is central to the understanding of these spirit 
possession practices for which this community is well known. 
 
3.4 The Chai 
 It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the Chai ceremony in 
both defining and binding the community of the Imam San.  It is at once a 
celebration of Cham heritage, a historical drama in which the glory and 
subsequent descent into exile of the Cham people in Cambodia is reenacted, and 
an opportunity for members of the community to take stock of their own personal 
fortunes and place them on the narrative continuum that is the Imam San story.  
Seen from the outside, the ceremony is at worst a dangerous act of idolatry and 
shirk and at best a ridiculous superstition with no place in the correct practice of 
Islam now available to the Cham.  This ritual and its concomitant beliefs in spirit 
ancestors and the importance of royal lineages is, along with their failure to pray 
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five times daily, regarded by Orthodox Muslims as the defining feature of the 
Imam San community and as evidence of the deviancy of their faith. 
 It is important from the outset to make clear that the Imam San themselves 
do not consider the Chai ceremony a religious ritual, or at least, not an Islamic 
practice.  Much like other Muslims in Cambodia, a sharp distinction is drawn 
between those things which are classified as acts of faith and those that are 
manifestations of culture.  When speaking Khmer, the Imam San regularly use 
the words sasanā and vabbadharm to distinguish between their Islamic religious 
beliefs on one hand and their Cham traditions on the other.  Among Khmers 
themselves, the word sasanā  typically refers to Buddhism and its institutions in 
Cambodia, or, when in reference to non-Khmers, some other religion such as 
Christianity.  Vabbadharm is typically used in reference to ceremonies and 
rituals that are essentially secular although there may be a religious component or 
even involve the participation of religious functionaries such as weddings - such 
that while these words refer to two spheres of life understood to be distinct from 
one another, and so one should resist the temptation to think of them as being 
wholly separate.  Instead, there is significant overlap in these two terms and 
considerable interpenetration of the beliefs and ideologies associated with these 
aspect of social life.   
 In interviews with Orthodox Muslims, even those who expounded at 
length on the importance of separating and even eliminating culture in favor of 
religion, virtually no one believed that the Imam San themselves made this 
distinction, rather, the Chai ceremony as well as other non-Islamic practices were 
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symptoms of a broader ignorance of the fundamental tenets of the Muslim 
religion.  These were not two distinct facets of the cultural life of that 
community but a warning writ large of the dangers of allowing one's faith to be 
contaminated by alternate objects of veneration and forms ritual practice.  The 
mongrelized confession of the Imam San was after all, once upon a time, the 
belief system of all the Cham and so the Imam San are held as a foil against 
which distance can be measured along one's own path to purity and perfection. 
 The practice of the Chai ritual is thus important both as a crystallization of 
Cham ethnic ideology which defines Chamness as a positive and enduring 
essence in a world dominated by Khmer hosts and Vietnamese enemies as well as 
the hallmark of a dying society, mired in the historic past and an ethnic 
provincialism on a planet in which the true operative distinction between people, 
regardless of their geographic origin or ethnic background, should be between 
those of the Muslim religion as taught by the prophet Muhammad and all others. 
 
3.4.1 When and Why 
 The Chai, or Chai spirits, are the souls of ancient Cham royals and 
aristocrats who return to the community during the Chai ceremony and inhabit the 
bodies of the spirit mediums who then perform rituals and theatrical dance for a 
period of as long as three days.  These dances are divided into several routines, 
each recounting some aspect of Cham history or court culture.  Ultimately, the 
entire performance is an expression of a collective history of both greatness and 
vulnerability, exile and belonging, past events and future possibilities.   
133 
 The Chai ceremony is frequently described as a healing ritual.  Yet, while 
health and bodily well-being are concerns of the ceremony, it is not a ceremony 
that will bring about healing per se.  In fact, the Chai ceremony is carried out 
only after the patient has been healed and not before and so the ritual itself is not 
what is seen as healing the ill individual.  Instead it would better be understood, 
on the one hand as an expression of gratitude for the spirits of Champa who 
intervened to heal the sick and, on the other hand, as a manifestation of 
community solidarity as an extension of familial solidarity, which is an explicit 
focus of the Chai ritual. 
 This distinction between a healing event and an occasion of thanksgiving 
is crucial to how participants themselves describe the Chai.  As I was told by a 
middle aged man: 
We are having a Chai next week.  It is for me.  I was very sick.  
My lungs... I had problems with my lungs.  But now I'm healed so 
we are doing a Chai.  You should come.  You could see it and I 
would be very happy if you came as my guest. 
 
I'd love to come.  I'm glad you’re well now.  Can you tell me 
how you got better? 
 
The Chai helped me.  I asked them for help because I was sick 
and they helped me. 
 
But you didn't go to the doctor or take any medicine? 
 
Yes, I did.  We always go to the doctor first.  We ask the doctor, 
and the doctor gives us medicine and tells us how to get healthy.  
But this doesn't always work.  We only ask for the Chai's help if 
we already tried everything else.  We MUST go to the doctor first 
and we MUST try everything we can on our own before we ask the 
Chai. 
 
So the medicine didn't work? 
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No, the medicine helped a little but then it stopped.  I saw several 
doctors, no one could give a different treatment.   
 
So how did you receive help from the Chai?  You just asked 
them? 
 
Yes, I asked them.  But also I promised them that if I am healed 
then I will make a Chai ceremony and we will bring everyone 
together for them.  We will have much rice and chicken and 
incense... and fruit and together we will have a Chai ceremony.  
When the doctors could not cure me I asked the Chai for help.  It 
was at that time that me and my family started saving money.   
 
How long ago was this? 
 
About two years ago.  Before I didn't believe in the Chai spirits, 
but when the  medicine didn't work I asked them and I started 
saving the money for the Chai.  Now I am well so we can have 
the ceremony. 
 
So you never have the ceremony before the person is healed? 
 
No.  No healing, no ceremony.  First the person gets better, 
then the person spends the money saved.  But if there is no 
healing then there is no ceremony. 
 
 The Chai ceremony may be one, two or three days long depending on the 
amount of money saved by the family.  The layouts of cash can be quite great.  
For a three day ceremony, one would expect the slaughter of a buffalo which on 
its own would cost in the neighborhood of five hundred dollars.  Add to this the 
cost of mediums, musicians and the rest of the Chai cult paraphernalia and the 
expenditures for a large ceremony will quickly surpass the thousand dollar mark 
and so are regarded as a long-term investment by the family as a whole.   
 The Chai ceremony is a celebration of the healing of the patient and of the 
ancestor spirits involvement in that process.  The spirits greatly enjoy these 
ceremonies – the food and dance and the opportunity to be with their people.  In 
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the way some describe this conditionality, the ceremony can even be described as 
a reward for good deeds performed - not merely as a thank you but rather as a 
carrot offered ahead of time when the patient makes the commitment to start 
saving money and then delivered when the Chai finally make the person well. 
 Quite apart from this, the Chai ceremony is also increasingly seen as a 
community bonding experience and as a public relations opportunity.  For 
reasons I will explore in a later section, many members of the Imam San 
community are eager for these events to be attended by outsiders especially 
Westerners but also Khmers.   
  
3.4.2 The Path to Mediumship 
 During my time in the field there were no fewer than 10 ceremonies in the 
Our Reussei area.  Ing-Britt Trankell reports that the Chai ceremony has 
increased in popularity since the Pol Pot period (Trankell 2003) even if the exact 
form of the ritual as well as the list of potential participants has changed 
somewhat.  With the Cambodian economy growing rapidly (even if less rapidly 
of late) and family members working in Phnom Penh or other commercial centers 
it has become easier for families to hold more elaborate ceremonies – a fact which 
pleases the ancestors and bodes well for the future of the community.  
 In the past, exactly who could become a receptacle for the ancestor spirits 
was quite restricted – limited to those of royal descent only.  However, the scale 
of loss during the Pol Pot régime along with the ensuing dislocation and 
relocation in its immediate aftermath meant that much like the marriage 
136 
restrictions that held in the past, dictating who might be suitable marriage partners, 
the distinction between po and others in affairs of mediumship was significantly 
weakened.  This erosion of the barriers to the status of medium, has opened up 
the possibility of channelling spirit ancestors to potentially any member of the 
Imam San community.   
 Stories about how one became a medium vary greatly, but very typically 
they involve a period of illness from which the person recovered by the grace of 
the ancestor spirits.  In one case, that of Blang-Nak, the spear-wielding soldier of 
the army of Champa, her encounter with the spirits began when she was afflicted 
with a disease that caused her to be paralyzed.  Unable to work, move around or 
even feed herself, she lay helpless certain that she would die.  Finally, after 
begging for the intervention of the ancestors, she received a message – that she 
should pray to Allah and continue to do so until she is well again.  Slowly but 
surely, she began to feel the health restored to her body.  At first she could move 
one finger, then another until at last she was healed.  From that moment on she 
was recognized as a medium and as such has made a successful career for herself 
as a performer at Chai ceremonies.  Blang-Nak was present at every single 
ceremony I attended and was known to other researchers and visitors that had 
attended over the past years.   
 Chai ceremonies frequently end with a divination to determine whether the 
person healed has also been chosen to embody a spirit in future events.  At one 
ceremony that took place shortly before the end of research, the older mediums 
determined that the patient had not received a spirit.  She said that for the 
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duration of the festivities, although she felt that she had recuperated she did not 
feel in any way special – she had not been entered by a spirit.  During the 
divination however, her younger sister began to sob, complaining that during the 
festival she wanted to dance but nobody had asked her to dance.  It appeared that 
it was her sister rather than the patient herself that had received the spirit.  Yet 
even this became unclear as it was remarked that her ex-husband had failed to 
attend the ceremony.  The presence of all family members is vital at these 
ceremonies as it is the linkage through family and blood that tie every member of 
the community back to each other, the royal family and the ancestral spirits.  At 
the time of departure, her status as a medium was still being considered through 
further divinations and dream interpretation sessions. 
 Merely calling oneself a medium is not quite enough to become active in 
the Chai ceremony circuit.  Popularity is key to a medium since it is only by 
being invited to a ceremony that this gift can be translated into an economic good.  
While potentially anyone may be a medium, one's recognition as such depends 
much more on whether or not one is in attendance at a ceremony rather than any 
single person's claim to communication with the spirits.  Even if someone 
believes themselves to be a medium, the potential will remain unrealized unless 
bid by a family to channel the ancestors for them.    
 Some mediums such as Blang-Nak mentioned above appear to be popular 
because of the amount of time she has been performing and her survival through 
the Khmer Rouge régime.  She is a member of the older troupe of mediums, 
much respected because they are thought to better understand their spirits - to 
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more fully appreciate the history of that particular ancestor and the rôle he or she 
plays in the historical re-enactment.  That said, it is fundamentally her 
performance that most arouses the public.  Blang-Nak is fierce, as a soldier 
should be.  Her stoic demeanor and stony countenance retell in the minds of the 
audience the stories of old Champa, whose warriors bravely resisted the 
Vietnamese juggernaut.  There is no doubt about how the story ends, but for a 
time, in the presence of a medium like Blang-Nak, animated by the defiant spirit 
of her proud fore-bearers, the community remembers what it meant to have a 
country, to fight and die for it, and to be regarded by all the world as a people 
worthy of note. 
 This is not to say that young mediums are not valued.  Certain spirits are 
best embodied by young men as their dances involve vigorous movements, 
energetic displays of athleticism and, for the monkey spirit, lewd and suggestive 
gestures.  These spirits spend most of their time engaged in running, jumping, 
wrestling and in the case of the monkey spirit, sexual molestation.  The ability of 
these mediums to perform at a high level of intensity and entertain the crowd is 
what keeps them in business and for all the seriousness of the occasion – its grave 
concern for the well being of the healed patient, its solemn veneration of a 
long-past civilization – it is these mediums that provide the excitement that the 
spectators look forward to and decide whether or not the ceremony will be talked 
about afterwards by non-family members. 
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3.4.3 The Ship of State 
 For a Chai ceremony to be held, a wooden structure needs to be 
constructed in a field near the home of the patient.  This construction consists of 
a simple enclosure, rectangular in form, with a clear distinction between front and 
back, or since it is meant to represent a boat, bow and stern.  The stern is covered.  
It is here that the patient and close family members will be joined by the mediums 
of the spirits of the royal family.  Along the centerline of the watercraft are 
placed a hammock protected by a parasol and just a bit forward of that hammock, 
an altar for offerings.  It is around these two objects that the dancing will occur – 
always in a counter clockwise motion.   
 When asked what the structure is meant to represent most respondents will 
reply 'palace' rather than 'boat', although they also recognize it as a raft and admit 
that it represents both the royal palace and the boat in which the Cham king 
rescued himself from the Vietnamese.  This stems from story of the Kerik tree, 
known throughout the Cham community and recorded in various versions.  A 
young man in attendance explains it in rough detail: 
Before when we had a country, we had a king.  And there was a 
Champa but the Yuon were always making problems.  They were 
attacking and making war.  But the king was too strong and he 
always defeated the Yuon.  Every time they fought the Cham won.  
The king had a special tree in front of his palace.  It was a 
powerful tree and it made the king powerful.  It protected the 
Cham people.  So the Yuon could not defeat the Cham.  So they 
made peace with the Cham by giving the Yuon princess to the 
Cham king.  The princess was very beautiful.  Her skin was very 
white... You know that Yuon people have light skin, right?  They 
are not dark skinned like Cham or Khmer people.  They have 
white skin and their women are very beautiful... and then the king 
married the Yuon princess.   
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 But she wasn't happy.  She said she was sick and her 
bones hurt... but the Yuon are clever.  She was not sick.  
Actually, she placed gravel under her bed and when she moved in 
her bed it made this noise “crunch, crunch, crunch”... it sounded 
like her bones were breaking.  But she's faking!  You 
understand?  The king was very worried... he has a beautiful wife 
but she was unhappy.  So they called people to heal her.  Many 
people tried but nothing worked.  Then finally a Yuon healer 
came to the palace and said that the reason for her illness was the 
tree.  The tree had a bad influence on the princess and it was 
making her ill.   
 The king then said “cut down the tree!” to his soldiers.  
Everyone thought the king was crazy.  But they respected the 
king.  So they cut away at the tree, but they are unable.  The 
tree was too powerful and nobody could cut it.  The king became 
angry with his soldiers and he ran out and cut the tree himself.  
Even though he was an old man, because he was king he could cut 
the magic tree of the Cham people.  He cut down the tree in a 
single stroke and when he cut the tree it started bleeding – a lot of 
blood.  When the Vietnamese learned that the king had cut the 
tree they restarted the war.   
 Without the tree the Yuon defeated the Cham and then took 
the country.  The king escaped because he used the wood from 
the tree to make a boat.  Even though he cut the tree the wood 
was still powerful and it still protected the royal family.  He used 
the boat to get away from the Yuon and traveled on the sea until 
he could find a safe place to land. 
 
 The story continues and ends tragically as the king tries to hide from the 
Vietnamese in a well.  Although the spiders obligingly covered the mouth of the 
well in cobwebs to help hide the royal, a lizard eventually revealed his location 
with his call.  The king was drawn out of the well and beheaded.  In discussions 
of events in Iraq, some Cham recalled that the ignominious end met with by their 
king was not all that unlike the fate of Saddam Hussein – a fact which made it all 
seem even more pathetic and drew odd parallels between Champa and Iraq as 
Muslim countries under occupation engaged in a resistance that in historic terms 
would ultimately prove futile.  In the context of the Chai ceremony, this story 
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explains the identity of the structure as both raft and palace since, for a time, the 
raft of the Kerik tree was the palace.  In fact it was all that remained of Champa 
just as the Chai enclosure is the last place where Cham sovereignty can be made 
manifest.   
 Within the structure there are also a number of other items and symbols 
that appear to have different significances depending on who is asked.  The spear 
flags – red and white – can symbolize war and peace respectively or male and 
female energy.  The parasol can be said to represent the monarchy or it can, in 
conjunction with the hammock, stand for leisure and enjoyment such as was 
enjoyed by the sovereigns in their land.  There is no authoritative lexicon of 
Cham symbols and much like older mediums are considered to have a better 
understanding of the spirits and rituals, there is a feeling that knowledge of Cham 
symbolism is also not what it once was. 
 
3.4.4 Kabuki of a Nation 
 The full spectrum of stylized performances and rituals that is the Chai 
ceremony involve layers of intricate detail and nuance that are far beyond the 
scope of this work.  A detailed study of the ceremony is available in Juliette 
Baccot's On g'nur et Cay à O Russei (1968).  Here I will only discuss a few 
elements that bear on the ethno-historical value of the festival as well as some of 
the ways in which community involvement in its production make this a broadly 
popular social affair. 
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 The opening of the Chai ceremony makes clear that the concern at hand is 
more than just the health of one particular member of the community.  It consists 
of the mediums marching around the periphery of the enclosure.  They will make 
several rounds before actually entering the perimeter.  As they circle the royal 
residence, the forward-most among them clash with swords and clubs.  Chasing 
each other around, they cross weapons repeatedly.  “This is the Cham army.  
They are protecting the country from the Yuon.”  Once they move inside, they 
continue circulating in the same counterclockwise direction although, within the 
relatively restricted confines of the enclosure they no longer lock weapons.  
They do continue to display and parade them and will do so throughout much of 
the ceremony – the martial character of the carnival is never far beneath the 
surface.   
 In a nod to modern times swords, spears and bows are joined by firearms.  
One medium, possessed by the spirit of a Cham general and bedecked in a a red 
silk scarf and a pair of Gucci sunglasses, explained to me that: “We change with 
the times.  Before we had these weapons of wood or metal but now we can use 
guns to defend ourselves.  I am not protecting the Cham just in the past but also 
today.”  He stroked his wooden Kalashnikov and continued: “Cham use 
everything to defend Cham.  We can use weapons.  I am a general and I use 
weapons like these.  Some people know religion or science or business – 
everyone does their best and we build a community.”  As to why he was wearing 
sunglasses in the middle of the night, he replied that he (the general) thought they 
looked good.  They did. 
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 Frank Proschan (2001) describes how among the Kmhmu, oral narratives 
of the creation of the world and its peoples have become infused with the 
experiences of the storytellers themselves, so that as Khmhu people encounter 
Frenchmen and Africans through military service in the French Empire, or later 
come across Japanese and Americans as a result of their struggles for control over 
the region, they incorporate them as characters in their origin myths.  In this case, 
when the last woman on earth gave birth to a gourd, the last man on earth pierced 
it with a hot poker to allow the children to escape.  The first children to exit 
brushed up against the charred breach and were thus blackened – the Africans.  
By the end, the carbonized edges of the opening were scuffed clean and the last to 
emerge represented the ancestors of the Japanese and the Europeans.  The 
Khmhu themselves appeared somewhere in between the dark and light-skinned 
groups.  Proschan argues that while the presence of colonial African troops and 
Europeans may be a relatively recent addition to the story and the integration of 
this new knowledge is not uniform across story tellers, the antiquity of the story 
itself is not prejudiced by it, as it continues to maintain the same contours of 
history and memory, albeit with the addition of elements that revalidate the basic 
premises of the account – just as the wielding of modern arms by Chai mediums 
does not alter the essential rational for carrying that weapon in the first place. 
 For all the gravitas of the underlying reasons for holding the ceremony – 
the health of a community member and the communion with the ancestors – it is 
still a festivity and as such is expected to engage, involve and entertain the 
audience.  Two types of spirits that are critical in this regard are the flying horse 
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and the white monkey.  Typically there are two or even three flying horses 
performing at once.  Unlike the royal spirits leisurely strolling through their 
realm or the military spirits marching across the battlefield, the horse runs in 
circles at whatever speed he can manage on the grass mat surface periodically 
jumping into the air and then stopping at the rear covered portion to dance for the 
pleasure of the royal spirits, then they begin running again and the cycle repeats 
itself.  Other mediums will offer the horse bananas, for which he will have to run, 
jump and dance.  When there is more than one horse, they often enter into 
comedic routines as they compete for the attention of the royals and access to 
bananas by trying to outdo each other in athleticism or, if that proves insufficient, 
slapping the other horse in the mouth as he tries to eat his meal. 
 The white monkey on the other hand typically appears alone.  In his 
office of troublemaker, he runs about on all fours groping and fondling the other 
mediums.  If possible he will steal their cigarettes, paw their breasts and try to 
crawl up their dresses.  Although the mediums do not leave the enclosure during 
the performance, the monkey can reach outside of it to grab the ankles of the 
unsuspecting or snatch a snack carelessly placed within range of his arm.  This is 
interspersed with calmer episodes of the monkey scratching, and fondling himself 
and his cloth tail, which he sticks between his legs as a mock penis.   According 
to all my sources, the monkey has never failed to please the crowd with this 
routine. 
 While the ceremony is not exactly scripted, it does follow an order of 
songs within which certain types of routines, such as the horses fighting over 
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bananas, may take place.  Some of these schticks are performed more often than 
others.  They include the procession of the nervous princess, where the Cham 
princess is paraded around, but if any male spirit should even brush up against her 
during the procession she screams and cries uncontrollably in a fit of fear and 
anger until the offending medium is forcibly restrained and detained.  In another, 
performed toward the end of the whole ceremony, the warrior mediums pass 
around and drink from a bowl, the contents of which are meant to represent an 
alcoholic beverage.  Inebriated, they become careless with their weapons which 
are then stolen and hidden by a Vietnamese agent, thus bringing on the defeat of 
the Cham army.  The variability of these performances ensures that each 
ceremony is unique even if they all follow the same basic pattern. 
 The Chai festival is a major social event that incorporates virtually all 
members of the community.  Families attend together with parents explaining 
the events to their young children.  Children also participate in the musical 
component.  The orchestra consisting of drums, gongs and flutes also includes a 
long piece of bamboo that the children strike rhythmically to keep time using 
small pieces of wood.  As they tire they are replaced by a new batch of 
youngsters and some anthropologists – in this way ensuring that everyone has a 
chance to participate.   
 For adolescents and teens, the ceremony is a good night out.  The 
performances go late into the night and end after midnight, a time at which girls 
should certainly be at home.  Along the perimeter of the field, groups of young 
men, some of them drunk, loiter in the shadows.  A few of them are talking to 
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girls.  Others are waiting to see if any girls will pass by them and give them an 
opportunity to spring into action and turn on the charm.  Inevitably, a group of 
young ladies locking arms will stroll just inside the lit area and then, giggling, 
skip back to the performance.  Invariably, the boys fail to seize the day (or night) 
and resign themselves to further waiting.  I have been told that people actually 
meet this way, but it did not appear to be enormously effective.  Most of the 
couples I saw were already couples before  the ceremony.  Nevertheless, the 
sideline interactions provide an alternate theatrical experience for those needing to 
take a break from the trance-inducing drum and gong music. 
  
3.4.5 Belonging in the Hostland 
 The above description might lead one to regard the Chai festival as a 
self-centered, self-indulgent celebration and affirmation of Cham independence 
and sovereignty and yet, the event deploys story and imagery that bond these 
Cham to their land of exile as well.  The most obvious commonality that one 
sees with the Khmer is the depiction of the Vietnamese as the arch-enemy of the 
people, the primary existential threat to the community and the agent of their 
demise as an independent polity.  The story of the Kerik tree in which the 
Vietnamese apply the feminine wiles of their light-skinned beautiful women to 
undermine resistance from within has a parallel in Cambodian history as well.  
The Cham are also aware of how once upon a time, a similar marriage meant to 
bring peace and stability resulted in political subjugation and humiliation.   
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 In the early 17th century, King Jayajetta took a Vietnamese wife from the 
Nguyễn line and shortly thereafter, in 1623, allowed the Vietnamese to establish a 
customs house and trading post in Prey Nokor.  In time, the Vietnamese would, 
through settlement of their own people designed to change the demographics of 
the area, come to control the entire Mekong delta and exert commercial, military 
and political influence from that formerly Khmer city that would later be known 
as Saigon (Tully 2005).  The loss of these territories, known as Kampuchea 
Krom, is still felt as the greatest of the many historic wrongs perpetrated upon 
them by the Vietnamese and continues to be a source of ill-feeling.  Although 
Cambodia managed to escape the complete political annihilation that befell the 
Cham, the loss of the Mekong delta cut Cambodia off from seaborne trade, 
effectively rendering it a landlocked march, subject to the abuses and 
interventions of its more powerful neighbors – the Vietnamese and the Thais 
(Chandler 1996). 
 On a mythic level, the story also resonates with the Khmer story of Preah 
Ko Preah Kaew, or Lord Kaew and the sacred cow.  Preah Ko and Preah Kaew 
are brothers, except one of them is a cow, who were born when their pregnant 
mother fell from a tree causing her belly to burst open.  Over time, it becomes 
apparent that the Preah Ko possesses great magical powers.  This is due to the 
fact that within the belly of Preah Ko are contained the golden books that store the 
knowledge of all things such as science, medicine, literature and statecraft.  This 
is the Indian inheritance with which Khmer people were charged and which 
enabled them to build a glorious civilization.   
148 
 Preah Ko and Preah Kaew had successful careers in service of the king of 
Cambodia, until the king of Thailand learned of their existence and sought to 
possess them for himself.  After a long chase, Preah Ko and Preah Kaew were 
encircled by the Thai army at the fortress of Longvek.  Fortunately for the heroes, 
Longvek was protected by an impregnable wall of bamboo thickets that made any 
conventional assault impossible.  Unfortunately for them however, the Thai 
general had a plan for breaching this defense.  He ordered that his soldiers 
should load the cannons with silver coins rather than cannonballs and aim directly 
into the vegetation.  They did so and continued firing until the entire bamboo 
palisade was strewn with gold.  Having exhausted their ammunition, the Thais 
abandoned the siege and retreated.  Seeing the Thais withdraw, the Khmers 
quickly set upon their own bamboo defenses – cutting them down to get at the 
coins.  With their defensive perimeter dismantled, Longvek lay prostrate before 
the Thai army which returned in short order once they learned that their plan had 
worked.  The fortress fell and Preah Ko and Preah Kaew found themselves in the 
hands of the enemy and on their way to Thailand. 
 This story is frequently invoked as an explanation for the dominance of 
the Thais and the corresponding decline of Angkor civilization, but it is somewhat 
more than that.  Not only does Thailand become powerful at the expense of 
Cambodia but in fact the very essence of sovereign power, the knowledge of India 
and the virtue of Buddhism, is transferred from the declining Khmer state to the 
now ascendant kingdom of Thailand (Smith 2006).  The story has a basis in 
historical fact.  The sacking of Angkor in 1431 by the Thais resulted in the 
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wholesale transfer of scholars, dancers, musicians and monks to their capital at 
Ayutthya and the development of a court culture that usurped Cambodia's rôle as 
the guardian and paragon of Indic civilization in the region. 
 In the Cham story, the Kerik tree is said to represent the unity of the Cham 
people.  It had strong roots that came together to form a great trunk.  When it 
was cut, it spilled the blood of the Cham nation and ended their unity as a people.  
In both stories, the font of national strength, be it the virtue of Brahmanic wisdom 
or the solidarity of the people, is an impregnable defense until the Cham and the 
Khmer themselves decide to sacrifice the underpinnings of their dominion.  The 
sexual lust of an old king for a fair-skinned beauty and the greed of the Khmer 
inhabitants of Longvek lead to short term decisions with tragically long term 
consequences.  The focus on the skin of the Vietnamese princess also casts the 
Cham as a 'dark people' like the Khmers rather than as a light-skinned and 
presumably more beautiful  people like the Vietnamese and Chinese and 
implying a natural bond between the less fortunate, less comely Cham and Khmer 
races. 
 Both stories concern bastions of Indian civilization under assault by the 
forces of barbarism – on their own unable to topple the civilized regents from 
their position of superiority.  However, in both cases, a loss of virtue and 
deviance from the correct principles results in their being unworthy of their 
fortunes and capitulating, not only politically but also morally, to their enemies.  
On the one hand, these stories offer an explanation for the low standing among 
nations of the Khmer and the Cham today.  Yet, on the other hand stories like 
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these, like that of the Garden of Eden, which paint a glorious past now lost to a 
single act of faithlessness, also imply a solution to the present predicament, 
namely that the recapture of the virtue that sustained the past could lead to the 
closing of the ring of history, where the people are redeemed and brought back to 
their initial state of grace.  
 Another story that circulates in the Imam San community is the story of 
Tasart, a Cham princess living in Kampong Cham at a time after Champa had 
ceased to exist.  In an incursion by the Thai army she was captured and taken 
back to Thailand.  Tasart's husband rallied a band of soldiers and set off to 
punish the Thais and reclaim his wife.  The Thai general sent soldiers to 
intercept him but he defeated them and continued to charge at the Thai main force.  
He continued to absorb arrows and lances as he marched on the general.  
Horribly wounded, he did not stop.  Overcome by pity, Tasart agreed to help the 
Thai general put her husband out of his misery and gave him a broach from which 
was fashioned an arrowhead.  The arrow struck her husband dead and Tasart was 
taken back to the royal court in Thailand, where the ladies of the court copied her 
hairstyle and jewellery and made them their own. 
 This story permits the Cham to claim some degree of enmity with the 
Thais, the other great rival of the Khmer and so present themselves as united with 
their hosts in the struggle against their common enemies.  At the time that I 
received the story, Thai-Cambodian tensions over the temple of Preah Vihear 
were continually flaring.  The final touch of having Tasart perform an extreme 
makeover on the Thai court also echoes the transfer of knowledge and culture in 
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the story of Preah Ko Preah Kaew and unites the Cham and Khmer as the original 
possessors of Indian arts and learning in mainland southeast Asia.  This earlier 
pre-Islamic culture is regarded by the Imam San as the basis of their commonality 
with Khmers and the reason why they are able to get along so well. 
 There are other less obvious signs of this cultural substrate such as the 
dancing of the mediums themselves.  In segments of the ceremony when the 
soldier spirits are not on the warpath, they dance around the altar performing what 
is essentially a roamvong, a traditional Khmer circle dance performed at 
celebrations and gatherings.  It consists of dancers moving in a circle while 
rotating their wrists and spreading their fingers in front of them as if a flower 
blossoming.  When I asked about this striking similarity, I was told that it was 
because of the common origin of Cham and Khmer culture.  A father holding his 
young daughter explained: 
These dances are old dances from Champa.  Before we came to 
Cambodia we had Champa and the dance of Champa and 
Cambodia are the same.  Why?  Because it came from Langka.  
Do you know where Langka is?  It's in India.  Cham culture – 
Khmer culture they are the same because they are both from 
Langka.  In Langka they had dance like this.  They had art and 
letters and they also had science... like this.  The Chai ceremony 
is a kind of science.  It has scientific properties.  We follow the 
old ways and the old ways are still effective.  Like you see today 
– this person is healed. 
 
 The same explanation was given for the spirit of the white monkey.  In 
Khmer representations of the Ramayana, Hanuman, the monkey king and an 
important character in the legend, is depicted in white.  Both Hanuman and the 
white monkey are mischievous and perform acrobatic routines designed to inject 
152 
levity into the performance.   This is regarded as yet another example of the 
common heritage whereby the Imam San imagine their relation to Khmers as that 
of siblings – children of the same parent, descendants of a common ancestor – 
having similar and parallel cultures, neither superior to the other.  The only real 
difference being that the vicissitudes of history, that have dealt cruel blows to 
both brothers, were considerably harsher on the Cham.  
 The role of population transfers in cultural diffusion is historically 
important in Southeast Asia as the region has long been relatively sparsely 
populated.  This led to a type of warfare that focused on the capture of slaves 
rather than territory – slaves who would be moved to the political center and 
rendered for service.  Beemer (2009) explains that not only did the slave 
population eventually assimilate and take on the culture of their captors, but the 
slaves themselves exerted a powerful influence on the host society.  The Imam 
San remember the Cham contribution to Thai court life, which was itself drawn 
from Cambodia.  They also understand themselves to have been in the service of 
the Khmer king as soldiers and so as a result have a degree of belonging in the 
society.  By contrast, virtually all Cham believe that any Cham who remained 
behind was essentially demoted to peasant status and have remained there this day.  
They have not been incorporated into the body politic of the Vietnamese state and 
so have not truly been assimilated to that country.  Unlike other parts of the 
region, the population of the Red River delta was relatively dense and so it was 
land rather than people sought by the Vietnamese.  This failure to be 
incorporated into the Vietnamese empire in a dignified manner that recognized 
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their value is still resented and contributes greatly to the notion of the Vietnamese 
as alien and incompatible with the Cham, unlike the Khmer or even the Thai to a 
certain extent. 
 Not only are their cultures compatible, but even their ancestral spirits 
appear to have come to an understanding about the presence of the Cham in 
Cambodia.  Before a Chai ceremony is initiated the Khmer spirits are also 
propitiated and thanked for allowing them to continue their tradition in this land.  
A younger Cham man, of royal blood himself, explained that when the Cham 
arrived in Cambodia they were given permission by the king of Cambodia to live 
there.  Ever since then, the Cham and Khmer are joined by this agreement of 
their royal families and because of this the Cham always thank the Khmer spirits 
at the outset of any spirit ceremony and, in addition to this, Cham are able to host 
Khmer spirits as well.  This means that among the Imam San, apart from the 
Chai ceremony, Areak ceremonies also take place.   
 The Areak is a Khmer form of spirit possession similar to the Chai 
ceremony but without the royal or historic element.  It's practice is still common 
in much of the Cambodian countryside today.  On occasion, healers will 
determine that the illness of a Cham is due to a unsatisfied local Khmer spirit and 
not a matter related to their Cham ancestors.  When this happens, a Khmer style 
spirit ceremony is arranged and the services of the appropriate mediums are 
engaged.  Some Cham have Cham spirits, some have Khmer spirits and yet 
others are able to channel both.  The medium Blang-Nak also receives a Khmer 
spirit and is also a regular performer at local Areak ceremonies.  The Imam San 
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feel that the ability to accept Khmer spirits would only be possible if the Cham 
were truly accepted as a part of the nation. 
 Through the Chai ceremony, the Cham both celebrate and lament their 
history.  In celebration, they embrace their Brahmanic Indian heritage and the 
sophisticated and cultured polity it once produced.  At the same time, they 
mourn the loss of that world and renew their resistance to the forces that threaten 
them further.  In both of these sentiments, the Imam San find a very basic 
common bond with their Khmer hosts as heirs to a single legacy now lost to the 
depredations of their enemies.  
 
3.4.6 The Future of the Past 
 As Ing-Britt Trankell (2003) understood, the Chai is also an occasion for 
contemplating the future of the community and for hoping that the times of 
trouble that the community has experienced - from the exile, to the Pol Pot period, 
to the current economic difficulties gripping the country – will give way to a 
prosperous future for the Cham nation.  I found that the lull between dinner and 
the start of the Chai ceremony always sparked an almost stream of consciousness 
conversation with young Cham about their plans for the future as well as the 
nature of their current predicament.  While these young people seemed happy to 
discuss all aspects of their experiences growing up as young Cham in the Imam 
San community, it was around the time of Chai festivals that they appeared 
especially concerned about their futures as they, this time without being asked by 
me, recounted their hopes and dreams and asked what advice I might have for 
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getting one's affairs in order and having a successful life.  Much as New Year's 
celebrations in the United States lead conversations to turn to weight loss, quitting 
smoking and running marathons, the Chai ceremony sparks adolescent concerns 
about marriage possibilities, schooling, work, and their future standing in the 
community. 
 In a comment heard by many foreigners working in the Cambodian 
countryside, Yusuf, a young man said to me: “In Cambodia the cows eat grass, 
but in America the cows eat hamburger”.  The very notion of feeding cows to 
cows struck me as odd and for a moment I thought I should explain to him how 
silly it was, but then, reflecting on the mad cow epidemic of the 1990's caused by 
grinding up cows and feeding them to other cows, I thought it better to just ask 
what he meant by that comment: 
In Cambodia there is no money.  There are no jobs – especially 
here.  If you go to Phnom Penh then you can find a job.  But the 
jobs aren't good and then you live in Phnom Penh.  The city is 
expensive and then you have to come back to your village to see 
your friends and family.  Travel is expensive, rent is expensive in 
the city...  In America I think you have a lot of money and you 
have jobs to do.  In America maybe you can be a doctor or you 
can do business, but in Cambodia there is very little to do.  So we 
farm, but farming can't make a better life. 
 
If you had the money, what do you think you would do? 
 
I would be a doctor.  I want to study medicine and be a doctor, 
but I don't want to work in Phnom Penh.  Maybe I can live there 
for a few years while I am studying, but I want to be a doctor for 
my community. 
 
So you would study there and come back here? 
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Yes... well... it's hard.  There is no hospital here.  So even if I 
become a doctor, maybe I still won't help Cham people.  I will 
work in Phnom Penh. 
 
But you could send money back to your village? 
 
Yes, but I want to be the doctor for the community.  If I send 
money, that is good.  But we need to have a Cham doctor and 
Cham medicine.  Today we have a Chai ceremony, but before the 
Chai the sick person has to go to doctors and travel outside the 
village to Phnom Penh.  It would be better if we had a doctor 
here.  The Cham doctor would do his best and charge very little 
money to help the patient. 
 
 Yusuf's concerns here are multiple.  On the most elementary level, he 
makes the observation that Cambodia is poor – an uncontroversial statement.  
However, he relates this not merely to a lack of money but also to a lack of things 
to do.  His broader point is that the United States or other more developed 
countries have economies where things happen, where a person that wants to 
study and work can indeed study and work – the efforts of the person are 
absorbed by social institutions.  In Cambodia today, most people who would like 
to study and work, by contrast, will have nowhere to do so.  Yusuf's hopes for 
the future are accompanied by a feeling of futility.   
 Since the Imam San are not orthodox Muslims, they are not considered for 
aid by Muslim charities.  The lifeline from abroad is not a real possibility for 
them in the way that it is for Wahhabi or Tablighi communities.  Occasionally, if 
the international Muslim donors are not too savvy regarding the local divisions of 
Muslim communities in Cambodia, it is possible for the Imam San to receive 
some aid during holidays.  One Imam San member solicited and received 8 
heads of cattle for the feast of the sacrifice.  He simply wrote his name and 
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village and the number of people he needed to feed.  They did not ask how many 
times a day he prayed, neither did he volunteer this information, and so the village 
received a donation that year. 
 Yet these windfalls are the exception rather than the rule.  Most 
organized donors are aware of the need to enforce orthodoxy in this corner of the 
Muslim periphery and are willing to use aid as leverage to induce Cambodian 
Muslims to bring their practices in line with those of orthodox Muslims.  For this 
reason, it is not clear that any such aid would even address Yusuf's other key 
concern, that being the integrity of the Cham community to which he belongs.  
The reliance on Phnom Penh might just become a reliance on Kuwait and in any 
case: 
I think the Arabs want us to study religion.  They send everyone 
to their country and then they come back.  They come back and 
they are Arabs and they know everything about religion.  But I 
want to study medicine. 
 
So you don't want to study religion? 
 
I'm not so interested.  (smirk) If we study religion it has to be 
their religion.  And afterward we still need doctors.  We already 
have people in this village who study religion in the Cham way.  
That is enough. 
 
 Yusuf's ability to meet his goals will not come from “the Arabs”, a people 
that he sees as positively hostile to the existence of his own community.  It will 
have to come from somewhere in the community itself.  Options that involve 
leaving the community or “becoming and Arab” are simply insufficient to the task 
Yusuf would like to set for himself.  So far he has been unable to secure money 
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for anything other than English lessons, but he feels medicine may yet be a 
possibility for him. 
 Another example of community-centered long-term planning came as I 
was taken for a walk by Rina and Sras, two girls in their late teens.  They took 
me to an area between their own village and the Khmer village with its Buddhist 
temple.  They were separated by a lake used to irrigate rice fields during the dry 
season, and walking along the dyke to the Chinese graveyard and Buddhist temple 
we could look back on the lake and their village. 
I want to make a resort here...  This place is beautiful.  There is 
a lake and there is our Cham village and there is a Khmer Village 
and the Khmer village has a nice wat that people can visit.  If we 
make some chairs and tables then we can sell food and drinks.  
People can enjoy this area and they can visit our village.  
Everyone will know that the Cham village is a nice place.  
People can relax in the village and everyone will be happy.  I 
think it would be a good business.  People already eat and buy 
coffee in Sala Lekh Pram (on the highway).  But Sala Lekh Pram 
is not so nice.  Not like this place.  They don't have a lake.  
And here there is the Buddhist temple.  For Khmer New Year 
people come here and they have a carnival.  So people can come 
here and they like it, but only once a year.  If we make a resort, 
they will come every day. 
 
 Rina and Sras' plan both emphasize the importance of their own Cham 
village and Cham space as well as set in a broader multicultural context with 
Khmer temples and Chinese graveyards in a way that does not subordinate one to 
the other.  This projection of a future involving neighbourly relations, not as an 
abstract “we-should-all-get-along” but rather as a blueprint for very concrete 
cooperative relations between themselves and the Khmers and Sino-Khmers of 
the surrounding settlements.  At the same time, there is no reference made to 
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other Muslims in nearby communities, of which there are several.  By 'Cham 
village' these women always mean their own cluster of Imam San villages.  
Other Muslims, Arabs or Chvea are simply not part of the productive and 
prosperous future of their imaginations. 
 
3.5 Muslim Gaze 
 For young Imam San, the Chai ceremony is not only the celebration of 
their shared Cham heritage but also an event that crystallizes ethnic consciousness 
and projects it into the future as a possible coordination of Cham aspirations with 
the realities of living in a Khmer dominated state.  For this reason, many Imam 
San are eager to receive visitors during this time so that they might better 
understand what Cham culture is about.  The history, the display of material 
culture and the spiritual component are presented simultaneously as the most 
complete and comprehensive expression of the experience of the people that can 
legitimately be called 'Cham'.  This sort of ceremony is something that only 
Cham perform.  It anchors their understanding of their relationships to both 
Khmers and Vietnamese and so helps establish a yardstick for their progress as a 
people.  Other Muslims, as they have abandoned the Chai spirit cult, are 
therefore also abandoning Cham culture and so cannot lay claim to the inheritance 
of their Champa ancestors. 
 However, this pride in the conservation of Cham cultural practices 
disguises a parallel insecurity in their community's knowledge of those things 
which other Muslims, by virtue of their access to the outside world, possess.  
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That the Chai is classified as a 'culture' event and not as a 'religion' event is 
critical here.  As the Chai cult is antithetical to the modern practice of Islam it 
has no analogue in the other Muslim communities and therefore it is 
incommensurable.  There is no critique by foreign Muslims or local orthodox 
Muslims about the way in which the ceremony is carried out, rather, the critique is 
that it is being carried out at all.  The Chai ceremony is regarded by even the 
most scathing detractor of the Imam San as an 'authentically Cham' ceremony – 
the real McCoy.  Nobody doubts that it is a tradition passed down from ancient 
Champa, which incidentally is exactly the reason why they hate it so.  But 
outside of the Chai cult, the self-assuredness of the Imam San begins to evaporate. 
 Early on a Saturday morning, I received this call from Usman (a 
personality I will discuss in greater detail in section 3.5):   
Hello, brother, I need to ask you something.  Do you know 
Arabic? 
 
Very little.  Why? 
 
We have a document.  It's really old maybe two or three hundred 
years old.  Some of it is in Cham and some is in Arabic.  I can't 
read it.  Can you read it? 
 
Well, I know the Arabic alphabet. 
 
All the letters!? 
 
Yes, but that doesn't mean I know the meaning of the words.  I 
can pronounce them and then maybe I'll understand or maybe I 
won't. 
 
Great!  Can you come now?  I am bringing together all the 
students.  We are going to the elder's house and we will copy the 
document together.  But if you can help us then maybe we can 
really understand the entire thing. 
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 Arriving at the village I was greeted by Usman and his band of students – 
nine boys and girls.  They were gathering around a low table and anxiously 
waiting for the elder to come out of the house with the old texts.  They were 
armed with notebooks, pens, pencils, rulers and a a large piece of heavy paper 
roughly a square meter in size.  One of the older girls explained that they were 
going to copy the document onto the paper.  That way they could study it 
without damaging the original since it was so old.  I couldn't help but remark on 
her shirt – a red T-shirt emblazoned with an image of Preah Vihear, the temple on 
the Cambodian-Thai border, and the words 'I am proud to have been born a 
Khmer.'  This shirt and others like it had become very popular in Cambodia with 
the increasing tensions between the two countries over the ownership of the ruins.  
Everyone laughed as she proclaimed her Cham pride and then explained that she 
liked the shirt.  After all it was a nice shirt and those temples really are Khmer 
and not Thai.  Outside of the Imam San community, I have never seen any other 
Muslim wear any of this line of Preah Vihear shirts. 
 A man in his 60's emerged from his house with a bundle of old papers.  
These were texts that he had handwritten himself and that he had hidden in a 
pillow during the Khmer Rouge period.  As the document was produced, the 
students, under the direction of Usman, carved out a grid pattern on the paper, 
with each student taking responsibility for copying one of the sections.  The 
majority was written in Cham using the Cham characters typically used in 
Cambodia with titles of sections written in Arabic.  I helped sound out the 
Arabic as well as copy it out into the duplicate that they were making.  Although 
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all of the students knew the Cham writing system, they were slow – they sounded 
out each syllable until the sound in their head matched a word that they knew.  
There are few opportunities for reading and writing in Cham and so while they 
understood the script, it is not something that they ever had the chance to 
internalize over a lifetime of literacy.  Their difficulties notwithstanding, it is 
remarkable to find people in this age bracket with any degree of Cham literacy, 
much less nine at a time. 
 As I finished my contribution to the project – the copying of the Arabic 
text – Usman turned to me and said: 
Listen brother, please don't tell anyone else about this... anybody 
from the other villages. 
 
Is this a secret? 
 
No, but we do not understand it yet.  The Cham is very old and I 
will need to have an elder explain to me what the text means.  It 
is not the same as the Cham spoken today.  And the Arabic, we 
don't understand at all, except for what you explained.  Until we 
know, we can't allow anyone else to see it.  Especially don't tell 
Ali from Chrok Romiet. 
 
Why not him? 
 
He comes here often and tries to tell us that we should change our 
religion and culture to be like the Arabs.  I think he studied in 
one of those Arab countries... 
 
He studied in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Right, Saudi Arabia, and I think he knows Arabic very well.  
Maybe even better than you, brother. 
 
He has a degree in Arabic literature from Medinah.  My Arabic 
doesn't compare to his. 
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Yes!  Exactly, he can use his knowledge of Arabic and try to tell 
us what it means.  Then he will criticize us.  He always 
criticizes us.  We need to understand the text first, and then 
maybe we can show it to other people. 
 
 Unlike the Chai ceremony, this text was certainly religious in character – 
the presence of the squiggly 'worm script' made that clear to them from the 
moment they set eyes on the yellowed text.  The Imam San may own this 
particular document, but their understanding of it, and by extension their 
worthiness to continue to own it, is not beyond dispute.  The students, who will 
also be discussed further in section 3.7, arrived on a mission to document, 
conserve and protect a piece of Cham culture and history, but were faced with an 
artifact whose significance straddles both the linguistic and literary inheritance of 
Champa, which they are devoted to defending, and the religious importation of 
Islam, which lies well outside their comfort zone.  A document like this could 
potentially spell disaster.  If an 'Arab' like Ali were to come across it and decode 
the Arabic, he could well be in a position to expound further on the rest of the 
document, rendering the Cham components irrelevant or twisting them so they 
support his idea of what the text says.   
 Usman and the students know that when it comes to Islam as a religion 
they are hopelessly outgunned.  The fact that they called me as an Arabic 
language consultant is a rather good indicator of the absolute lack of people 
skilled in Arabic in their community and their degree of mistrust for other Muslim 
groups.  The elder explained that the text related to the health of the body and 
the way in which a correct life leads to a sound state.  These were texts handed 
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down from Champa and the teaching that they received from Ali, who introduced 
Islam to the Cham.  For this reason the texts could only be understood by 
someone well versed in Qur'an and other religious knowledge. 
 And this was the problem.  Quite apart from the oldfangled writing style 
was the question of the content, which this group of young Cham, of which none 
had ever even held a Qur'an in their lives, was ill-prepared to interpret.  
Moreover, none was at all interested in acquiring this type of knowledge.  The 
students dutifully finished their duplication of the text and returned the original, 
but their initial enthusiasm for it was dampened as it became clear that this was a 
'religion' thing rather than a 'culture' thing.  Several months later I asked about 
what progress there had been in decoding the text.  The project was on hold.  
There were more pressing matters and a text of that type could wait.  The 
important thing was to create the replica – with that done, it could be put on the 
back burner for later.  I never heard of the document again. 
 The sensitivity of the community to criticism by other Muslims and the 
need many feel to perform, explain and justify their ways to the outside world 
leads the Imam San to emphasize events such as the Mawlud, Mawlud Phnom and 
Chai ceremony as public relations events for potential visitors.  During my time 
in the community, I was thanked not only for attending the events myself but for 
bringing others to witness them.  Other researchers, journalists, aid workers and 
US Embassy staff are seen as important to the status and image of the community.  
Foreign Muslims who were not missionaries and not interested in explaining to 
the Imam San what the correct practice of Islam should be were also welcomed.   
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 On one occasion, I arrived in the company of an Ismaili woman from India, 
who was curious to meet this group of Muslims that pray only once a week. 
This lady is a Muslim from India. 
 
Oh.  Hello.  She is a Muslim? 
 
Yes, she is an Ismaili Muslim.  They pray three times a day. 
 
Three times!  (leaning over to repeat this into another elder's 
ear)  Three times!  (smiling)  Here we pray once a week.  It is 
our tradition from Champa.  (turning to tell a group of people in 
a louder voice)  She is from India.  She prays three times a day! 
 
Everyone was very amused by this, but also there was a sense of vindication: 
The Arabs come and tell us to pray five times a day.  They say 
everyone prays five times a day.  But we say no.  We pray once 
a week.  And she prays three times.  The Arabs travel.  We 
don't travel.  So I've never been to her country.  Her country is 
India, right?  ...  India is far.  Maybe we would need a boat, or 
nowadays a plane to go there.  There her people pray three times 
a day but the Arabs never said, some people pray five times and 
some people pray three times.  We do it in our own way.  
Everyone has to worship according to the tradition of their people.  
If you have a good heart, like this lady, you can pray three times – 
it's not a problem. 
 
Another middle aged man, nodding his head, speaks up: 
We are from Champa.  Our culture is also from India like this 
woman.  Although we are Muslims, we are not Arabs.  There 
are Muslim people in India, but their tradition is different from 
Arabs, and our culture is from Champa and also India and so our 
tradition is different as well.  Arabs don't care if we pray with 
sincerity.  They only want everyone to do things their way. 
 
 The men thanked her for visiting and talking about her country and 
religion to them.  For them, this was proof of what they had suspected for some 
time – that Islam is practiced in different ways in different places.  If a well 
educated Muslim foreigner working for an NGO can pray three times a day then 
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the whole tzimmes about praying five times daily is really an irrelevancy.  The 
fact that she was from India, the historic origin of the Cham civilization was 
another victory over the Arabs – they may be able to foist their beliefs and 
practices on those who forsook their Cham heritage to become cultureless Chvea, 
but people with real culture such as the Indians or the Cham need not surrender 
themselves to the lies spread by 'intolerant and aggressive Arabs'.   
 Liisa Malkki (1995) working among Hutu refugees, also encountered this 
drive to establish an outer universe of foreign agents who support their struggle 
not only materially but on a moral level by recognizing their value as people as 
opposed to the Tutsi who negate it.  The presence of these foreign visitors in to 
the Imam San community is essential to developing a world view in which the 
'Arab' is not the final and absolute arbiter of practice.  Like most Cambodians the 
Imam San do no travel outside the country and do not study geography for any 
significant period of time.  They are unsure as to where Arabia, India, France, 
Japan or the United States are and what their relative sizes are.  The impression 
that they are given from Islamic missionaries is that out there there is a benevolent 
and supportive Muslim society – the umma.  If only they would conform to their 
practice of religion then the Imam San too would be brought into the fold.  
Americans, Europeans and other unbelievers are at best irrelevant and at worst a 
threat to the health of the umma.  By filling in the gaps in their knowledge about 
the outside world through interactions with visitors, the Imam San can begin to 
challenge this view of a world that is morally uni-polar and find justification for 
their practices in the acceptance of foreigners who in turn accept them.   
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3.6 A New Generation 
 As in other Muslim communities in Cambodia, there is a pronounced gap 
in religiosity and world view between the younger and older generations, 
separated by the Pol Pot period of the mid to late 70's.  However, while in most 
communities there has been a trend toward increased religiosity and elevated 
interest in a kind of Islam that transcends the borders of the Cambodian state 
(Blengsli 2003), among many of the Imam San of Kompong Chhnang, the 
opposite has been true.  Dissatisfied with the negation of their ethnic identity that 
they feel orthodox Islam represents, they construct a vision of community that 
adds weight to their historic status as an independent and civilized people and 
weaves it into the fabric of the Cambodian state which ultimately they see as the 
guarantor of their place in the country. 
 
3.6.1 'The Students' 
 One morning I was invited by a young Imam San girl to join her friends 
on a field trip.  Usman, their teacher of English and all of his students were off to 
the National Museum.  They were going to look at the art objects and then have 
a discussion about Cambodian history.  Much of the museum is given over to 
Buddhist and Hindu images from different periods, made in different styles.  The 
students wove around the statues and displays while taking notes – mostly in 
Khmer but also in English when possible.  As their English teacher, Usman 
continued to reinforce the need for them not only to know English, but also to be 
able to use it to talk about their community.  This means knowing how to handle 
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history, art, culture and engage a potential new foreign friend in an interesting 
conversation and act as an advocate for the needs and concerns of the Imam San.   
 Since placing them in a museum does not diminish the religious power of 
Buddha images, attendants were present to offer jasmine flowers to visitors so 
that they could in turn offer them to the Buddha along with a small monetary 
contribution.  A smiling attendant extended several bundles of flowers to Usman 
and the students he brought in tow.  “I'm sorry.  We're Muslims”, he replied 
politely.  The attendant seemed confused.  Afterwards she explained that they 
looked like Khmers so she did not understand why they did not make the offering.  
“They don't cover their heads like the people in Chroy Changvar or Chbar 
Ampouv.  But later I heard them speaking their wa, wa, wa language”, she 
explained, tacking on her best Cham impression at the end. 
 Arriving at the last room of the museum, the students gathered in front of 
a large map showing the extent of the Khmer empire at its zenith - covering all 
that is today Cambodia and extending into much of present-day Laos and 
Thailand as well as parts of Malaysia and of course the Mekong delta, known as 
Kampuchea Krom, or Lower Cambodia by Khmers today.  The map also 
included other states contemporary with Angkor – most notably Champa, hugging 
the littoral of the South China Sea in what is today central Việt Nam. 
That is Champa.  That is where we're from.  You see, at the 
same time as Angkor, Champa was a great country.  Now we are 
in Cambodia... maybe here... (pointing at a map of today's 
Cambodia at a spot just north of Phnom Penh in Kompong 
Chhnang province.)  Now we can't go to Champa because the 
Vietnamese took it.  You see here... (snaking a finger down the 
coast from Champa to the tip of today's Cà Mau peninsula.)  The 
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Vietnamese took everything.  They took Champa and Kampuchea 
Krom from Cambodia.  
 
What was Champa like? 
 
It was like Angkor.  The same.  It had big buildings and culture.  
Cham people were happy because they had their own country.  
Until the Vietnamese came and took the land from Cham and 
Khmer people.  Both Cham and Khmer fight against the 
Vietnamese.  That is why the Khmer let us live here in Cambodia.  
We cooperate to protect our country. 
 
Did the Cham and Khmers also fight each other? 
 
No, I don't think so.  They worked together to fight Việt Nam.  
You know we have a culture like the Khmer so we also had 
buildings like Angkor Watt in Champa.  If we have more money 
then maybe someday we will go to Siem Reap and see Angkor 
Watt.  If we can't go to Champa then we can still see Angkor and 
understand the history of our people. 
 
 As with the participants and spectators of the Chai ceremony, the students 
present a Cham historical narrative forged in the conflict with the Vietnamese 
enemy and tempered by a sense of belonging to the Cambodian state, but moving 
beyond this, the students are not content to replay the drama of Cham nationhood 
on the Chai stage but instead are resolved to add to the fund of knowledge that 
buttresses their claims to be the heirs of Champa, and justifies their current 
religious and cultural orientations vis–à–vis Khmers, Muslims and non-Muslim 
foreigners. 
 For the past several years, this group of young people have been studying 
English from Usman and at the same time, engaging each other in discussion 
about the Imam San community – its problems and its future.  Usman is himself 
of the royal lineage.  He tries to be as discrete as possible about this since he 
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feels it may cause people to respect him unduly and not listen to the actual 
substance of what he is saying.  Around himself he has built a following of 
young people mostly in their late teens and early twenties, who he hopes will be 
the nucleus of a new Cham society.  The group does not have a formal name.  
They are typically referred to and refer to themselves as Usman's students 
although sometimes they are referred to as 'Krom Rina', or Rina's group, after one 
of the older, more charismatic girls among them.     
 The students share both an interest in their Cham heritage and a general 
apathy for the Islamic faith.  They hold the practice of praying only once a week 
as an important part of their understanding of Cham culture, but they themselves 
do not ever pray.  They enjoy and participate in events such as the Mawlud, 
Mawlud Phnom and the Chai but never in a religious capacity – merely as 
spectators.  These religious events are reinterpreted as cultural events and thus 
protected from criticism by other Muslims, who naturally do not have the same 
understanding and appreciation of Cham culture as they.   Once, in the middle of 
February, Rina was explaining to me some important Cham traditions as we 
walked the path that led to her family's rice fields. 
...and we have another tradition which is Bulan Euk.  Do you 
know this one? 
 
No, I don't.  What is it called again? 
 
B-U-L-A-N E-U-K.  Bulan is the moon.  Euk is when you don't 
eat.  For one month we don't eat or drink during the daytime. 
 
Oh, OK. You mean Ramadan. 
 
What's that? 
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It's the month of Ramadan.  When Muslims don't eat or drink 
during the day.  It is the month that Mohammed first received the 
Qur'an.   
 
I don't know anything about that. 
 
 Rina was not all that interested in the revelation of the Qur'an and the 
conversation tailed off a bit until a few minutes had passed when, spinning around 
to face me, Rina remembered to wish me a happy Valentine's Day.  The students 
may not care much for Islamic topics, but part of their English language training 
did apparently include a review of what holidays were observed in the West and 
what their significance was.  Bulan Euk is a time for Cham to show discipline by 
refraining from eating or drinking.  Valentine's Day is the day foreigners give 
gifts to people they love.  Ramadan is some kind of Arab word for something 
weird thing that Arabs do. 
 Usman strongly encourages his students to understand Westerners and 
their ways, not in an effort to 'Westernize' his students per se, but to enable them 
to access and deploy cultural capital to their personal advantage and the benefit of 
the Imam San community.  Apart from English, this means knowing something 
about Western countries beyond which football teams correspond to which cities.  
It means taking an interest in those things that are interesting to Westerners.  
And it means learning to interact with them in ways that they consider appropriate, 
such as making up your own business cards.  Rina has never had a job other than 
cultivating rice, but she has a set of hand-made business cards with her name, 
address and her status as a member of the Imam San community which she 
smartly produces whenever receiving a foreign visitor. 
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 Usman's goals for his students and ambitions for his community are 
complex, but can be outlined according to what he sees as his two most elemental 
principles.   
 
3.6.2  Purity 
 If this movement is about anything, it is about being Cham.  And that 
means defining which characteristics are indispensable for being considered 
Cham and which are peripheral, optional or even contrary to being a member of 
the nation.  The first and for most people least controversial component of 
Chamness is language.  Speaking Cham goes a long way to establishing 
someone as Cham.  Since virtually no Khmer or Vietnamese person ever learns 
it, this tongue can be considered unique to its native speakers.  “Now”, Usman 
remarks, “there are people who speak Cham, but are not Muslims.  In Champa, 
there are Cham people who are Brahmanists and not Muslims”.  If they are 
Cham but not Muslims then, Usman reasons, being a Muslim is not central to 
being Cham.   
I'm tired of meeting with other Cham and all they want to talk 
about is religion, religion and religion.  I want to talk about 
culture and I want to talk about the problems in our community.  
We are poor.  We need jobs.  We need more education.  But 
they want religion.  And then they want to ask the Arabs or the 
Malays for money.  But we can work.  If we work together then 
I think we can help the community for all Cham without regard to 
religion.  But they don't care about being Cham.  It's just about 
religion for them. 
 
 This is the problem that most frustrates Usman and the Imam San like him.  
Simply put, they cannot convince other Cham speakers to feel solidarity on the 
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basis of their ethnic identity and then also use that feeling of unity as a 
springboard for collective action.  In addition, they are unwilling to 'cross over' 
and join a community bound by a collective belief in importance of orthodox 
Muslim practice.  Usman is not without strategies for trying to curry the favor of 
orthodox Cham.  Very frequently he will admit that there are Cham that are 
non-Imam San who know things that the Imam San do not.  Stories and 
genealogies of which the Imam San were not aware.  This is a weighty 
concession for a member of a community that considers itself the guardian of all 
things Cham.  To invite a Cham from another community to enlighten him on 
the culture of the Cham is to forsake an opportunity to lord his more authentic 
Cham credentials over other Muslims.   
 Sitting at a Cham eatery in Phnom Penh, Usman and I begin to listen in on 
a conversation at the next table.  Usman remarks that 'that man speaks very good 
Cham.'  As one of the men leaves, Usman gets the other's attention and asks him 
to join us.  He begins with 'Wow! You're Cham is really good.  Where are you 
from?'  The man responds that he is from Kompong Cham, and Usman 
immediately offers that as the explanation for the superior quality of his Cham 
diction – the clarity of the vowels and the crispness of the individual syllables.  
The evening proceeds with Usman flattering and attempting to charm his new 
friend by suggesting that they have much to learn from each other about 
Chamness and could only profit by working together on something.  The man 
was entertained and even somewhat intrigued at moments, but in the end seemed 
unwilling to make any efforts himself on behalf of an ethnic Cham movement.  
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He was not unsympathetic, he explained, but unlike many Cham (or Khmer for 
that matter) he was rather gainfully employed at a university and this was simply 
not something for which he would budget any of his precious time.  Usman 
would not quit, but to my knowledge, he has not yet convinced a single non-Imam 
San Cham to share his vision of community action informed by ethnic pride and 
blind to confessional allegiance. 
 Related to this concern for the essence of Chamness is the purity of the 
language and culture.  There is a strong feeling, not only among the Imam San 
but among all Muslims in Cambodia, that much has been lost and then replaced 
with borrowings drawn from Khmer culture primarily but also from foreign 
Muslim.  Not all Muslims necessarily believe this is such a terrible thing, but for 
Usman and the students, although contact with other peoples is desirable the 
preservation of Cham culture from these influences is also important, or, if not 
possible, at least a recognition of the borrowedness of the culture trait in question.   
 As with concerns about ethnicity, language practice is the most important 
barometer.  Today the Cham language relies heavily on Khmer words in order to 
discuss any but the most mundane matters.  Frequently this is expressed in terms 
of the percentage of strength that the language has.  'Cham is only 70% strong', 
is used to mean something like it can only be used in 70 percent of cases or the 
remaining 30 percent is Khmer.  The assignment of percentile values to the 
relative strengths of things such as language proficiency is common in Khmer.   
 The visit of two Indonesians to a Chai ceremony sparked interest in 
knowing more about the other Malay languages.  For an hour, the visitors were 
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bombarded with questions – “How do you say this in Indonesia?” followed by an 
analysis of how close that was to the Cham word.  The languages have many 
cognate words and it is recognized that they are related by migration as well.  
Indonesia is a country that has very little presence in Cambodia at the moment.  
Malaysia on the other hand is a major investor in Cambodia and is also an 
important source of patronage, particularly for the Tabligh sect.  The Malaysian 
language, while mostly identical with Indonesian, is seen as a threat to the purity 
of Cham.  The common example given is that of the ubiquitous 'tetapi' meaning 
'but' or 'however'.  It is in fact the most common word in Cham to express that 
meaning, but some Imam San are quick to point out that the correct word is 'ta' – 
it is the authentic Cham word.  What is galling to language purists is not merely 
that the Malay word is preferred, but that most people who use it believe it to be 
Cham.  It is not only linguistic degeneracy but also a kind of ethnic false 
consciousness with which they are charged.   
 Usman himself, would like to see a more active program of language 
purification and education to remedy the situation.  Even basic phrases such as 
'nice to see you' are considered calques from Khmer.  The correct expression, 
which he recently coined himself, literally means 'it's good to see Cham folks 
here'.  Self-conscious language reforms of this type need always be considered in 
the wider context of social and political expectations that drive them (Neustupny 
1989).  Apparently, Usman's version of the greeting is better because it is not a 
direct translation of the Khmer and because it immediately engenders a feeling of 
ethnic solidarity, addressing the other not as a mere interlocutor, but as a comrade, 
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a person with whom one can be expected to have much in common – a 
commonality that opposes itself to the wider non-Cham society.  That wider 
society consists of Muslims – people who are Cham by heritage but do not 
valorize or cultivate that aspect of their identity.  Since the greeting would only 
be given in Cham, and Khmers do not speak Cham it is not reasonable to interpret 
this as a Cham vs. Khmer opposition.  Khmers would never hear and understand 
it.  On the other hand, a Cham person may overhear two people greeting each 
other in this way and thus know that he is in the presence of people who take their 
Cham identity seriously and perhaps he too will feel inspired to revalorize his 
Cham identity.   
 The Cham language spoken aloud – correctly and without hesitation – is to 
be the mark of the new ethnically aware Cham individual. 
Before, my students were like pill bugs.  They were very shy in 
the market or any place that had Khmers.  And they would 
always speak to each other in Khmer.  But I encouraged them 
and now they always speak Cham together.  They are proud of 
themselves and they see that the Khmers don't hate them.  They 
can live together speaking Cham and Khmer.     
 
 Without this pride, Usman's students could not move about in the wider 
society as Cham.  They could do so as individuals, but not as representatives of 
their people, and as a consequence the Cham people as a whole would have no 
place in the broader, modern community in which the business of the nation is 
conducted.  
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3.6.3  Modernity 
 Secondly and most difficult to pin down precisely, is the notion that the 
Cham should be a modern people.  This means a great many things and is quite 
different from the notions that other Muslims attach to the idea of modernity – a 
subject that will be addressed in Chapters four and five.  Far beyond technology 
or even wealth, modernity seems to represent a complex of institutions that will 
make the Cham a nation in the same way that other nations are constituted as 
nations.  Cultural establishments, the likes of which are never mentioned by 
Orthodox Muslims, are becoming increasingly important to some of the younger 
Imam San.  Other types of possibilities that are opening up for business, trade 
and the training necessary to carry out those affairs are also regarded as crucial to 
the health of the community and its relative standing in the area. 
 As Yusuf explained earlier, the problem is not merely one of money, but 
also of things to do.  It is at once an economic difficulty, but at the same time a 
moral trap, since the absence of gainful employment leads to a lack of money 
which may then lead to asking the 'Arabs' for money – a solution which 
compromises their ethnic integrity and still leaves them with nothing to do besides 
waiting for the money to arrive.  Recent moves to address this situation include 
cooperation with a foreign NGO for the development of a training program that 
would turn young people into motorbike mechanics and then help them establish 
shop along the national highway.  Another has been the opening of a tailor 
producing women's fashion that is toan samay, or modern, much like what 
fashionable women in Phnom Penh might sport.  As the owner explained, 'We 
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like modern clothing in the Khmer style, we don't do old style clothes like the 
Arabs and Malays wear.  We don't like that here.'   
 This connection between modernity and Khmerness is also made by 
orthodox Muslims, although there is some difference in the significance of that 
linkage.  Among the Imam San, the accoutrements of modernity place them on a 
par with the Khmer but do not compromise their identity as Cham.  Indeed, the 
acquisition of modernity is what makes the Cham a nation just as it made the 
Khmer a nation – it is an attribute that people must strive to attain for themselves 
but it is in and of itself not the core of ethnic identity.  Blengsli (2003) observes 
how orthodox Muslims have adopted certain aspects of 'modern Khmer' culture as 
a way of distancing themselves from their Cham traditions.  He notes how Cham 
are increasingly married in the Khmer style (man – suit, woman – dress) and that 
this is seen as an abandonment of older Cham practices.  As this is also the 
practice outside Cambodia, it is seen as uncultural rather than culturally Khmer 
and therefore an acceptable adoption by the community. 
 For young Imam San, these marks of modernity are signifiers of 
nationhood and are imagined to have existed before the fall of Champa.  This is 
to say, Champa was once upon a time a real and proper state equivalent to Angkor 
from which the lineage of the Khmer civilization is derived (Muan 2001).  These 
were lost, and with them, the status of the Cham as a fully-fledged nation which 
was both an independent producer of civilization but also a partner with Khmers 
in the guardianship of the Indian arts.  In recent years, this has lead to many 
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individual efforts to 'produce culture' and to imagine institutions in which this 
production can be housed and managed. 
 Several people have taken it upon themselves to produces books in the 
Cham language.  This is typically done by handwriting a text and then having 
photocopies made.  These copies are distributed among the elders in order to win 
their approval and also among younger Imam San who are involved with this 
movement of Cham cultural revival.  A certain number are always held back to 
offer interested foreign visitors as an exemplar of the present-day vitality of the 
Cham people.  With books comes the need to house these books, and Usman is 
currently floating ideas about having a library and museum built.  This would 
enable both conservation and display of documents and artifacts, some of which 
he has recently acquired from contacts in Việt Nam.  
 These two acts – conservation and display – are the foundation of the 
National Museum in Phnom Penh.  Conservation implies on the one hand a 
maintenance of a relation with an ancestral people and on the other the possession 
of something worthy of conserving.  It is not lost on either Khmer or Cham that 
much of the interest of the outside world in Cambodia is due to its cultural 
heritage made manifest in buildings and artifacts.  It is Westerners who finance 
and develop the majority of the projects aiming to restore Angkor era monuments 
and it is this legacy that gives the Khmer, a people to whom recent history has not 
been kind, a degree of standing in the world.  The ability to then lay claim to and 
display this type of heritage capital gives enormous prestige and potentially 
developmental benefits to the community in question.  The dispute over Preah 
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Vihear on the border with Thailand flared up because of dissatisfaction in 
Thailand about the listing of the temple as a Cambodian UNESCO World 
Heritage Site and the feeling that Thailand would be excluded from claiming the 
temple, and the associated benefits from tourism, as part of its own heritage. 
 Conserving and displaying are the opposite of what the Imam San see 
other Muslims as doing, namely, imitating and repeating.  The slavish adherence 
to foreign Arab or Malay norms in ritual practice and daily life represent a 
collective forgetting of the Cham heritage and its replacement by a foreign veneer 
which itself is sterile – it cannot produce anything new, at least not in Cambodia, 
because its source is external.  By contrast the inner cultural integrity of the 
Imam San permits them, albeit slowly, to move towards the establishment of a 
more modern community of capable people.  The external supports of the Arabs, 
however formidable, condemn those who choose that path to a moral pauperism – 
waiting for hand-outs and instructions from foreign masters.  This ideology of 
locating power either internally or externally and applying a moral significance to 
this locus is also very similar to that found among the Hutu refugees of Tanzania 
by Liisa Malkki (1995) and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5. 
 
3.7 Obstacles 
 But all is not forward progress for Usman and the students.  It is not by 
accident that Usman's followers are all in their early twenties at most.  There is a 
strong feeling that they are not only struggling against an outside world that 
doesn't understand them but that they are also engaged in a conflict internal to the 
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community.  This friction became apparent when Usman proposed what was his 
latest idea to modernize the Cham people.  It was a logo.    
 During a field excursion with Usman and anthropologist Bjørn Blengsli in 
Kampot province, Usman remarked on a tattoo on Bjørn's arm.  It was a Hon 
Kan.  The Hon Kan is a symbol used by the Cham of central Việt Nam that 
combines an image of the sun with one of the moon as well as the numerals 
representing six and three, which add up to nine, considered the largest number 
(Nakamura 1999).  It is a sign of unity between the Cham and Islamic elements 
of the community and is commonly found on Cham publications there.  Usman 
was astounded that such a symbol should exist and as part of his plan to bring the 
Cham into the modern world, resolved to have it adopted as a logo for the 
community.   
 Within a week, he had made several sketches himself and, having 
produced an elegant design, proceeded to fashion a computer graphic file that he 
could then set as the backdrop to his cell phone.  Finally, he arranged a meeting 
with some elders after the Friday service and asked that I attend for support.  At 
the time, I was unsure as to what that meant. 
This symbol is called the Hon Kan.  It comes from Champa and it 
is the symbol they use there for all the Cham people.  Alberto and 
another friend explained it to me. (Glances over at me.) 
 
Uh-huh... (Also looks over at me.) 
 
You see... this is the sun and this, the moon... and these are the 
numbers three and six... together they represent the whole.  All 
the Cham people! 
 
Uh-huh... 
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I want this to be the symbol for the community.  For all the Cham 
– Imam San and the other ones.  We can use this symbol when 
we want to talk to other Cham about Cham issues. 
 
I understand.  (Looks at the other elders, then me, then Usman.)...  
We need to make sure we understand this.  I have never seen this 
symbol before. 
 
I know.  It is from Champa.  We aren't using it here yet.  
(Usman is becoming impatient.) 
 
We don't understand it fully.  We have to wait.  What if we 
begin to use the symbol and then we learn it means something 
else? 
 
 The conversation fizzled out at this point as the elder grew cautious and 
self-conscious of his ignorance.  Apparently, my role was to provide support for 
Usman's position.  By bringing in the foreign scholar, Usman hoped to head this 
problem off at the pass - providing an outside voice that would assuage the fears 
that the Hon Kan might have a problematic meaning.  While the elders asked 
me to comment and appeared to take my words under consideration, it proved 
insufficient to move them towards acceptance of the sign.  Usman, visibly 
exasperated, was forced into a retreat.  Walking away from the mosque he 
vented. 
We don't have a symbol.  The Red Cross has a logo.  And the 
Muslims, they have the moon symbol.  But we need a symbol for 
all the Cham.  This symbol is perfect.  It includes Muslim and 
non-Muslim Cham so we can use it to talk about Cham issues 
without all the religion.  Organizations have logos.  Businesses, 
religions, countries... they all have a logo so when anyone sees it 
they know what is being represented. 
 
Do you think the elders will accept the logo? 
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I don't know... They're scared, because they don't know.  They 
don't understand so I have to explain it to them over and over 
again.  But they are afraid of the other Muslims.   
 
 Much as was the case with the antiquated document in 3.4, the elders were 
concerned that this symbol may have a meaning, history or significance of which 
they are unaware.  These hidden meanings lie in wait, lingering in the 
background, until they are revealed – betraying the community and exposing it to 
criticism and ridicule.  This threatening ambiguity, where culture artifacts that 
embody the proud history of the people can be transmuted into the dirty laundry 
of the community is strongly reminiscent of Michael Herzfeld's concept of 
cultural intimacy (2005).  Herzfeld describes how aspects of culture may be seen 
as shameful in the presence of outsiders and yet be well accepted among members 
of the community themselves.  These traits are guarded both because they may 
prove embarrassing, but also because they engender a sense of solidarity among 
all those who share this fear of the discomfiting gaze of the other. 
 The importance and significance of culturally intimate practices is 
continuously reinterpreted and tested not only within the community but also 
against the exterior world whose judgment is feared.  My presence at this 
meeting was meant to address whatever apprehensions the elders might have 
about adopting the Hon Kan – Usman hoping that the 'knowledgeable outsider' 
would reduce the scope of other Muslim's ability to criticize by introducing a 
'broader, more international' perspective to the conversation.  As Herzfeld found 
during his time in Crete, the outsider need be careful when confronting a people's 
cultural undergarments, since he may be allowed knowledge but not use or 
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ownership.  In my earlier encounter with the students and the old manuscript, I 
was made privy to their insecurities about their understanding of religion and 
Arabic.  It was clear that the students considered me trustworthy and I did feel 
honored to be a part of their project, but it was also made equally clear that I was 
to refrain from sharing this with Muslims from other villages, with whom they 
knew I was good friends.  In effect, I was asked to keep their secret and share in 
their intimate cultural life and in return, I was expected to know my place in the 
chain of knowledge transmission. 
 Herzfeld's work emphasizes the importance of cultural intimacy in 
creating solidarity but that feeling of unity is not immediately obvious among the 
Imam San.  In fact, it appears to be the basis for the division between the older 
and younger generations of the community.  While the elders prefer to maintain 
a sort of status quo with regard to the hidden knowledge, that is, they would rather 
not explore nor allow it to be explored, the students are given to the notion that 
they should find ways to possess this information before it is lost, or worse, before 
it falls into the wrong hands.  For the students, the elders are the most precious 
source of traditional knowledge.  They are also the greatest obstacle.  Usman 
tries his level best to speak politely of the elders and frequently he is successful – 
criticizing specific policies or particular ways of doing things instead of focusing 
on the limited competence that these older men of deficient education and 
experience may have. 
 These attempts at restraint notwithstanding, for young Imam San 
interested in changing the way life happens in the community, changing the 
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nature of the office of the Ong Knur, the religious and political head of the Imam 
San community, is vital.  One young Imam San explains: 
We have to change the leaders.  If they are old and they have 
knowledge about Cham culture, then that is very good.  But we 
have a lot of problems... we have problems about work, about 
health problems in the community... we also have problems with 
agriculture – we want to grow vegetables, but we need to get 
water... the old people are important but they don't understand all 
of these things.  And they don't change.  They are always the 
same.  We need to have term limits for the Ong Knur.  If we 
have term limits then we can have the right leader at the right time 
and then change the leader later.  Some people know about 
medicine... some people know about agriculture... you understand 
what I mean? 
 
 I understood perfectly well what he meant – he intended to establish a 
sub-state, ethno-national technocratic bureaucracy.  The discrepancy between 
younger and older Imam San in political thought is, I believe, more than merely a 
question of entrenched interests and a sclerotic gerontocracy unable and unwilling 
to change course.  In reality, the elders are extremely troubled by the thought of 
their way of life disappearing and have, in their own way, made efforts to 
encourage some activities, such as the publishing of books in Cham, that they see 
as new and innovative ways of reinvigorating the culture.  Their methods and 
their hesitancy to do anything too brash may irk the newer generation, but no one 
claims that the elders are unconcerned with the world that their grandchildren are 
inheriting. 
 As an alternative to this, I would submit that the operative difference is to 
be found in the historical imagination of the two generations.  Older people in 
the community reminisce about their lives before the civil war.  This time was 
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far from perfect.  Life was difficult.  The land provided only a modest living at 
best and they were subject to the same vicissitudes of climate and pests as any 
other farmer in Cambodia.  Nonetheless, this was a relatively stable time when 
they felt safe.  Relations with other Muslims were strained at times, but this was 
well before large scale foreign missionary work had begun and they did not feel 
threatened in the way they do today.  There was a even a group of curious 
foreigners like myself, such as Juliette Baccot, who conducted extensive research 
on the Chai ceremony and a certain 'Mr. Ra' (perhaps Roth?), who provided 
clinical services to the community and was said to not only speak Cham, but be 
able to read the script as well.    
 Today's elders wish to have the pressure taken off the community – to go 
back to an earlier time when they were left alone and respected enough to be 
allowed to practice their customs and religion as they saw fit.  This structural 
nostalgia (Herzfeld 2005), the imagination of an ideal time, the conditions of 
which were somehow natural, was disrupted by the war and the subsequent 
penetration of foreign Muslims into Cambodia.  The elders say they consider the 
continued practice of the faith and the culture in the form of praying once a week 
and the Chai ceremony as the best way for protecting the culture in the face of 
adversity.  This 'stay the course' message has proven unsatisfactory for younger 
Imam San that would like to emphasize education and development as a critical 
component of protecting the community.  The elders are themselves very much 
in favor of members of their community finding opportunities for secular 
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education outside the community, but do not typically make the programmatic 
connection between the degrees obtained and the uplift of the community. 
 For people of Usman's generation, there is no memory of the pre-war 
lifeways.  Born around the time of the war or shortly afterwards, the recent 
experience of the community has been marked by deprivation, suffering and more 
recently, because of the ridicule of other Muslims to which they have been 
exposed, humiliation.  To the extent that they feel there exists a past model for a 
better community, it is located in the much farther past – in Champa.  Yet, they 
are not calling for a return to historic Champa.  They know this is impossible and 
would only place them in the position of the Kampuchea Krom – caught between 
two states, neither of which is particularly concerned with their welfare.  Nor are 
they seeking to re-establish a community based on kingship.  Indeed, although 
they regard Champa as the source of their culture and the origin of their status as a 
people, they are not looking to put into practice any of institutions that once 
organized the Cham people along the coast of the South China Sea.  Incidentally, 
even if they wanted to undertake such a project, they have little idea as to how the 
Cham actually governed themselves in those times.  Questions such as 'How 
were taxes levied?' or 'What was the penalty for murder?' are met with a vague 
'The king would decide that.'  But in any case, Usman and the students are 
angling for the creation of 'modern' institutions, but grounding their case in the 
shared experience of the nation which began in the Champa period. 
 Instead of the structural nostalgia of the community elders, the 
intellectually active youth are working toward a form of structural homologization 
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with the Cambodian state.  The past is idealized not as a model for the future, but 
as just that – an ideal past, at which time Champa and Angkor were 
commensurate in all aspects of culture and civilization.  As a result of the 
Vietnamese invasions, the Cham people missed the boat to modernization and 
statehood and today find themselves in an unresolved situation – not quite 
possessed of all the trappings of a modern society, but certainly not at the level of 
the indigenous minorities lacking in civilization of their own.  Structural 
homologization is therefore the attempt to make up for lost time by charting the 
progress of the contemporaries of Champa from the moment in which Champa 
ceased to be to the present day, and using this a guide and template for the 
communities own development.  Not a Cham king, but an Ong Knur (an ancient 
title) with term limits (an exigency of the modern world).  Not a military 
aristocracy for defending the country, but an educated vanguard to develop the 
nation.  These are the goals toward which Usman and others like him are 
steadily working. 
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Chapter Four 
A New Sense of Belonging 
 … first he took me to the Barça Café, sat me down and 
ordered tea for me.  Al Jazeera was reporting on Iraq.  The 
camera fixed on a man, his eyes wild, his distorted mouth silently 
screaming, his legs running frantically with no direction, a little 
girl in his arms, blood and brains streaming from her head.  It 
was not the Fox or CNN video game of the Iraq war, where, in 
Orwellian fashion, body bags had become even more sanitized 
“transfer boxes” that no one was ever allowed to see except for 
the family just before the burial. 
 “Some things a man can’t take.” (Atran 2010) 
 
 “You know you’re a Muslim when you drink, gamble, have 
sex... but you won’t eat pork.” 
Ahmed Ahmed on the Axis of Evil Comedy Tour 2007 
 
4.1 The Ummah 
 For many millions of Muslims around the world, the idea that each 
Muslim is connected to every other in a community of belief is still an operative 
concept in the imagination of the world and the interpretation of the significance 
of the events that occur upon it.  When Scott Atran began investigating the life 
histories of the Madrid bombers, he encountered a way of engaging world events 
that is quite different from what one typically finds in the West.  The towns of 
Morocco, where the bombers were from, were daily steeped in graphic images of 
violence perpetrated by non-Muslims on Muslims.  Whenever it was time to turn 
on the news, tune into the radio or pick up the paper; the senses are accosted by 
the narrative that somewhere out there people like themselves are suffering and 
they are largely powerless to stop it (Lewis 2003). 
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 The “people like themselves” are Muslims, and this classification of 
humanity into members of the Ummah and non-members is a process that has 
been constantly renegotiated as Muslims encountered non-Muslims societies – 
first from a position of strength and then later, from one of relative weakness.  
Recent developments in communications and global mobility have made this 
feeling of solidarity come alive among Muslims whose connection is now realized 
by international networks of labor migration, 24 hour news channels, and 
websites offering Islamic chat rooms, matchmaking services and online fatwas 
(Cooke and Lawrence 2005; Hansen et al. 2009; Roy 2004) . 
 The persistence of this differently centered world view is explored by 
Tamim Ansary (2009), who wrote, in English, a work of history that more closely 
cleaves to the Islamo-centric model of historical development found in his 
childhood Farsi books.  From this perspective, long chapters must be devoted to 
the life and achievements of the prophet Muhammad, the further elaboration of 
society by the rightly guided caliphs, and the later division and decline of the 
community.  The great political revolutions of France and the United States are 
given short shrift, while the industrial revolution which is seen as the key to 
Euro-American dominance over the lands of Islam is treated in much greater 
depth.  Privilege at every moment in this narrative is given to either those events 
that lead up to the formation of the Islamic community or those that have had 
subsequent impact on that same community in an effort to explain its positionality 
in the present.   
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 Edward Said (1979) long ago developed the critique of the Western notion 
of the East as a self serving intellectual framework on which to construct the 
moral and cultural superiority of the West, so it should be unremarkable that in 
the Muslim world the West is regarded primarily in terms of how it has altered the 
flow of history as Muslims believe it should have unfolded.  Ansary’s “Middle 
World” (rather than “Middle East”) is defined by the community of adherents to 
the faith even as geographic and political boundaries fluctuate across the 
topography.   
 What is important to keep in mind then, is the power of the idea of 
belonging to create webs of significance among Muslims in all places and at all 
times, and that this outlook on the classification of humanity is at odds with the 
ethno-national models typically found in the West and which serve as the 
unspoken substrate for the majority of intellectual, political and media discourse.  
This chasm in basic presuppositions was driven home to me years ago when I sat 
with a group of Muslim men and translated a new report on television about the 
events in Iraq that day. 
…They are talking about the US soldiers in Iraq… some 
fighting… 
 
They are fighting Iraqis? 
 
I don’t know.  Maybe Iraqis, maybe there are foreign fighters. 
 
French [foreign] people? 
 
No, other people, coming from Saudi Arabia or Syria or other 
countries nearby. 
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But they are Muslims.  Muslims have to protect each other and 
help each other.  Muslims are going to Iraq but Iraq is a Muslim 
country.  They must defend it. 
 
 The message was clear.  These people are Muslims in a Muslim country.  
They are not foreigners.  They are simply doing their duty by defending the 
Ummah – the community of Iraqis, Jordanian volunteers, and Cambodian 
Muslims, watching impotently from the other side of the world.  The apparent 
real time nature of this television program, the ubiquity of foreign travel, and the 
influx of visitors to the country mean that in today’s Cambodia, the Islamic ties 
that bind are becoming ever more real and, as a consequence, ever more 
imaginary – transforming the Muslim’s sense of self and relationship to others. 
 
4.2 New Contacts 
 The recent opening of contact with Muslims outside Cambodia has 
introduced Cambodian Muslims to a wide world where instead of a small 
minority they are joined by over a billion others in the cause of making a 
worldwide community.  Previous chapters have focused on how conceptions of 
history and valorization of ethnic particularity relate to the adoption of forms of 
Islam with a center of gravity outside the country.  In this chapter, the 
examination will be of how new experiences of Muslims in this environment are 
shaping a vision of belonging in the national and international community.  As 
these are relatively new options for many Muslims, this chapter must also serve as 
an exploration of Muslim youth culture at a time when they are becoming 
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increasingly aware that their lives will take very different paths from those of 
their parents. 
 
4.3 Hajj 
 If all of these new vectors for contact among Muslims were not enough, 
the foundation of the religion have already provided for a mechanism to both 
imagine the geographical unity of the Ummah as well as to realize it through 
collective action.  The Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam, which requires 
every Muslim of sound body and finances to travel to Mecca in pilgrimage at 
some point in his life.  The power of this ritual to transform the way Muslims see 
their fellow coreligionists was famously related by Malcolm X after his Hajj in 
1964, when a militant Black nationalist saw the possibility of enjoying 
brotherhood with men of different races and complexions by submitting to a 
singular god (Haley 1965).   
 As with other aspects of Muslim influence, the Hajj is understood 
differently by members of different sects.  An example of the most common 
reaction to the Hajj is related here by Mat, a Muslim praying five times a day who 
identifies himself as neither Salafi nor Tabligh. 
I traveled to Saudi Arabia in 2002.  I had saved the money myself 
and we all went together.  All the Muslims from Cambodia, first 
we met at the airport, then we went to Malaysia and we met some 
more people there.  Together we traveled to Mecca.  We met 
many Muslims from every country.  There were so many 
people… We went around the Ka’ba, went to mount Arafat… then 
we came home.  It was a very happy feeling.  I completed an 
obligation of the religion.  Everybody should do this once in their 
lives.  I did it so I am relieved.  I did the right thing for God…  
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If you go on the Hajj, you see people from all over the world…  
We love each others like brothers from the same womb…  I 
couldn’t speak to many of them…  But we were happy to be 
together. 
 
 Mat’s testimony of fulfillment and belonging among strangers who aren’t 
strangers because they are all brothers in faith contrasts with that of Ly, an Imam 
San who was given an airline ticket and support in the hopes that he would pray 
five times a day and accept orthodoxy after visiting the most sacred site in Islam. 
I went on a plane.  This is a little scary but then you get used to 
it…  We arrived in Mecca and we saw the Ka’ba.  They took me 
around and then I came home. 
 
What did you think of the place?  How did you feel about being 
there? 
 
It was very hot.  No trees or cows or rivers.  They had a lot of 
goats.  Arabs like goats.  But I didn’t see any rice fields.  It 
was brown and sandy. 
  
Are you changing your religious practice in any way now? 
 
(smiling) No, we’ll continue like before. 
 
 Ly’s allegiance to his local understanding of the religion seemed 
undisturbed.  His account was mostly about the contrasts between Cambodia, a 
tropical country where life is determined by the seasonal flowing and harnessing 
of water, and the Arabian desert, alien, inhospitable and teeming with goats, of 
which Arabs (rather than Chams) are fond.  Other than a few handpicked 
individuals sent to Mecca in the hope of helping them discover the error of their 
ways, the Imam San do not perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, and stand wholly 
outside the discourse of belonging that crystallizes around it.  
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 The Mufti of Cambodia, Sos Kamry, estimates that the number of 
Cambodian Muslims who perform the Hajj annually is in the low hundreds.  
Many receive assistance from foreign organizations to help defray the costs of 
travel and accommodation, but others may, over the years, have saved enough 
money to perform the pilgrimage on their own.  These will make this fact readily 
known as paying for the Hajj one’s self means that the spiritual benefit accrues 
completely to the traveler and is not shared with a benefactor.  This point of 
pride betrays another issue that arises with the travel of Cambodians to the Middle 
East, namely, the fact that Cambodia is not only at the geographical periphery of 
the Muslim world, but at its economic, political and social periphery as well. 
 The Hajj, along with Islamic education and migrant labor, have planted 
Cambodia’s Muslims firmly in the grounds of a global Muslim community, but it 
has done this in a position of structural inferiority from which the avenues for 
escape are unclear.  Cambodian Muslims have passed from being a Muslim 
minority maintaining a separate existence parallel to the majority to a member 
community in the Ummah occupying the bottom rung in the great chain of 
belonging.  Muslim households will often have cherished pictures of the Ka’ba 
surrounded by throngs of believers.  Talking to people about them, it becomes 
apparent that this is not a devotional item or a mere decoration.  It is a reminder 
of the sheer number of Muslims in the world – that despite their relative isolation 
inhabiting the banks of the Mekong, they are part of something bigger and greater 
which will endure and never die out.   
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 The Hajj ensures a lifeline to the outside world and the security that the 
anxiety of community survival examined in 3.2 can be palliated through union 
with the rest of the Ummah.  Yet, the Hajj is still undertaken by relatively few 
Muslims and for those that do it is a one-off affair, which while personally and 
symbolically important does not much alter the way life occurs in the home 
community.  However the Hajj is not the principle vehicle for communicating 
Cambodia with the Muslim world.  The education of Muslims in the Islamic 
sciences as well as the opportunities to work in Muslim-majority neighboring 
states have had a far more dramatic effect on the consciousness of young people 
and lent tangible muscle and sinew to the ideologies of Muslim fraternity. 
 
4.4 Saudi Arabia – The Cradle of Islam 
 Although founded relatively recently as a state in 1932, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has a very special place in the geography of Islam.  The location of 
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina within the boundaries of the kingdom makes 
it the center of pilgrimage and confers upon the king the status of guardian of the 
sacred sites – an epithet that in earlier times was attributed to the Ottoman Sultans 
as a way of justifying their leadership of the Muslim world.   The adoption of a 
particularly conservative and puritanical form of Islam known as Salafism, or 
sometimes Wahhabism, which is claimed to be the form of the religion as 
practiced in the time of the prophet, also has a hold on the religious and historical 
imaginations of many Muslims worldwide.  The enormous wealth that is the 
result of extensive petroleum and gas exploitation has also given the kingdom the 
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means by which to project influence and cultivate its image as the cradle of the 
Islamic faith. 
 Direct Saudi presence in Cambodia was mostly ended when the Umm 
al-Qura school was closed after it was connected to the Islamist terror network 
al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah (JI) and Hambali of 2002 Bali bombing notoriety.  This 
operation led to the arrest of three foreign teachers and the expulsion of 28 and 
was an important motive for the push to indigenize Islamic education in the 
country and have as much as possible taught by Cambodian nationals.  Despite 
this setback for the Saudis, all of the same Salafist influences are entering the 
country through Kuwait.  In fact the word “Kuwait” now commonly means 
Salafi and is also used to refer to organizations and programs that are just as or 
more likely to lead participants to Saudi Arabia. 
 The center of the “Kuwait” system is held by the Revival of Islamic 
Heritage Society (RIHS).  RIHS maintains a large high school and dormitory in 
Phnom Penh with hundreds of students from all over the country.  This school is 
also served by a number of feeder schools in the provinces.  All of these schools 
are also orphanages.  Orphanages study free of charge and receive two meals a 
day.  These schools are notable for the complete education they make available 
to students. 
 Cambodian state schools operate in both the morning and the afternoon, 
but students will only attend one of the sessions, depending on their schedules or 
family obligations.  Cambodian state education is designed to be taught in 
half-day sessions.  RIHS students spend their mornings studying religious 
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curriculum including Arabic language, and their afternoons studying the state 
mandated curriculum.  All teachers, including those teaching secular subjects are 
Muslim, and all teachers are paid a minimum of 90 dollars a month.  In a country 
where a regular state school teacher receives a monthly salary of 30 dollars, this is 
an impressive sum and obviates the problem of teachers charging for lessons or 
test answers to make ends meet. 
 Feeder schools apply exams in both Islamic and state subjects, the passing 
of which makes the student eligible for a place at the main school in the Phnom 
Penh district of Chaom Chao.  Chaom Chao, unlike Umm al-Qura, Trea or other 
large Islamic institutions, is not built in a Muslim neighborhood and does not 
engage the local community.  The school’s vice director explained to me that the 
Arabs wanted to build the school close to the airport, so they could fly in, look 
around and be off on another flight later that day.  The school is ideally situated 
for just this purpose. 
 Within the compound, students continue their 7th to 12th year state 
educations as well as the Kuwaiti curriculum.  The graduate of Chaom Chao has 
completed all years of state education.  This is by no means common in 
Cambodia, where only 75,000 students in the entire country were enrolled in 12th 
grade in 2008 (MoP 2008).  The successful exam takers will also be in a position 
to continue their Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia or sometimes Kuwait.  To study 
abroad anywhere is an enormous opportunity, but to seize the opportunity to 
return to the source of the Islamic faith to become a scholar is an honor for both 
the student and his family.   
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 The experience of being abroad however, is often far from smooth.  
Students encounter a number of difficulties starting with language issues.  
Studies and social life is conducted in Arabic a language that presents significant 
problems in terms of pronunciation and grammar for speakers of Austronesian 
and Austro-Asiatic languages.  Their training in Arabic consisted, up until that 
point, of written Arabic of the classical and formal registers leaving them ill 
equipped to follow more mundane conversations and interactions which are 
necessary to sustain a complete life anywhere. 
 Another hurdle to overcome is that of discrimination by Arabs against 
non-Arabs. Frequently treated as second class citizens, non-Arabs find that they 
are mocked for their accents, their deficient religious educations and the poverty 
of their home countries.  The low regard with which the “airport Arabs” hold the 
Cambodian population becomes the social backdrop against which these students 
must conduct their academic experience abroad. 
 Finally there is the question of curriculum and educational satisfaction.  
RIHS students have been prepared for years to undertake studies in Islamic 
sciences since childhood, and ostensibly, that is the motivation for sending them 
to the Middle East – to transform them into scholars.  It should be of no surprise 
however, when young men, traveling abroad for the first time and encountering 
diverse peoples, novel experiences and unexpected opportunities, should 
reconsider their path in life and begin taking interest in matters that were once of 
little moment in his high school dormitory.  The inflexibility of the curriculum 
with regards to non-religious subjects creates for some students a straight jacket 
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permitting them to see but never touch the opportunities which this new 
environment presents. 
 Students abroad are difficult to interview as they are typically in the host 
country for most of the year, returning only for Ramadan, when the month-long 
fast from sun up to sun down means that interviews should be conducted at night.  
Nevertheless, over several years and several Ramadan periods I was able to 
engage a number of students on their experiences in the Middle East.  The 
following is an excerpt of a reasonably typical interview which illustrates the 
points above: 
Tell me about Saudi Arabia.  Do you like studying there? 
 
Yes.  But it’s hard.  My Arabic is much better now, but in the 
beginning I couldn’t speak.  Here we study how to read, write 
and recite, but when Arabs speak normally they don’t use the full 
grammar…  They pronounce the words differently.  But now I 
can speak well. 
 
You must have many Saudi friends now. 
 
Sometimes I see them at the soccer field.  We will play a few 
games, but usually they don’t want to be with us.  I am usually 
with other non-Arabs.  The Arabs and the non-Arabs are apart.  
We see them in class and in sports.  But in the free time they are 
elsewhere.  They speak amongst themselves and we don’t 
understand them so clearly.  Also, they have more money and we 
are poor. 
 
So you’re mostly with Cham people? 
 
No, there is one other Cham.  I spend time with the people in my 
dormitory.  We have some Chinese and Indonesian students.  
Sometimes we see students from Africa. 
 
Are there Arabs in your dormitory? 
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Not really.  The dormitory is for people coming from abroad.  
So we live with other non-Arabs…  We are not permitted to bring 
in food to the dormitories.  The Saudis are afraid it will stink too 
badly. 
 
…What are you going to do when you return to Cambodia? 
 
I will teach Arabic or shariah.  When I finish studying I will be 
able to teach those things for the community. 
 
Do you study anything other than Islamic subjects there? 
 
It is very difficult.  My patron doesn’t want me to study anything 
other than Islam.  He won’t pay for anything else.  I want to 
study English and computers… I take part of my stipend and use it 
to pay for private classes, but I need that money to live.  I take 
some English and computer courses on the side but it isn’t 
enough. 
 
Would you rather be a teacher of Islamic subjects or work with 
computers? 
 
Don’t know… 
 
 Saudi Arabia is, in a manner of speaking, a developed country. Yet despite 
the obvious wealth and the comforts of modernity the Cambodian Muslims that 
study there do not seem to see it as a model for their own society.  Studying in 
Saudi Arabia has its charms to be sure – there is prestige that comes from being 
selected for the scholarships and support necessary for the undertaking.  There is 
also a certain pride that one feels knowing he is fulfilling an obligation on behalf 
of the community.  In Islamic thought, obligations can be individual (fard 
al-‘ayn) or collective (fard al-kifāya).  While each individual Muslim should 
seek knowledge of the religion for himself to the best of his ability, it is simply 
impossible for everyone to commit themselves for the period of time necessary to 
become and Islamic scholar.  These students go to Saudi Arabia not only for 
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themselves, but to serve the entire community and keep it in good standing with 
god. 
 While religious obligations are met, other needs are not.  For Salafi 
students, taught that local particularities, customs and traditions didn’t matter in 
the light of the shared faith, the social rejection at the hands of Arabs is a sharp 
disappointment.  Gulf countries have cars, highways, potable water and elevators, 
but they also have a way of life that consigns them to a second class status and 
hampers them from realizing themselves as social personae. For feelings of 
brotherhood, acceptance and belonging, Cambodian Muslims would best go 
elsewhere. 
 
4.5 Malaysia – An Islamic Modernity 
 Tabligh Muslims, if they study abroad are unlikely to go as far as the 
Middle East.  Instead, they are drawn to Malaysia and Southern Thailand, from 
which much of their funding and curriculum is sourced.  And for those Muslims 
less inclined to studies, a period of time spent working abroad in a Muslim 
country can be a powerful experience of connection to a world they had heard 
about growing up.  The most important countries accepting their labor are also 
Malaysia and Thailand.  Like studying in the Middle East, this endeavor is 
heavily laden with expectations and hopes for a better future both social and 
financial.   
 The impact of Malay culture, even on Salafi communities, has been deep 
and long-lasting.  Apart from the Imam San who have their own Indic script, all 
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other Muslims in the country write the Cham language in the Jawi script – a 
derivation of the Arabic script developed by Malays to represent the different 
sounds found in Malay but not in Arabic.  Islamic fashion – women’s hijabs, 
men’s sarongs – are dictated from Malaysia.  Music has also had an influence 
and there are now Cham language karaoke DVD’s available for sale.  When I 
asked if this type of music was permissible in Islam, the vendor replied, “It’s the 
same as Malaysia.” 
 
4.5.1 Making the Modern Muslim 
 It may be useful to digress for a moment and consider why Malaysia is so 
significant in the development of the notion of Islamic modernity.  Arabian 
civilization, for all its ostentatious wealth and financial resources, fails, in the 
eyes of many Cambodian Muslims to provide a model that they themselves can 
follow so that they too can be Muslims in the modern world.  Malaysia on the 
other hand holds out the promise of being a reproducible modern Muslim society 
– a model of which at least some elements can be exported.  This is not at all an 
accident, but the result of a long period of negotiation in Malaysia that did not 
oppose Islamic ways and modern, Western modes, but rather started from the 
assumption that modernity is not a unique property of the West and that many of 
its benefits could be Islamicized while its dangers could be attenuated with some 
good Islamically grounded planning and guidance. 
 The interaction of Islamic faith and modernism (a faith in progress) in 
insular Southeast Asia has been the subject of anthropological inquiry for the 
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better part of a century (Federspiel 2002).  While Islam is the dominant faith 
throughout much of the Malay archipelago, historic contacts and relations with 
non-Muslims, both Western and indigenous to the region have led to a number of 
strategies for cohabitation.  In the British and Dutch colonies, the religious 
establishment were allowed to regulate many aspects of public morality and 
family law provided they did not interfere with the administration of the colony.  
With independence, a new generation of young scholars, trained in Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan and strongly influenced by the works of Syed Abul Ala Maududi, 
began to challenge the old guard of the religious establishment (Hassan 2003).  
The resurgence of confidence in their Islamic heritage coupled with the notion 
that Islam should not be reduced to a mere religion, but rather practiced as a 
comprehensive way of life, made efforts to integrate Islamism and modernism 
inevitable. 
 From the colonial crucible of developing nationalisms to the post-colonial 
condition that emerged after WWII, notions of modernity and its consequences 
for traditional societies have been central to the elaboration of paradigms for the 
development of imagined communities as well as the frameworks for engagement 
with the developed world.  Industrial and trade policy, the reconciliation of 
distinct legal traditions with the needs of the state enterprise, the question of what 
to teach in schools and at what age English language should be introduced as a 
compulsory subject are all part of a wider series of debates that ostensibly seek to 
resolve the tensions between ideology and practice.  In developing Islamic 
countries, this discussion takes place at the intersection of several narratives, 
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namely, an Islamic discourse that defines a community by its acceptance of the 
revelation of God's word to Muhammad and a modernist Western conception of 
historicized progress whose trajectory propels man from barbarism to ever greater 
levels of civilization and within which, the prophecy of Muhammad is but another 
event on the timeline.  Add to this localized notions of community, identity and 
development derived from national or racial ideologies and the picture becomes 
even more complicated. 
 Modernization theory has for some time posited that as a society accepts 
modern ideas and ways of organizing social institutions, those institutions will 
become increasingly rationalized, that is governed by codified rules and 
regulations with an eye to enhancing efficiency and productivity.  This increased 
yield of the institution must necessarily be measured in relation to some other 
institution that absorbs the product so that iron mines are judged by how well they 
supply steel mills, steel mills by how well they supply shipyards, shipyards by 
how well they supply the navy or the merchant marine and so on.  Schools and 
institutions of learning then are valued and legitimized to the extent that they 
produce graduates who will then occupy positions of influence and prestige in 
society.  As value and legitimacy become increasingly derived from the 
relationships between specific groups of producers and consumers, institutions 
develop particular internal logics governing correctness of work and 
administration.  The result should then have been the collapse of 
all-encompassing narratives and ideologies as valid organizing principles for the 
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various new forms of economic activity and intellectual plurality (Dobbelaere 
1981; Luhmann 1984).  One source of such narratives is religion.   
 Religion, however, has not retreated from public life with the notable 
exception of Europe.  Virtually everywhere else it seems to be resurgent in some 
way or another, alternately in opposition to modernist projects or in support of 
them (Haynes 1997; Saha and Carr 2001; Simpson 1992; Westerlund 1996).  
Predictions of the demise of religion in the face of modernity were for the most 
part incorrect because they rested on the crucial assumption that modernity was a 
unitary phenomenon which by necessity would give rise to liberal democracies, 
capital markets and neatly defined and internally coherent spheres of social and 
economic activity.   
 What these predictions failed to reckon with was the degree to which the 
grand narratives offered by religion could succeed in incorporating the modernist 
vision rather than being superseded by it. Assuming that modernization would 
take the form of a master-pupil relationship between the West and the rest of the 
world, social scientists overlooked the desire of people around the world to craft a 
version of modern life that is less at variance with local norms and pre-existing 
ideologies that define ideal social relations (Hefner 1998; Roy 1994).  Islamic 
societies in particular are often imagined to suffer from a peculiar kind of 
backwardness - an inability to take that one key step toward embracing modernity 
that every other society seems to have done or be in the process of doing 
(Hofmann 2002; Huff and Schluchter 1999), yet there is already a long history of 
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Islamic engagement with modernity and the West that utilizes Islamic principles 
and institutions productively to create new and satisfying social arrangements. 
 Educational institutions hold a certain special place both in traditional 
Islamic societies as well as in the vision of modernity.  In the Muslim world 
there is a long history of education, formalized to varying degrees, that centers on 
the study of the Qur'ān and the Qur'ānic sciences, particularly law.  Other 
religious subjects as well as the natural sciences, history and literature were also 
studied in this context.  There is a strong association between the acquisition of 
knowledge ('ilm) and personal value, with the pursuit of knowledge imagined as a 
perfection of the individual's ability to understand his duties before God and 
society (Ahmad 1985; Ashraf 1985; Khan 1986; Makdisi 1981; Mohd Nor Wan 
Daud 1989; Sardar 1991).  In a sense, the pursuit of knowledge makes the ideal 
citizen in both the Islamic system and the modernist conception.  In both cases, 
there is typically an overt program for producing citizens through education 
whose bodies and intellects will serve as a resource for the institutions of society.  
In the developing world, it is the school system that is charged not only with 
teaching children those academic skills that will be required of them after they 
graduate but also a way of imagining themselves as parts of a larger 
communitarian or national whole (Keyes 1983). 
 The study of education and especially the study of the transformation of 
education cannot be separated from the examination of the matrix of values, 
symbols and material exigencies in which particular forms of knowing are 
elevated to the status of knowledge and how that very knowledge is then 
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disseminated, acquired and deployed differentially by members of society.  In 
different societies and at different times, these conditions are likely to vary, 
leading to locally and temporally specific articulations of ideology, 
socio-economic systems and education - the inculcation of ideology in 
anticipation of a particular kind of economic life (Anyon 1980; Anyon 1995; 
Levinson 2000; Reagan 1996).  Whether it is a question of modern media 
requiring telegenic spokespersons for Islamic values, the development of Islamic 
economics and banking drawing religious students into the financial professions, 
or discussions of halal foods for astronauts awakening young Muslims to the 
promise of an Islamic space program; it is the transformations in the worlds of 
statecraft, commerce, culture and ideas that are at once producing novel modes of 
education and transforming older practices by imbuing them with new relevance. 
 At present, there is a substantial literature on the incorporation of Islam 
into the machinery of state and deployment of Islamic ideology by the state to 
legitimate itself.  This scholarship is typically concerned with the relationship 
between religious thought and state bureaucracy as a whole, rather than systems 
of schooling in particular and yet, the discourse of Islamic modernity, particularly 
in Malaysia, where Islam is integral to the morality of modernity, has a profound 
influence both on schooling and the moral and intellectual boundaries in which 
that schooling takes place.  This section of this paper will be dedicated to an 
examination of the effects on education of state-sponsored efforts at 
modernization of Malaysian society and the degree to which they are suffused 
with a religious worldview and ideology. 
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 The notion of Islam as the foundation of worldly success was expounded 
by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaysia and in so doing he 
created a foundation upon which subsequent Malaysian politicians would build an 
ideological edifice characterized by an intertwined Malay/Islamic identity, a 
progressive attitude towards technology, commerce and education as well as a 
powerful state apparatus that commands the allegiance of its prosperous subjects.  
It is probably not insignificant that fairly early in his prime ministership, which 
lasted from 1957 to 1970, he established the Islamic Welfare Organization, which 
provides aid to Muslim Malays such that from the very beginning, Abdul Rahman 
promoted Islam as a vehicle for the promotion of basic welfare and was extremely 
popular. 
 After Abdul Rahman stepped down, the most important promoter of 
Malayo-Islamic values became Mahathir Mohamad, who did not deviate from the 
policy of making Islam the lynchpin of all modernization efforts in the country 
including educational modernization.  Indeed, since assuming political 
leadership in 1981, Mahathir sought to outmaneuver his antagonists in the Islamic 
party, PAS, by instituting a program of state-sponsored Islamization that 
presented the state (with Mahathir at the helm) as the legitimate protector and 
promoter of Islam in all affairs public.  Unlike other progressive minded leaders 
in the Muslim world like Atatürk or Tunisia's Habib Bourghuiba, who saw strict 
secularism and, when necessary, the suppression of Islamic institutions as 
necessary to the development of the modern state, Mahathir embraced Islam in 
public life and in so doing neutralized much of PAS's momentum.  In this 
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context, progressive Islam was developed as a discourse of social engineering by 
bureacrats and elites which had as its primary feature the “re-invention of Islam as 
a discourse compatible with development and commerce.” (Noor 2004: 3) 
 This new articulation of Islamic principles would then be embedded in the 
institutions of social reproduction, particularly the schools and other academic 
organizations such as universities and Islamic think tanks.  This occurred to a 
great extent by including members of the 'ulamā within these academic and 
administrative bodies so that by Mahathir's second year, there were over 100 
'ulamā working for the Office of the Prime Minister and more than 700 on the 
payroll of the Ministry of Education (Noor 2004: 15).  In addition, Mahathir 
greatly expanded the number and visibility of Islamic learning institutions.  Most 
notable was the foundation of the International Islamic University of Malaysia in 
1983, a university dedicated to the development of Islamic knowledge at the 
university level.  By Islamic knowledge progressive Muslims are not limiting 
themselves to the traditional Islamic sciences, but rather, they are proposing to 
Islamize all knowledge in general so that Islamic knowledge is not simply about 
what one studies and what one understands, but instead it focuses on how one 
studies and how one comes to certain knowledge (Mohd Nor Wan Daud 1989; 
Sardar 1991). 
 By emphasizing an Islamic way of knowing rather than merely an Islamic 
content, a wider range of investigation and research could be conducted by 
scholars within the legitimating discourse of Islamism.  Universities and think 
tanks began holding conferences on Islamic media, Islamic banking, and Islam 
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and technology to name but a few topics.  Most recently, Malaysia played host to 
a conference on Islam in space in anticipation of Malaysian astronauts going into 
orbit in cooperation with the Russian Federal Space Agency (Reuters 2006).  
Topics covered included the determination of the direction of Mecca from orbit 
and the performance of ablutions in a weightless environment among others.  
Many of these issues have already been dealt with in one way or another - there 
are rules for prayer when the qiblah (direction of Mecca) cannot be determined, as 
well as for tayammum, dry ablutions in the absence of fresh water - yet, this 
conference is promoted as a momentous occasion in the history of Islam.  What 
matters here is not so much the technical details of religious performance, but the 
powerful subtext that there is in fact a place for Muslims and Islam in the 
exploration of space and that there is an Islamic way to conduct space sciences.  
This has brought attention to Malaysia as the cutting edge of Islamic modernism 
where Islamic knowledge leads to Islamic applications and a modern lifestyle 
consistent with Islamic principles. 
 Mahathir's other chief innovation seemed to be the articulation of a 
comprehensive critique of the West, its civilization and morals (or lack thereof) 
and the Western conceptions of modernity.  Mahathir Mohamad's writings and 
lectures focus on the essential character of Malay people - it is good, but weak, 
and the compatability of this national character with Islam, which fortifies it 
(Mohamad 1986).  Kamal Hassan (2004) takes a similar stance and describes the 
contemporary Muslim mindset as insufficient to the task of modernisation - a 
situation that must be remedied, not by abandoning religion and embracing 
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Western values and practices, but instead by "recapturing" the forward-thinking 
and progressive Islamic spirit of the 12th century. 
Setting the requisite mindset of the Malaysian Muslim community 
is certainly not an easy task as it requires a coordinated, unified 
and comprehensive agenda by all agents of social change for a 
truly comprehensive transformation of the Malay people.  We 
have to bear in mind that the Malays are highly tolerant but 
custom-bound people with the behaviour pattern of the 'nature's 
gentleman' who were exposed in the thirteenth through the 
seventeenth centuries to an Islamic heritage which carried a 
strong emphasis on tasawwuf (spirituality) as well as elementary 
fiqh (legal procedure) of al-Shafi', separated from the more 
scientifically and technologically rich Andalusian legacy of the 
once holistic Islamic civilization.  The task of changing the 
Malay mindset is daunting but not insurmountable.  People do 
wake up from their slumber of complacency and will want to 
break away from their self-imposed prison of political myopia 
when calamities or disasters descend upon them as was the case 
with post-World War II Germany and Japan (Hassan 2004). 
 In both the works of Mahathir and Hassan, one is struck by the amount of 
self-deprecation and criticism of the apparently inherent weakness of the Malay 
people and their fundamental inability to compete on the same terms as 
Westerners.  This is however a common rhetorical device among many Asian 
leaders and intellectuals who seek to build a modern society that will look nothing 
like the West - to define for themselves what constitutes modernity.  By 
reappropriating the discourse of Asian difference so prevalent for centuries in 
European and Anglo-American society (Khairudin Aljuneid 2004), intellectuals in 
the Pacific Rim countries, particularly China, Singapore and Malaysia, define the 
distinctive Asian qualities that differentiate them from the West (Ong 1999).  
Usually these qualities are friendliness, kindness, gentleness, gregariousness, 
family values and other such warm and fuzzy attributes. 
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 By valorizing that which the West appears to reject, Asian leaders propose 
a particular form of modernity that is more virtuous than the Western version 
based on the cold logic of individual capital accumulation.  Leaders such as 
Mahathir Mohamad, Lee Kwan Yew (Singapore) and Ishihara Shintarou (Japan) 
have used such rhetoric in order to legitimize their politics and bolster their claims 
to be defenders of their people against Western-style market capitalism that seeks 
to subject Asiatic peoples to its needs.  It is this discourse that enables these 
leaders and others like them to style themselves simultaneously as the caring and 
generous father of the state, and the masculine and self-empowered Asian that can 
say "No" to the West.   
 In this way, Islam is made indispensable as it gives the gentle Malay a 
moral certitude with which to compete with the West and win.  The Cham too 
can now benefit from this model.  As Malaysians have already demonstrated that 
Islam belongs in the future of the modern world, the Cham as a related race can 
also expect to participate in the rational, bureaucratized, technologically 
sophisticated and increasingly mobile world that tomorrow is expected to bring.   
  At a coffee shop outside of the Tabligh KM 8 mosque three men who 
have worked in Malaysia, two as construction workers and one as an ice cream 
vendor, agreed to share their experiences there as well as their impressions of 
Malaysia as a country.  They are labeled A, B and C: 
 
C: Malaysia is a good place.  In Malaysia everyone is Muslim 
and they do things the Muslim way. 
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A: That’s right.  You don’t have any problems with anything.  
Halal food, places to pray – you have everything. 
 
Me: But there are many non-Muslims in Malaysia as well. 
 
C: It’s a Muslim country it doesn’t have so many non-Muslims. 
 
A: Yes, there are.  The Chinese. 
 
C: Yes, ok, the Chinese.  And some Indians, but many Indians are 
also Muslims. 
 
B: I also met non-Muslims, but there were more Muslims. 
 
A: In Malaysia there are Muslims and non-Muslims, but the 
non-Muslims understand Islam and they respect the religion.  
The country is Muslim so even if they are not Muslim they cannot 
offend Muslim customs. 
 
C: That’s right. (increasingly animated) If people are not Muslims 
that is not a problem because the country and the laws are Muslim.  
For example…  for example… for example, alcohol.  You 
cannot have advertisements for alcohol in Malaysia.  (pointing to 
a whiskey advertisement) In Malaysia that is not permitted.  
Why?  Because alcohol is haram.  You understand? So we have 
no problems there. (thumbs up) 
 
B: Yes, Malaysia is easy.  Ramadan comes and everyone is 
fasting like you.  They don’t bring you alcohol or other things 
that are haram. 
 
C: Malaysia is a good place! (thumbs up + satisfied smirk)  
 
Me: How about Malay people? 
 
C: Very nice! (two thumbs up).  If we go there, they will treat us 
well.  They help us and accept us like brothers.  We live like 
them and speak Malay and we have no problems. 
 
A: If you speak Cham, Malay is not difficult.  Malay people 
respect Chams.  We have the same religion, the same customs, 
the same language also…  our children can go to school there 
and learn English…  they learn about Islam. 
 
C: The girls can wear the hijab in school – no problem. 
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Me: Can’t children do that here? 
 
C: No, the girls can’t wear the hijab in Cambodian schools.  
They don’t allow them in the school. 
 
Me: But [prime minister] Hun Sen just said a few months ago that 
Muslim clothing should be permitted in schools.  Don’t they let 
the girls into school here now. 
 
B: That’s right, he said that. 
 
A: He said that, but it’s not the law.  They didn’t make a law.  
He just made a pronouncement. 
 
C: In Cambodia we have freedom to practice our religion.  But 
the whole society is not Muslim.  So we can go to school but the 
school is not a Muslim school.  We are different from them – we 
speak Cham and we are Muslim…  In their schools we must do 
things their way. 
 
Me: Can you teach Cham language or Muslim subjects in state 
schools? 
 
C: No, we have madrasas for that.  They teach religion there. 
And they use Cham, but in state schools never.  I’ll explain – the 
Cambodian government and the Vietnamese government are very 
close. (joins index and middle finger)  If they teach Cham or 
Cham subjects, the Vietnamese will be angry.  They have a great 
influence and they don’t want us to talk about Cham people or 
Cham history… 
 
Me: How is life in Cambodia now – compared to Malaysia? 
 
B: It’s hard.  
 
C: It’s hard here.  There are no jobs.  In Malaysia you can 
always find work and they pay well. 
 
B: There is a lot of crime here too.  Malaysia is safe. 
 
C: In Malaysia, they have police, they aren’t corrupt.  There 
aren’t so many thieves.  Not like here.  You see, in Malaysia 
they don’t have the problem of alcohol, because it’s haram.  
Drugs are also haram.  You don’t have these thugs getting high 
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and causing trouble.  Cambodia, yes – but in Malaysia, no.  
(thumbs up) 
 
B: Here there are two ways – Khmer and Muslim.  In Malaysia it 
is all Muslim. 
 
C: Muslims need to be with other Muslims, or the non-Muslims 
don’t know about our religion and they look down on us.  In 
America, Muslims must hide their religion. 
 
Me: You can be a Muslim in America without hiding it. 
 
C:  Do you know Michael Jackson?  He was very famous.  He 
just died.  He was a Muslim but nobody knew.  He was hiding 
his religion.  If people in America knew he was a Muslim they 
would not like him. 
 
A: Also because he is a Black person…  Many Black people in 
America are Muslims… 
 
Me: Yes, I do know Michael Jackson.  I heard he was a Muslim 
but I wasn’t sure.  But, his brother, Jermaine, was also a Muslim.  
He never hid his religion.  I knew he was a Muslim for a long 
time. 
 
C: That’s right, but you know Muslims.  Maybe most Americans 
didn’t know about his family… If Muslims live with non-Muslims 
it is difficult for people to understand each other’s hearts…   
 
 This rather long discourse on the character of Malaysia as an Islamic 
community highlights both the palpable anxieties that become evident when 
Muslims encounter non-Muslims, and the promise of temporal resolutions to 
worldly problems offered by a fully functional Islamic culture.   
 The interview took place in Chrang Chamres, a district of Phnom Penh 
with a large Muslim population supporting three major mosques.  While not the 
worst neighborhood in the city, Chrang Chamres does have real problems with 
drugs, juvenile delinquency and crime.  Straddling the outbound Highway 5 
217 
heading north to the Thai border, the area has a mixed economy of fishing and 
small-scale agriculture which has been practiced here for centuries as well as 
garment factories and mechanical support for the columns of trucks that form the 
backbone of the Cambodian ground transport network.  It is dirty, polluted and 
crowded with rural migrants.  This, plus the fact that each of the men had been 
back in Cambodia for a number of years already, may have helped to raise the 
level of fondness with which they remember Malaysia.  Nonetheless, their praise 
for Malaysia as well as the implicit and explicit critiques of Cambodia illuminates 
important aspects of Cham thought regarding their place in the world. 
 Firstly, there is the importance of living in an Islamic society.  This is 
distinct from living amongst Muslims.  The fact that the organs of state are 
Muslim, particularly schools, but also the criminal law and the regulations of 
work places, meant that Muslims would be protected from the problems attendant 
when they are made to interact with non-Muslims.  Strictly speaking, these men, 
and many like them, are not desirous of a society without non-Muslims per se, 
rather they see a practical ideal in having a multi-confessional community 
subordinated to Muslim norms and conventions.  The Muslim character of the 
Malay state neutralizes the disruptions that could be caused by the presence of 
Chinese and Hindus.  Without Islam, the natural character of the person is given 
to vice.  Much like Islam gave backbone to the gentle Malay, it fortifies the will 
of Cham people to follow the correct path. 
 Secondly, each of these men evinces a strong identification with Malay 
people as ethnic kin.  This is quite different from what many experience when 
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they travel to Saudi Arabia.  In Malaysia, the commonality of language (both 
Malay and Cham are Austronesian languages, which while not mutually 
intelligible have many cognates and obvious similarities), of religion and of 
imagined heritage as descendants of the Muslims who plied the sea lanes between 
India and China, means that the Cham can feel a sense of bonding and develop a 
network of fictive kinship much like they would back in Cambodia and unlike 
Arabia, where they are never made to feel that they are part of the community. 
 In conversations like these, there is very little reference to the tenets of the 
religion itself – no quoting of the Qur’an or references to the hadith.  Combined 
these three men may have had as little as 6 years of Islamic education total.  The 
central themes of the discourse are comfort, respect and belonging.  The comfort 
that Chams feel at seeing people living in a familiar material world – rice-staple 
diet, Malay style clothing and fashion, social conventions regarding the treatment 
of family members and the interaction among individuals including body 
language and tone of voice – helps many Cham feel that Malay people practice a 
culture similar to but more advanced than their own.  This leads many who have 
experienced the material prosperity of Malaysia to regard it as a model for a 
modern Muslim society completely in keeping with the principles of the Cham 
moral economy.   
 This kinship is reinforced by the fact that they feel themselves to be 
respected by Malays.  This respect is in opposition to the contempt with which 
they believe they are held by the Khmers, the Vietnamese and the Americans / 
Europeans and even Arabs.  The narrative of Islamic faith buffeted in a sea of 
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willful disbelief is a common one in Cambodia and other Muslim-minority 
contexts.  That even Michael Jackson a world famous superstar could not openly 
practice his religion attests to the insignificance of the individual, no matter how 
great, when not supported by a Muslim society.   
 Muslim-friendly edicts from the prime minister’s office are certainly 
welcome, but they do not constitute the basis for a good Islamic community.  
Malays have found the answer to this in Islamicizing society and bringing justice 
for Muslim and non-Muslim alike.  Of course, as a small minority, the Muslims 
of Cambodia are in no position to make such impositions on the rest of the society, 
and so, Malaysia becomes an ideal – not really acheiveable but available to be 
admired and emulated to whatever extent possible.  Unlike Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia is not an alien land of austere Islamic purity powered by pilgrimage and 
petrochemicals, but a civilization, connatural with their own, but more fortunate 
in that they were never stricken with the territorial dispossession of the ancient 
Cham.  This ideal of living in an Islamic world where non-believers cannot 
contaminate the purity of belief or the correctness of lifestyle is especially 
relevant to the urban mixed population of Chrang Chamres and the rest of the 
urban agglomeration of Phnom Penh. 
 
4.6 Phnom Penh – “There is Pork Everywhere” 
 Boarding a bus in Phnom Penh to accompany Ysa back to his village, it 
occurred to me that we should grab some bread for the trip up.  Ysa agreed and 
authoritatively motioned through the bus window for a vendor to approach.  As 
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the young man raised a bag of French bread to within reach of Ysa’s outstretched 
arm, a voice called out.  Rushing over, a share-taxi driver raised his hand and 
shouted that that bread contained pork.  Ysa recoiled from the offending vittles 
and shooed the vendor away.  He thanked the taxi driver and they spoke for a 
few moments – clearly they knew each other.   
 The Cham are traditionally matrilocal and typically move from their natal 
villages to their wives’ upon marriage.  This means that Cham men frequently 
have a well developed network of friends and family that include their home 
villages, their wives’ villages and the villages of other men from the natal village 
that married women from other areas.  This taxi driver was from Chroy 
Changvar, a peninsula across the river from the center of Phnom Penh – a historic 
center of the Cham community in the area and until recently, relatively 
undeveloped despite being formally within the bounds of the city.  Ysa would 
sometimes comment on how growing up in Phnom Penh and now living in 
Kampong Chhnang gave him perspective on the urban-rural divide. 
 But Ysa hasn’t lived in the city for a long time.  The town has changed 
and it is now a place that combines business and educational opportunities, which 
he approves of, with personal hazards and moral endangerments, of which he 
approves less.  Fortunately, Muslims are always looking out for each other and 
Ysa’s childhood friend stepped in to prevent what would have been an awful 
situation.  As the bus pulled away from the station and away from our last 
chance for lunch, Ysa explained that the city isn’t anything like the countryside, 
where any strange person can be spotted and kept an eye on.  In the city there are 
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lots of bad things – crime, alcohol, sex, pork and other bad influences.  He 
worried about me living in such a dilapidated apartment block and advised me to 
move somewhere safer.   Ysa would later be accosted by a group of young 
hoodlums looking for cigarette money in the stairwell of my building shortly 
before Chinese New Year.  As if the point were not clear to me he drew the 
picture: your building, plus addiction, plus Chinese holidays equals crime… 
 
4.6.1 Fear of the Foreign 
 One should be clear that Ysa’s feelings of trepidation vis-à-vis Phnom 
Penh is by no means a new phenomenon nor is it particular to Muslims.  The 
anxiety about the city is shared broadly especially when it is children or younger, 
more impressionable family members going off to work or study.  A significant 
aspect of this is the very foreignness of Phnom Penh.  Business of virtually any 
type is dominated by Sino-Khmers, the descendants of Chinese merchants and 
agricultural workers as well as the Khmers amongst whom they married.  
Despite the fact that, unlike Việt Nam, Cambodia was never under direct Chinese 
rule nor was its language ever written in Chinese characters, Chinese decorations 
and characters for luck and fortune are to be found in the majority of private 
businesses – be they restaurants, hotels, stationary stores, pet shops or coffee 
houses. 
 This image of Phnom Penh as being non-Khmer has a history going back 
to the French period, when the administration preferred Vietnamese civil servants 
over Khmers.  The city consisted of a French ruling class, their Vietnamese 
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clerks and assistants and a Chinese merchant community.  Khmers and Chams 
were both resident in the city but their influence over its functioning was minor.  
In the 1930’s, attempts to modernize Khmer culture led to the appearance of the 
first Khmer language novel, Sophat.  This story of a young orphan boy from the 
countryside who grows to manhood and reconnects with his family roots in 
Phnom Penh is remarkable in that, although taking place almost completely in 
Phnom Penh, there is not a single non-Khmer character in the work (Klairung 
1998).  This urge to make Khmer the urban polity would find a less innocuous 
expression when the Khmer Rouge evacuated the cities into the countryside in 
order to purge the nation of the corrupting influence of the foreign. 
 For many Cham, the city is doubly foreign.  It is a place where Chinese 
merchants and Euro-American tourists interface with Cambodian people through 
points of common interest such as – alcohol, pork products, dancing and 
everything that leads to – all things forbidden to Muslims.  Yet Muslims have 
been a presence in the city since its founding (Osborne 2008).  The peri-urban 
regions of Chrang Chamres on the road leading to Thailand, Chbar Ampouv on 
the route to Việt Nam and Chroy Changvar across the Tonle Sap river from the 
heart of the city all have large Cham-speaking Muslim populations supporting 
mosques, madrasas and halal business establishments.  These communities have 
created Cham and Muslim neighborhoods by continuing many of the same 
practices of barrier building as one finds in the rural context. 
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4.6.2 Barriers and Defenses 
 The most plainly obvious fact that keeps Muslims and non-Muslims 
separate from each other is their physical separation.  In the countryside, 
Muslims and non-Muslims almost always live in different villages.  In a contact 
area, a commune will have some villages classified as Khmer and others as 
Muslim.  Even in those places where one finds mixed villages, the villages are 
not so much mixed as divided.  An example of this phenomenon is Prek Tapouv 
just south of Phnom Penh, where the Cham population lives on the bank of the 
creek and engages in fishing, whereas the Khmers live on the side of the road 
away from the water and mostly find employment in the market town.  
Cambodian land laws prohibit the private ownership of waterfront property, so 
Muslims do not own their homes and will not maintain or expand them for fear 
that the land will be confiscated without compensation.  In this same village 
Muslim and non-Muslim are separated by patterns of land occupation, profession 
and relative squalor as well as language and religion.  
 Muslim villages will usually have Muslim village chiefs and mixed 
villages will always have a Muslim assistant to the village chief.  When a 
problem emerges among villagers the me juma’ah is called to determine whether 
the dispute is a matter for the religious leadership or for the civil authorities.  
Family law is usually handled by the religious establishment while land disputes 
or cases involving criminal conduct are referred to the village chief.  In addition, 
Muslim communities may punish infractions such as drinking alcohol, which are 
not crimes at all in Cambodia.  The combination of spatial distance and 
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administrative particularism gives Muslim communities a certain feeling of 
autonomy and self-sufficiency regarding the day-to-day conduct of their lives.  
These facts have been recapitulated in the urban setting. 
 As in the countryside, Muslim communities are defined geographically.  
These are places with where the call to prayer can be heard, women walk about 
with their heads covered and pork is not on the menu.  Women’s dress is the 
clearest indicator to Khmers of whether they are in a Muslim area.  Although 
many Tabligh men do dress in ways that call attention to the fact that they are 
Muslims, most will dress down when it comes time to go to work.  Seeing a man 
in a Tabligh village who is always Islamically dressed is usually a good indication 
that he is employed in the Muslim community and interacts little with Khmers.  
Women on the other hand, among Tablighs, Salafis and most other Muslims with 
the notable and important exception of the Imam San, must be dressed in an 
Islamically appropriate fashion whenever they are in public.   
 It is a known fact among Khmers that marriage to a Muslim requires 
conversion of the non-Muslim partner.  By marking themselves as Muslims, 
these women remove themselves from the world of romantic intrigue and sexual 
maneuvering of non-Muslims.  This should not be understood as Khmers being 
uninterested in Muslims in this way.  The headscarf and social distance 
engenders a certain allure for many Khmer men, many of whom believe that 
Muslims are actually extremely sexual and engage in full-on orgies at the mosque 
every Friday.  The combination of Muslim women being sexually unavailable 
and at the same time being regarded as having secret lives to which Khmers are 
225 
not privy, creates feelings of anxiety at the possibility that members of the Khmer 
community might be lost.  As a member of the district office responsible for 
Chrang Chamres explained in the presence of Muslims, “If a man marries a 
Muslim, he converts.  If a woman marries a Muslim, she converts.  They take 
everyone.  They take people.” 
 These Muslim body snatchers break the bonds between the Khmer and his 
or her family, friends and community.  To marry a Muslim woman means to 
convert and to enter her community.  It means that one should abstain from 
alcohol and refuse to eat pork, a popular meat among all non-Muslim Cambodians.  
It means that the convert should no longer attend Buddhist festivals or religious 
ceremonies.  It means adopting lifeways that are at odds with those of Khmer 
Buddhists and surrounding one’s self with a new family that the old family may 
not feel as comfortable with. 
 To spend a day in Phnom Penh with an observant Muslim is to quickly run 
into a number of obstacles that do not present themselves when spending time 
with Khmers.  If you eat three times a day, those are three times when halal 
eateries must be located.  In Phnom Penh, outside of the Muslim areas listed 
earlier in this section, these places are relatively few.  A city of nearly two 
million people is immediately reduced to a handful of locations where food is 
both halal and affordable.  Recent years have brought an influx of new 
restaurants and other dining options that cater to the growing middle class, the 
expatriate community and the increasing numbers of tourists.  Some of these 
serve South Asian or Middle Eastern food, which are halal, but these 
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developments have meant nothing to the local Muslim community since they are 
priced for foreigners and well-off Cambodians.  Whether they feel excluded 
because they are practicing Muslims or because they are poor Cambodians, the 
distribution of Muslim friendly options across the city has remained essentially 
unchanged throughout the period of fieldwork.   
 The maintenance of these parallel life paths through the urban landscape 
and these alternate networks for sustaining the Muslim both bodily and spiritually 
is still vigorous and effective by the reckoning of most Muslims interviewed.  
The one area in which this barrier between Muslims and non-Muslims may be 
weakening is in the use of language.  It should best be said that really this is 
something that separated non-Cham speakers from the Cham speakers, since not 
all Muslims are ethnic Cham, and in Phnom Penh both Cham and non-Cham 
Muslims are represented.  Nevertheless, the evidence for language attrition 
among the younger generation has begun to disturb many members of the 
community. 
 The characteristic that mostly clearly and unambiguously marks a person 
as a member of a Cham community is the use of the Cham language.  Non-Cham 
Muslims, or Chvea, do not speak Cham and for this reason Cham and Chvea 
typically inhabit different villages even when in close geographic proximity, a 
patern of separation similar to that found between Muslims of any type and 
non-Muslims.  Khmer converts to Islam also do not normally acquire any 
knowledge of Cham, favoring the continued use of Khmer instead.  The Cham 
language in effect separates the Cham from their Khmer hosts as well as from 
227 
other Muslims that do not have their origins in Champa.  This is not to say that 
the Cham language is a unifying force among Cham or even a common bond 
between different Cham communities.  The differential use of the Cham, Khmer 
and other languages along with the different writing systems used and notions of 
what the most clear and correct pronunciation is all help mark differences 
between Cham communities who in principle share a common language. 
 Today it is estimated that Cham is spoken by approximately a quarter of a 
million people (Blengsli 2008).  Throughout the country the vast majority of 
people who would classify themselves as being ethnic Cham all claim the 
language as their mother tongue.  In the provinces and particularly in Kompong 
Cham, the use of Cham remains vigorous.  It is the language of daily life for 
community members of all ages and is used for discussion of the most mundane 
matters as well as religion and politics.  However, the situation in Phnom Penh 
and its immediate environs has changed within the past generation.  In both the 
peninsula of Chroy Changvar and the northern suburbs of Reussei Keo, young 
people are less likely to use Cham for anything other than religious instruction 
and even this bastion of the language is beginning to give way.   
 Walking through the Muslim quarters of Chroy Changvar, one is as likely 
to hear a mother scolding a child in Khmer as in Cham.  Although Cham is still 
frequently spoken, there is frequent code switching into Khmer when a youth less 
proficient in Cham joins the conversation.  The two southern mosques of the 
peninsula, Masjid Dar Al-Salam and Masjid Al-Azhar, both have congregations 
that are primarily Cham speaking, even if the younger generation may not be as 
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fluent.  The northernmost mosque, Masjid Muk Dach, just at the foot of the 
bridge that connects the peninsula to the center of Phnom Penh, now has far fewer 
Cham speakers.  The few that are found in this community are often transplants 
from Cham-speaking communities in Kompong Cham or even Việt Nam.  The 
majority here continue to consider themselves Cham, that is they do not call 
themselves Chvea, but recognize that they no longer possess the language of their 
ancestors. 
 Opinion at the southern mosques is divided.  Firstly, there is no real 
agreement on whether their language will disappear in their communities as it has 
at Muk Dach.  Secondly, there is no consensus on what sort of action would be 
necessary to stem any decline of Cham language use or even that this decline 
represents any kind of a problem that needs to be addressed.  Many older 
Muslims claim to speak Cham fluently and as their first language, and balk at the 
notion that their children or grandchildren will somehow fail to develop those 
skills.  These discussions inevitably lead to the bairns being summoned before 
the audience of elders and foreign anthropologists and subjected to a quick 
grilling on their Cham skills.  In Cham they are asked if they speak Cham, if 
they write Cham and with whom they speak in Cham.  Once they have 
demonstrated their proficiency they are let loose to continue playing with their 
friends – frequently in Khmer. 
 Yet other members of the community do recognize that loss is occurring.  
Usually these are in early middle age and are raising the first generation of Cham 
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children in the area to complete a significant number of years in Khmer language 
state schools.   
Children now go to school.  I didn't go to school – only a few 
years.  But children now go to school longer... the school is here 
nearby... the teachers are Khmer, the students are Khmer.  They 
speak Khmer in school and when they come home they have TV in 
Khmer.   They like to watch karaoke and the songs are all in 
Khmer... when you look at the screen you see the Khmer 
characters.  So now they speak Khmer.  We speak Cham at 
home but they speak Khmer to friends.  Even if they both know 
how to speak Cham they don't.  They speak Khmer instead.  
Young people nowadays they prefer Khmer.  They can speak 
Cham but they don't care about it.  It isn't important. 
 
 The question of whether or not Cham matters is complex.  There is the 
problem of utility.  As I began learning the Cham language myself, I was both 
strongly encouraged to do so and at the same time questioned as to why I should 
even bother.  In Chroy Changvar, many were especially puzzled by the fact that I 
should study Cham when I had yet to master the more useful Malay language.  
Older women would gather by the windows of the schoolhouse where I studied 
Cham and called out the answer to the teacher's questions in Malay rather than 
Cham, thereby, according to them, affording me the opportunity to learn both 
languages at once.  This approach was not very effective, but they sincerely felt 
it would be in my best interest to acquire some Malay as a way of understanding 
their community and possibly meeting members of their family working in 
Malaysia..   
 The peninsula as a whole and Masjid Al-Azhar in particular have 
historically strong connections to Malaysia mostly because of labor migration.  
Malay was until recently studied by the students at the local madrasa, and has 
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been regarded as a language of upward economic mobility by enabling them to 
access opportunities in the Malaysian economy.  The similarities between Cham 
and Malay meant that many people saw Cham as a gateway to Malay – one the 
language of home and elementary religious instruction, and the other a language 
opening up another set of possibilities.  A younger woman working as a manager 
at the Puncak Hotel explained: 
Here there are many people that have gone to Malaysia to work.  
My brother worked in construction and his daughter was born 
there.  There are other people that go.  Some Cham go even if 
they don't know Malay.  But when we go, it is easier because we 
can speak and the people respect us.  In Cambodia also there are 
Malaysian people.  There is the Puncak Hotel, which is a 
Malaysian hotel.  Muslims stay there.  The food is halal and 
everyone is Malay or Cham and they speak Malay.  If I didn’t 
speak Malay I would not be able to work like this.  Now I am 
even learning Arabic for our Arab guests. 
 
 Despite these opportunities to validate their home language by connecting 
it to the broader world of Muslim languages, the continued decline in the use of 
Cham in Phnom Penh is likely to continue as there are no formal structures in 
place to encourage its learning or its usage outside of the home.  Much as 
valoration of Cham is connected to its perceived ability to bring Muslims together, 
fears about the loss of Cham is also strongly tied to anxieties about the loss of 
children to mainstream Khmer culture manifest in the monetized and impersonal 
economy of the city and the opportunities for straying from the path that this 
presents.   
 The ability to go into the city and gain anonymity means that young 
Muslims can and do experiment with drugs and alcohol with a reduced chance of 
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facing social opprobrium when they return home.  Some young people, already 
well down the path of addiction, no longer have the wherewithal to hide their 
activities, bringing shame upon their families who are usually at a loss as to how 
to deal with this unfamiliar challenge.  From among these, some will not return 
to the community.  They will instead establish whatever life they can for 
themselves in the city as their families’ disesteem turns to disconnection.  
 
4.6.3 Disconnected 
 Cham youth that have fallen out of the community provide us with an idea 
of how Islam and Cham identity are articulated in distinction to Khmerness as 
well as how these aspects of identity are seen as being both intensely personal and 
shared in a community.  These cases can often be quite tragic. 
 Ka is a 26 year old woman originally from Kompong Cham, although her 
family had relocated to Kampot when she was young.  For the past 4 years she 
has been working as a freelance prostitute in one of the major entertainment areas 
for tourists and expats.  Initially, she was renting an apartment together with 
anywhere between 3-7 other girls and was making a reasonable living.  In recent 
years however, her visibly declining health and her increasingly demanding drug 
habit and gambling problem have made her unable to make her portion of the rent 
and so now finds herself effectively homeless, depending on an increasingly 
Khmer clientele for a basic living. 
 When I first met Ka about 7 years ago, she had mentioned that she was 
from Kompong Cham.  At the time I was not studying the Cham and thought 
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little of her province of origin.  Upon my return to Cambodia, I saw her again 
working at an Australian pub.  I greeted her in Cham and asked me in Khmer 
whether I now also spoke Cham.  I continued in Cham for a while longer and 
realized that she responded to me exclusively in Khmer.   
Can you speak Khmer to me?  I don’t want to speak Cham 
here…  I don’t want anyone to know I’m Cham.  If you speak 
Cham they will think I’m Cham.  And I don’t want that… 
 
Are you ashamed of being Cham? 
 
I’m a whore (literally: broken woman), I’m not good.  Cham 
people are good.  Islam teaches us good behavior.  I don’t want 
people to think Muslims are whores.  Cham are not like the 
Vietnamese… Muslims don’t lie, steal or kill.  Everyone knows 
the Vietnamese work in prostitution and everyone hates them… 
they are bad people.  But Cham are good people, Cham don’t 
cause problems, so don’t speak any Cham with me anymore, OK? 
 
Ka’s acceptance of the mainstream Cambodian discourse of the 
Vietnamese as prostitutes, pimps and thieves as well as her interchangeable usage 
of the terms ‘Cham’ and ‘Muslim’ are certainly unremarkable on their own.  
What is of interest here is how she expresses a sincere regard for the Islamic faith 
that provides guidance and character, and yet distances herself from the very same 
religion so as to protect it – relegating herself to the status of broken woman and 
therefore not worthy of association with the religion of Islam.  Her awareness of 
the gaze of Khmers is obvious and she manifests a concrete fear that the 
connection of Chams or Muslims to unsavory activities will result in them being 
regarded with the kind of disdain Khmers normally reserve for the Vietnamese. 
On many occasions, I have told this story to older men in the countryside.  
Each time they wince and grimace as they hear of a Muslim girl having sex for 
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money with foreign men, however, as they learn of her response to the situation, 
as they understand that she is concealing her background to protect the honor of 
Islam, they breathe a sigh of relief and begin to nod with approval. 
Even if she is doing something bad, it is good that she protects the 
faith.  Nobody needs to know where she is from.  What she does 
is good. 
 
Unfortunately, Ka's defense of her community was not reciprocated when 
she fell on hard times.  Shortly after renewing contact with her, Ka was banned 
from the bar for allegedly starting a fist fight with a Vietnamese sex worker.   
Why did they throw you out of the bar? 
 
There was a Yuon woman talking to my customer.  I went to the 
bathroom and when I returned there was a Yuon with him.  I've 
known her for a long time.  She is mean and I know she was 
watching us because that day there were very few customers – a 
lot of girls, only a few customers.  Then we fought. 
 
You fought?   
 
Yes, we were arguing.  And then the customer became unhappy.  
And I was so angry.  That Yuon was giving me problems and 
making me lose my customer.  I haven't worked in a long time, 
you know?   There are no customers and I pay to get to and from 
the bar myself.  The taxi and then food.  I pay everyday to come 
to work but I can't find a customer.  I was so angry.  I told her 
get out of here and she hit me.  And then they threw me out. 
 
For how long? 
 
I don't know.  Maybe I can't go back. 
 
Did they throw the both of you out?  The Yuon girl too? 
 
She went back in.  She had money she could pay the guard to let 
her back in side.  Also she has friends inside.  The Yuon girls 
always work together.  You see them always together.  You 
know they are Yuon because they have light skin.  If you see 
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many light skin girls together they are Yuon and they are working 
together. 
 
Do you work with anyone inside?  Can someone help you?   
 
Before when I lived with other girls, sometimes we worked 
together, but know I don't.  We've argued and we don't want to 
be around each other...  The Khmer girls work together but not 
like the Yuon.  They [the Khmer] have fewer friends.  They 
change friends.  But also if they need help they usually have 
family in Phnom Penh or they have brothers and sisters. 
 
You don't have family here? 
 
No.  They have family, but my family is in Kompong Cham and I 
don't talk to them so often.   
 
 Ka here recapitulates the us-versus-them dichotomies typical of the 
Khmer-Vietnamese discourse – a group of light-complected invasive predators 
use their superior organizational skills to deprive the dark-skinned, good-hearted 
locals of the modest living to which they feel due.  Ka is a local in this scenario 
in a way that is reminiscent of the comments on ethnicity and skin color in 3.3.3.  
Ka’s confrontation with the Vietnamese brings into focus the importance of social 
connections in Cambodia as the key to success for anyone regardless of one’s race, 
ethnicity or religion.   
 This goes deeper than pithy sayings like “It’s not what you know, but who 
you know.”  While true to a great extent it doesn’t truly capture the web of 
mutual obligations, deferred and realized expectations, and bonds of loyalty that 
make up the networks of khsai and the framework of khnong which make social 
and economic advancement possible.  In Khmer khsai refers to connections and 
contacts (literally ‘string’ or ‘chain’) and khnong refers to support (literally 
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‘back’).  The term khsai here may be thought of as being similar to Guanxi in a 
Chinese context (Ong 1999), a notion whose definition varies from “a web of 
extended familial obligations and sentiments” to a view that privileges the 
strategic deployment of this form of social capital in driving social exchange 
(Bian 2001). 
 Khsai are important.  Anyone trying to make it in the city is going to 
need some work, and the best way to find a job is through some contact.  A good 
contact not only means that a young person coming in from the countryside can 
get a decent job, but that the working conditions and the social situation on the job 
site are likely to be better.  While there are exceptions to this, the reputation and 
status of the contact and recommender will accrue to the recommended, and he 
will be known as a kin or fictive kin relative of the recommender.  This brings 
great advantage in terms of being treated well on the job for fear of offending the 
person who provided the khsai, as well as for being considered a person of trust 
since one’s character has been vouched for and it is understood that nobody wants 
to disappoint his patron. 
 Understanding the importance of khsai and the degree to which it is an 
accepted practice is central to understanding what role discrimination might play 
in the economic and social relations between Khmers and Chams.  Newspaper 
articles and other publications about Cambodian Muslims will frequently include 
some boilerplate about discrimination and marginalization.  However, notions of 
discrimination in the West are based on the assumption that the correct way to, for 
example, hire an employee is to review a series of applications and select the 
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contender whose skills, training and aptitudes most closely match the description 
of the job published, without regard for race, gender or other quality understood 
to be unrelated to the performance of duties.  In such cases, to prefer a man over 
a woman, a white person over a black person or a Catholic over a Lutheran, is a 
violation of a principle of fairness defined by the characteristics of the position 
and nothing more.   
 The problem with importing this idea to the Cambodian context is that 
virtually no Cambodian could ever be naïve enough to ever entertain the fantasy 
of blindness to social connections in matters of employment.  In general people 
prefer to hire someone they already know.  For one, trustworthiness is very 
important where many aspects of business still have an informal feel.  Knowing 
a person’s background and family means that they can be held accountable for 
their actions.  In addition, hiring or supporting a young person with room and 
board is a way of building bonds between different family groups and maintaining 
networks of khsai by providing khnong.  An account of this system from Math, a 
Muslim from Kampong Cham who spent several years in Malaysia as a 
construction worker, reveals that with regard to this system of connections, 
Muslims live in a wholly separate but also closely parallel system of social 
relations: 
My brother was in Malaysia before me.  He had a job broker and 
he knew how to do everything over there, so I followed him.  
When I arrived in Malaysia my brother had already returned, but 
I met the people he worked with and they gave me work and I 
stayed with them.   
 
Why did you come back? 
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I wanted to get married.  I saved some money so I came back.  
But now I’m driving a moto-taxi.  It’s difficult because there 
aren’t many customers and gas is expensive. 
 
Can your brother help?  The way he did in Malaysia? 
 
No, he is back to farming.  He doesn’t have any khsai here and 
neither do I.  Before we had the broker and the broker helped us 
connect to work but now I don’t know anyone.  
 
Can you go back to school?  You’re still young.  I know Ahmed 
Yahya is still giving scholarships to Muslim students to go to 
Norton University. 
 
Same problem.  Before I went to Malaysia, I wanted to study, but 
I didn’t have the khsai so I couldn’t get the scholarships.  The 
other students have khsai and they can get support but I don’t 
know the right people.  I would like to study.  If I could meet 
someone that could help me I could finish school and get a better 
job. 
 
The khsai that these people have for jobs and school, are they 
Muslims? 
 
Yes. 
 
Can you try to connect with Khmers?  Maybe you can use a 
Khmer network to get a better job. 
 
Khmers have different khsai.  There is Khmer khsai (hands 
motioning to the left) and Cham khsai (hands motioning to the 
right).  They are different.  Chams help Chams and Khmers 
help Khmers. 
 
So you don’t know any Khmers? 
 
Yes, here there are many Khmers… some Vietnamese… some 
Muslims.  So I know many Khmer people. 
 
Where do you meet Khmers?  How do you socialize? 
 
On the street.  If I am walking and I see someone on the street 
walking I say hello (waving his hand). 
 
I see.  Do you visit their houses. 
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No. 
  
Do you go out to eat with them? 
 
No. 
 
You don’t spend time with any of them. 
 
No.  I just see them on the street.  Sometimes at the market. 
 
 Math and others like him are not opposed to the system of khsai and 
khnong, merely, they recognize that they are outside of the system and would like 
to be plugged in themselves.  When he did have khsai, back in Malaysia, Math 
was happy to make the best of the situation.  But today he sees his problem as a 
lack of social connection as well as no feasible way to build new ones.  Unlike a 
sterling CV, a prestigious diploma or a glowing letter of recommendation from a 
former employer, the whole khsai-dependent approach to making one’s way in the 
world does not travel well.   
 Any kind of social or geographic dislocation can potentially neutralize any 
number of social connections of patronage and obligation.  Moving to Phnom 
Penh can be risky because unless one arrives with a contact already in the city, the 
possibility of being without khsai is very real.  Math has fallen through his khsai 
network and now finds himself with little hope for the future.  His moto-taxi 
earns him barely enough to support his wife and infant, and the financial troubles 
are taking a toll on their relationship.  Despite living in the capital, he has no 
social connection to the majority Khmer community – his idea of good relations 
being friendly acknowledgments of each other’s presence made from a safe 
distance. 
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 Unlike Ka, Math still makes the clear distinction between the Khmer and 
Cham social worlds.  The inclusion of the Vietnamese into the discourse has a 
way of encouraging Chams to find commonality with Khmers.  We saw this in 
3.3.3, where remembering the Vietnamese invasion of Champa strengthens their 
cultural and racial attachment to their new country.  In 4.5.1, the difficulties tied 
to reproducing Cham culture in this new hostland was explained as a result of 
Vietnam’s overwhelming influence on Cambodians, both Muslims and 
non-Muslims.  Math however, still maintains the importance of being separate 
for the social order as well as the health of the individual.  As he explains 
further: 
You have to be careful here.  If you become involved with the 
wrong people you will be in trouble.  Even though I have no 
khsai, I don’t get involved with people that do drugs or commit 
crime…  There are other people here, from Kampong Cham, but 
they started doing drugs or other bad things.  So I don’t really 
see them now…  I think if they stopped being with those people 
and came back to the religion they could be ok.  But if they are 
criminals it is better that they don’t return.  They can stay in 
Phnom Penh.  They are with Khmer people now and they forget 
the difference between right and wrong. 
 
 Math sees himself as being in a difficult position, but cleaves to the 
religion – regularly attending prayers at the mosque as well as participating in 
Tabligh study circles.  By staying apart from Khmers he is not only protecting 
himself, but also his family and his place in the community.  These young 
Muslims who have lost their way, like Ka, are following the wrong path, because 
although they are availing themselves of opportunities in the city and developing 
new connections, those same connections lead to their undoing.  The poisonous 
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khsai that connect Muslim with non-Muslim will inexorably lead to the 
contamination of faith and the exit from the community of believers.   
 Math does not actually speak ill of Khmers when they are not corrupting 
Muslims.  He realizes that the majority of Khmers are not drug-pushing pimps, 
but then he also understands these upstanding Khmers to inhabit a different set of 
social relations – helping their own kind.  While these Khmers are not bad, they 
are also not that relevant in day to day life since they will not cross the line 
between Muslim and non-Muslim and so remain an inert element in social 
interactions.  The Khmers he worries about are on the lower end of the social 
spectrum.  They do not know right and wrong and as a result violate all kinds of 
rules – the law, sexual morality and social conventions regarding the interaction 
of Khmers and Chams. 
 This vision of two distinct and parallel societies living in the same country 
underlies much of the discourse of Cambodian Muslims of all sects.  Obedience 
to the laws of the state, respect for public institutions including the Buddhist 
heritage of the country and its monarchy, and recognition of Muslim Cambodians 
as individuals possessed of social and religious liberties because of the post civil 
war constitution, are all basic elements of mainstream Muslim discourse 
throughout the kingdom.  However, this is not simply an acceptance that Chams 
will live as a minority within a larger state.  This notion of parallelism, similar to 
the structural homologization of 3.7, leads to further efforts to instantiate and 
make manifest in social relations the imagined development of the community 
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disrupted and discontinued by the Vietnamese invasion of their original 
homeland. 
 
4.7  “We too have Hilltribes” – Imposing Civilization  
 Ratanakiri province in the Northeast of Cambodia is a hilly country to 
which access has historically been difficult from lowland central Cambodia.  It 
borders both Laos and Việt Nam and has long been populated by the Khmer Leu, 
a blanket term for the upland peoples of Cambodia.  Since independence, 
Ratanakiri has experienced immigration from lowland Cambodia, which the 
government encouraged with the aim of bringing the border region under firmer 
control and exploiting the economic potential of rubber and coffee along with the 
extractive industries.  This demographic shift, accompanied as it was by new 
arrangements of land tenure and the increasingly important role of money in 
economic transactions has put the indigenous peoples of the highlands on the back 
foot struggling to cope (Sokhom and Monie 2002). 
 To a great extent these state-directed transformations are similar to those 
found around the region, both in their material effects as well as their intellectual 
justifications and underpinnings (Duncan 2004).  Recent developments in 
Cambodian governance have made multi-culturalism an important principle of 
development in the country (Ehrentraut 2004).  This has led to support for local 
communities to support their cultures and languages, but on the whole there is still 
a strong sense of paternalism that pervades encounters between the lowland 
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peoples and the uplanders.  Here the lowlanders are not only Khmers, but Chams 
as well. 
 In an interview with Imam Sleh, the provincial imam of Ratanakiri 
Province, he recounted the history of the Cham community in the highlands in 
this way:  
We came here after UNTAC left.  At first we only had a few 
families – about 20.  It was difficult for us then.  It was a very 
wild place.  No electricity, the roads were not paved, no doctors.  
We came together from Kampong Cham and we lived together – 
near each other.  The Khmer Leu didn’t like us.  When someone 
died they wouldn’t let us bury the body here.  They were afraid 
that the Cham ghosts would haunt the area afterwards.  We did 
some farming and planted rubber trees.  It is difficult to grow 
rice here and it is difficult to fish… it is very different from 
kampong Cham.  But Kampong Cham has too many people.  If 
you have children, they can’t all work the farm.  Some have to 
leave…  But here we have rubber – we can sell it and then buy 
rice or other things…  Today there are several Muslim villages.  
More people have come to Ratanakiri and we have a few mosques 
and some Islamic teachers…  Also, many Jarai are becoming 
Muslim now.  The Jarai and the Cham are from the same people.  
Both are from Champa.  When Champa fell the Cham people had 
to come to Cambodia.  They crossed the mountains to Kampong 
Cham and Phnom Penh.  They went to the areas of the Mekong 
where they could fish and plant rice.  But some people didn’t 
make it.  They couldn’t cross the mountains and the forest and 
they stayed here in the middle.  These people returned to a state 
of wildness.  That is why they speak differently from us and they 
don’t know Islam.  But our languages are still similar enough 
that we can understand each other and so now we talk to them 
and teach them about Islam.  When we teach them, we also help 
them.  We are finding donors to build mosques and madrasas.  
We will bring teachers and help with development.  The Jarai 
are our little brothers and we will help [pity] them. 
 
 Imam Sleh’s story is one of opening the wilderness.  In it, an intrepid 
band of Muslims travel to the high country where rice does not grow, confront the 
natives, settle the land by establishing the foundations of a modern (cash) 
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economy and finally win the natives over by bringing them into the bonds of 
fictive kinship.  As remarked in 1.4, the Cham have an odd status in that they are 
not the majority in any significant polity as the Chinese and Vietnamese are, and 
yet they are not exactly a minority group like the Cambodian highlanders.  While 
they do not have their own state they do have rice agriculture, mercantile activity, 
a religion, a language with its own writing system and a history of interaction 
with the institutions of the Cambodian state. 
 The indications of this status are sometimes subtle because they are made 
visible not by state action but by a lack of state involvement.  An example of this 
is the writing system of the Cham language.  Moves to multiculturalism have 
enabled the development of scripts for the representation of the indigenous 
languages of Ratankiri, but they are all derivations of the Khmer script (Thomas 
2002).  These writing systems place indigenous literacy squarely within Khmer 
literacy and in fact, one of the justifications for these programs is that it will 
facilitate the acquisition of Khmer later on.  In the Cham community, there are 
sometimes fierce debates about how the language should be written, but these are 
internal to the community and have never been the subject of government 
involvement. 
 Like the Vietnamese and the Chinese, the Cham do not use Khmer script 
and to my knowledge, no Khmer politician has ever advocated this as a policy.  
Unlike Europe, where one can travel from Portugal to Spain to France and onward 
to Poland all the while still using the same alphabet until the Belorussian border, 
in mainland Southeast Asia there is a special congruence of national border with 
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language and script.  In many aspects of symbolic community capital the Cham 
are on the level, or would at least like to think of themselves as being on the level 
as Khmers, Thais or Vietnamese.  The use of Cham Jawi script marks them as 
separate and identifies them with the world-bestriding civilization of Islam.  The 
use of traditional Cham script also marks them as separate but more attached to an 
Indic heritage that birthed Khmer and Thai cultures.  In either case, the Cham are 
different but not inferior to any of their neighbors in the arts of civilization. 
 It should not be surprising then that just like the Vietnamese have 
Montagnards, the Laotians have the Hmong and the Khmers have the Khmer Leu, 
the Cham also have “Cham Leu”.  These Cham Leu, or Jarai, are an 
Austronesian people inhabiting the highland region of Việt Nam and Cambodia 
speaking a language closely related to Cham.  While Muslim missionaries never 
attempt to proselytize to Buddhist Khmers, the Jarai, who are neither Khmer nor 
Buddhist, are a potential source of converts.  In principle they could also engage 
other groups, such as the Tampuon or the Brau, but to my knowledge this has not 
happened.  When asked about this, missionaries respond that they are Khmer 
Leu, while the Jarai are Cham Leu, thus revealing an attempt to claim their own 
indigenous Other distinct from that of Khmers. 
 Khmers never use this terminology, nor do they recognize a division of 
ownership of the upland communities with the Cham, but missionaries are keen to 
press forward while flying under the radar of Khmer awareness of the highlands.  
While one village was receiving money from Kuwait for a mosque it did not 
appear to be integrated into an RIHS framework, as all the converts had contacts 
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in KM 8 of Phnom Penh, which is a Tabligh area.  Converts were mostly very 
recent converts – within the last year or so.  They typically had nothing that 
could be characterized as an Islamic education and their knowledge of the religion 
rarely extended beyond the shahada – the confession of the faith that there is only 
one god and Muhammad is his prophet. 
 The work of the missionaries is not over by a long shot.  Apart from the 
need to raise the level of religious knowledge there is the vexing question of 
competition for souls with Christian missionaries in a struggle to find a patronage 
network to allay anxieties about, among other issues, the problems of land loss 
associated with the expansion of plantations and mines in the province (Brady 
2010).  The trials of the missionary became vividly clear to me when I 
encountered Sen, a missionary from Kampong Cham who was sent to teach Islam 
to the Jarai. 
 Having heard of his mission, I asked a youth to take me to the village and 
make an introduction.  We arrived and he presented me as a visitor who “cheh 
khmaer at liay” – speaks Khmer without mixing, that is without using words from 
highland languages when Khmer fails.  Sen, a man in his 50’s rushed towards 
me with his arm extended.  Capturing my right hand he held it for what seemed 
an unreasonable amount of time as he smiled intently, only releasing to finally 
bring his right hand to his heart as is the greeting typical of most Muslims.   
Where are you coming from? 
 
From Banlung.  I heard you were here teaching Islam so I came 
to visit.  The provincial imam sends his regards. 
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Oh, good.  Come to my house.  Have you eaten yet? 
 
 Sen spoke hurriedly and seemed desperate to get as many words out as 
possible in whatever time we had together.  Climbing up into his house we sat 
down to tea and engaged in what was for him some badly needed small talk.  
This man was desperately lonely and he didn’t mind if I knew it.  His wife, a 
Jarai woman, served us lunch as she watched over their sleeping newborn.  She 
brought rice, vegetables and not one, but two kinds of prahok – a salted, 
fermented fish product that is a common way of preserving fish in the countryside, 
and an acquired taste. 
This prahok and that prahok are different… 
 
Yes, they are made from different fish.  Here have this one. 
(Pushing forward a plate of prahok that still looks identifiably like 
fish.)   
 
It’s good. 
 
Hmm.  Here we don’t have any meat.  If you come to Kampong 
Cham, you will have beef for lunch, but here we eat prahok. 
 
I saw a cow outside. 
 
Yes, but we don’t have anybody to slaughter the cow in the halal 
fashion.  We don’t have enough Muslims here so there are no 
halal butchers.  No beef, no chicken. 
 
When was the last time you had beef? 
 
(laughing) I don’t know, maybe a year.  I’ve been here for two 
years and I eat like this every day. 
 
So, not so many people here have converted to Islam? 
 
Not so many.  Some convert but these people are ignorant.  
They convert but they don’t really mean it.  They don’t 
understand the shahada or the religion.  Also you have the 
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Christians that come and they bring rice and gifts.  We don’t 
have as much money for gifts.  They convert to Islam but then the 
Christians bring rice and so they become Christians.  But then 
the Christians leave and so they come back to Islam.  But then 
their cousin converts to Christianity and they want to spend time 
with their cousin so they convert to Christianity again.  It’s 
always like this.  They don’t really understand (pointing to his 
wife), they don’t speak Khmer, they can’t read, they can’t write…  
I’ll be here three more years and then I return to Kampong Cham.  
I miss my family - my wife (legal wife) and sons.  I miss our food 
and our village…  Nobody here speaks Khmer.  It’s hard to talk 
to people. 
 
Can they speak Cham? 
 
A little, many words are similar to Jarai, but actually they often 
don’t understand.  If we speak quickly or about something they 
don’t understand then they don’t understand me.  I speak in 
Cham slowly and they understand (pointing to his wife.) 
 
It’s hard being out here.  Why did you come? 
 
We have to try to help them.  The Jarai are our younger brothers.  
We are siblings and we need to explain to them the religion.  
Insh’allah they will understand the religion and become good 
Muslims.  Otherwise they will remain in the forest. 
 
 Sen spoke at length about the Cham man’s burden and how he was trying, 
even if not so successfully, to bring civilization to his benighted brethren.  It was 
the kind of historicized discourse of perfection, decay and redemption that one 
frequently encounters among the Tabligh (see 2.9).  He talked almost 
exclusively about himself and his mission.  Very few questions about the 
Khmer-speaking foreigner who just appeared in his forest abode, no questions 
about his own religious affiliation and whether he would like to accept Islam.  
This is rather atypical behavior, but then again this man lives in a state of social 
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disconnection from the people he now finds himself surrounded by.  Perhaps this 
was his way of making up for lost time. 
 A stroll through this Jarai village revealed the attempts made by outsiders 
to bring their religions to these ignorant indigenes of the hills.  Sen’s own house 
established near the small mosque still under construction was far removed from 
any of the other residences.  Sen would clearly like some converts to start living 
near his house and create an identifiably Muslim area in the village but this has 
not happened.  Closer to the road that connects the village with the rest of the 
world is a large shack with crudely painted crosses.  Here people gather on 
Sundays and sing songs, the assistant village chief told me.   
 It did not seem possible to distinguish Muslim, Christian and traditional 
households by visual inspection.  Converts and non-converts lived amongst each 
other in the same arrangement as before the missionaries arrived.  Domestic pigs 
wandered back and forth visiting Muslim and non-Muslim houses alike.  It was 
mostly women at home at the time and my efforts to inquire about the practice of 
missionization were stymied by the fact that few women spoke Khmer.  My 
efforts to use Cham as a bridge language also failed as I attempted to ask a 
woman with the word “UNICEF” tattooed onto her forearm about her piece of 
body art.  The assistant village chief explained that some people change religion 
and some don’t.  It just isn’t much of an issue.  “The Christians and Muslims 
both come and sometimes they help us by bringing rice”, he added.   
 Of course, it is not simply an issue of Muslims and Christians, the Jarai 
themselves have very definite ideas about what this missionary work means for 
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them and they are not always all that pleased with it.  Closer to the Vietnamese 
border, there is another village, now divided into two distinct communities a few 
kilometers away from each other - one for converts to Islam and the other for 
traditional Jarai.  The second village, the one for Muslims, was smaller and had a 
small mosque with a classroom.  I was confronted by 6 men, all dressed in the 
Tabligh manner and all speaking fluent Khmer.  They were from KM 8 in 
Phnom Penh.  Other than that they would divulge very little about themselves.  
They asked for and meticulously examined my research permits before engaging 
me in any discussion. 
Why are there two villages here? 
 
This village is for Muslims.  In the other village, they worship 
according to their traditions. 
 
Are you teaching them about Islam? 
 
We did, but they do not accept Islam.  They prefer to follow the 
ancestors instead of doing things the correct way.  If they convert 
they can join us like brothers, but otherwise they will live 
separately from us. 
 
How about the children?  Are they all going to school together? 
 
(Points to the classroom underneath the mosque raised on stilts.) 
 
That’s not a school.  That’s a madrasah.  Where is the state 
school? 
 
It’s down the road close to the original village.  It is too far so 
the children don’t go… Later there will be a school here and the 
children will go. 
 
When? 
 
I don’t know. 
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 My questions were annoying them and since it was apparent that I wasn’t 
going to convert to Islam that afternoon, they decided to be busy and have other 
things to do – abandoning me in the muddy field in front of the mosque.  None 
of these men were from the community and they would all be returning to their 
lives in Phnom Penh once their visit was over.  On my own, I managed to round 
up a few young people, ages 12, 14 and 15, two girls and a boy.  They were 
indeed illiterate in Khmer and explained that they would study at the madrasah.  
They could read Arabic characters and sound out words and even write their own 
names, but they never understood what they were reading. 
 The Muslim diatribe against the Jarai closely resembles their critique of 
the Imam San – that their blind allegiance to tradition prevents them from 
appreciating the truth of the religion.  The inhabitants of the non-Muslim 
community saw things differently however.  Arriving at the larger, original 
settlement, I was met by the village chief and invited to his porch.  It was 11AM 
and he along with two men and a woman all appeared to be quite inebriated.  As 
they passed around a plastic bag full of rice wine, the chief spelled out the nature 
of the division between the converts to Islam and themselves. 
They look down on us.  That is why we fight.  They want us to 
believe in their religion, but we already have a religion.  They 
are Muslims, we are Brahmanists.  We have our own culture.  
We have our own language. We have our own traditions.  We 
have our own lands… (Counting on his fingers as he enumerates.) 
 
But the Cham and the Jarai have a common origin, don’t they? 
 
(laughing by all) That is what they say.  That we all came from 
Champa and that we are all the same people with the same 
religion.  But that is not true.  We were always here.  We were 
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always living in these villages. (Pointing in the direction of 
neighboring Jarai communities) I’ll explain, they call us little 
brothers and themselves big brothers.  They say they want to 
help, but what they want is to look down on us and make us be like 
them.  We were in this country before them.  We are the big 
brothers and they are the little brothers.  They are arrogant and 
that is why they cause problems wherever they go.  If we talk to 
Tampuons or we talk to Khmers, we have no problems.  But we 
talk to Muslims and then there are problems. 
 
But you speak similar languages?  You don’t feel kinship with 
them? 
 
(scoffing by all) No! No way!  They understand us only if we 
speak very slowly.  But if we speak normally, the way we speak 
amongst each other, then they don’t understand anything…  They 
say that we all speak Cham but they don’t understand us. 
(laughing) They say that they can write, but they only write in 
Arabic.  We have our own alphabet.  We use English letters.  
We don’t have to use Arabic.  Arabs come from abroad.  That is 
not our culture.  We have books and we write those books in 
English letters…   They tell us to not drink, to not eat pork, to 
pray every day, but we don’t want to. 
 
 These Jarai villagers were apparently very aware of the overarching 
narrative in which they figured as the untutored savage to the benevolent Cham 
patron there to save them from their own ignorance.  Their resentment took the 
form of a multi-layered counter narrative in which they, not the Cham, are senior 
because of their presence in the country since time immemorial – a claim that is 
also likely tied to the land title disputes in the region.  The derision with which 
they hold Islam as a religion and as a culture, a foreign, Arab culture no less, 
contrasts with the superior characteristics of the Jarai, such as writing their 
language in “English characters”, a language which everybody regards as 
important and powerful. 
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 These discourses of historical belonging, domination through kinship and 
willful reconfiguration of global connections are all occurring within Cambodian 
society, where certain tropes, be they the moral superiority of lowlanders, the 
Islamic authenticity of Arabic script, or the superiority of the all conquering Latin 
characters, are deployed by the Cham and Jarai to mark moral geographies 
particular to themselves, but intelligible in a wider context.  What all ideologies 
of Chamness (in the case of the Jarai, a kind of anti-Chamness) have in common 
is a particular way of deploying arguments about space, social relations and 
morality as parts of an integrated whole which springs from the political and 
economic realities of living in a poor, majority Buddhist country, in which the 
Cham position in the national narrative is still not concretely defined.  It is these 
discourses of place and belonging which will be engaged in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
The Geographic Imagination of Community 
 
5.1 Spatialized Identity – The Cham as an Islamic Diaspora 
 The preceding chapters have hopefully made clear the elements of 
religious, ethnic, linguistic and historicized identity components that define, in 
different proportions, the different communities that consider themselves to be 
Cham as opposed to Khmer or non-Cham Muslim.  This chapter will be an 
attempt to integrate these narratives of belonging with some of the scholarly 
literature relevant to this case, namely the case of diasporic communities.  As 
such, this will depart significantly from the ethnographic accounts which made up 
the bulk of chapters two, three and four and explore the outlines of some trends in 
thought concerning diasporas as well as selecting certain texts for more detailed 
exposition because I feel them to be particularly relevant and which propose ideas 
which parallel those expounded upon in this dissertation. 
 By the end of this review of literature and integration with field data, I 
hope to accomplish two objectives.  Firstly, to present a notion of “diaspora” 
which, by taking account of the history of this term and the way it has been used, 
is more appropriate and useful for deployment in the social sciences and other 
disciplines which incorporate subjective human experience as an object of inquiry.  
Secondly, this chapter will present the Cham as a diasporic people, whose 
variegated ideologies of community identity overlay a shared language of moral 
displacement explained in geographic and temporal terms.  To arrive at these 
254 
goals requires first a careful consideration of the role of space, place and 
geography in the imagined collective life of a community.  
 In discussing the predicament of personal and community identity in a 
world characterized by increasing numbers of people living and working away 
from their land of birth, Pico Iyer (2000) invokes the notion of the 'global soul' to 
describe the enlightened state of having embraced one's dislocation and found 
depth of character without a sense of rootedness in place.  This new community 
of 'global souls' will revel in its permanent state of foreignness - never quite 
invited to become members of the community they find themselves surrounded by 
and equally at home in all environments because they have no home in the 
traditional sense against which to compare whatever nexus of geographic and 
social relations they may be occupying at any given time.   
Oddly, one of the results of the increase in the numbers of global souls is 
that they will find themselves congregating in certain locations – global cities 
where the particular locality of a place will be obliterated and replaced by a 
mosaic of cosmopolitan subjectivities.  Like a modern-day Diogenes, Iyer 
welcomes the new post-modern landscape of multi-cultural bliss and social 
anomie which Robert Putnam's (2000) Bowling Alone presents in a very different 
light - as an atomistic dystopia.  Although focused on the United States, 
Putnam’s argument that Americans are losing their sense of connectedness during 
a period in history which has been marked by rapid and regular advances in the 
technologies of communication underscores the apprehension with which many 
view our impending globalized future. 
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 This general feeling that social relations and institutional bonds are being 
loosened with deleterious results for both the human spirit and society as a whole 
has been a recurrent theme in the arts and social sciences since the beginning of 
the industrial revolution, but turning to the more serious minded folks at the 
RAND Corporation, one finds a radically different conception of transnational 
communities and the growing importance of diaspora populations.  In the 
no-nonsense national security view, these communities represent detachments of 
an ethnic group that can be counted on by insurgents to provide funds and other 
support during conflicts in the homeland since they are motivated by feelings of 
kinship rather than strategic vision as well as relatively uninterested in the actual 
policies of the movement (Byman et al. 2001).   In their study of the Tamil 
insurgency in Sri Lanka, the RAND report characterized the relations between the 
Liberation Tigers of Tiger Eelam and the Tamil diaspora as follows: 
Sometimes immigrants support insurgents as a result of coercion 
by the movement's overseas representatives.  Diaspora 
communities are often tightly bound and isolated with as much of 
their commerce, policing, and other basic functions being handled 
within the community as possible.  if insurgents can influence the 
policies of these self-contained units, they may be able to force 
immigrant workers to contribute a share of their wages to the 
group and coerce businessmen to make donations to the cause.  
(pg. 56) 
 
 Although they recognize that insurgent groups might have to guilt, shame 
or coerce their diaspora brethren into contributing to the cause, they consider the 
diaspora population to be an essentially homogeneous bloc, internally 
undifferentiated, and unambiguously loyal to the ethnic homeland once they have 
been properly motivated.  This outgrowth of the home community becomes the 
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fulcrum through which insurgents can exert pressure in the world of nation-states 
and, in this context, become legible to national security planners.  The changing 
face of transnationality in the context of global economic and political institutions 
is a growing concern as elites seek to exert governmentality over a population 
which, while potentially very valuable, violate the traditional categories of 
administration (Ong 1999; Sheffer 2003).  
 Despite their differences, Iyer and the Rand Corporation both regard group 
identities to involve a spatial component.  For Iyer, the decoupling of place and 
person undermines the ‘group’ of group identity and yields a new configuration of 
person and social relations independent of place, whereas for the policy makers, 
the expansion in space of a community leads to their extension within that place, 
such that more of the earth’s surface comes under their sway.  The explosion in 
interest in the social and political conditions of transnational communities has 
focused primarily on understanding this problem of space and place in the 
constitution of social life.  One term whose use has been dramatically expanded 
in this context is that of ‘diaspora’.  The use and overuse of this term has led to 
significant confusion about what it is that is referred to when this word is 
pronounced.  The word is employed variously to describe all manner of peoples 
who find themselves outside their country or region of origin and the result has 
been a degree of muddlement about not only the meaning, but also the usefulness 
of this designation.  The following section will discuss the differing uses of this 
word and how it has been understood in the social sciences as well as propose an 
alternate and hopefully more parsimonious formulation of the term which will in 
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turn include the Cham people of Cambodia.  This is done with the full 
knowledge that it may well result in further muddlement.   
 
5.2 Defining Diaspora 
 In his treatment of the Tibetan community in exile as a possible candidate 
for diasporahood, Dibyesh Anand (2003) begins with a consideration of the 
shifting meaning of the word diaspora over time, as it comes to be applied to 
different groups and circumstances - the scope of the term expanding and 
contracting to suit the situation at hand.  The term 'diaspora' has its own history, 
of course, and Anand examines that history, deploying Edward Said's notion of 
'traveling concept' (1983).  According to Said, a concept arises in a particular 
context, such as an academic discipline, and is continuously negotiated and 
refined while, at the same time, this concept is adopted and becomes incorporated 
in different contexts, perhaps a different discipline or perhaps the concept travels 
from academia to the lay public.  This transfer of ideas across fields of 
intellectual endeavor then results in another round of negotiation and redefinition 
of the term in its new context.  This process can continue for as long as the 
concept retains enough currency to be worth incorporating into new fields and 
subsequently redefining.  As a result of these transmutations, the concept of 
'diaspora' has been used to characterize many different groups of people, focusing 
alternately on their demographic, geographic or socio-economic circumstances. 
 The present version of Microsoft Word on which this dissertation is being 
composed still finds the word “diaspora”, in the singular and uncapitalized, to be 
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objectionable. This is because term “diaspora” was long used primarily to refer to 
Jewish communities which settled outside of Palestine as a result of the 
Babylonian exile of the 6th century BC or the Roman expulsions of the first 
century AD.  These events created the template for describing and understanding 
subsequent population dispersals, focusing on the coercion of the dispersed into 
exile, their longing for the homeland and whether or not they ever return to it.  
Recent scholarship has sought to distill a formulation of the concept of 'diaspora' 
from out of its long history in both academic and general discourse.  In so doing, 
these scholars are addressing the question of what exactly constitutes a diaspora 
and what is merely a demographic dispersal.  At the same time, there has been a 
proliferation of the term in both scholarly literature and lay discourse that 
threatens to weaken its discriminatory power and usefulness as an analytic 
category. 
 Other than being a definable group of people in a place other than where 
they are supposed to be from, there is little coherence to be found in the 
application of the term ‘diaspora’.  Apart from Jews and Armenians, we find 
Chinese diasporas (Clammer 2002; Ong 1999), African diasporas (Gomez 2006), 
Muslim African diasporas (D'Alisera 2004), Jamaican/Ethiopian diasporas 
(Chevannes 1994), an Israeli diaspora (Gold 2002) (distinct from the Jewish 
diaspora) and a Muslim diaspora in the Indian Ocean (Ho 2006) among many 
others.  Once classified as a diaspora, there is a tendency for subsequent 
scholarship to adopt the designation as a matter of convention.  And while these 
groups can alternately be defined by a history of enslavement, religious or cultural 
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practices or simply a collective homesickness; much of the scholarship leaves 
unanswered the wider question of what these groups have in common and why 
they collectively should be considered to form a diaspora, a form of social 
organization distinct from all others.  Where does one draw the line between 
diasporas, national minorities, religious communities or immigrants? 
Early attempts to theorize the study of diasporas tackled the problem 
inherent in trying to ascribe a particular term, in this case 'diaspora', to Jews, 
Armenians, Punjabis, Chinese, Africans and other groups with such different 
histories and cultural specificities that bringing them under a single umbrella term 
becomes unwieldy or simply arbitrary.  This was initially done by organizing 
diaspora communities typologically according to the features considered 
necessary to qualify as a diaspora - features that are most salient in the description 
of the diaspora experience (Cohen 1997; Safran 1991). 
 William Safran proposes the following litmus test for diasporahood: 
 1. dispersal of a population to at least two locations 
 2. commonly held mythology concerning the land of origin 
 3. feeling of alienation from the host society 
 4. desire to return to the ethnic homeland 
 5. continuous connection with the homeland 
 
 Robin Cohen develops these ideas further and then adds a typology within 
which different diasporas can be classified according to the nature of their 
dislocation.  In this scheme, diasporas may be understood as: 
 1. victims (Jews, Africans and Armenians) 
 2. labor (Indians) 
 3. imperial (British) 
 4. trade (Chinese) 
 5. cultural (Caribbean) 
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 Noting that "categorization and theory-building are empty exercises 
without examples" (pg. xi), Cohen elaborates in some detail on each type of 
diaspora using selected communities to illustrate his points and justify his 
classificatory arrangement.  Cohen himself recognizes that, in fact, there will be 
considerable overlap in the way these categories fit over the historic lifetime of a 
diaspora, so that Jews, while originating as a victim diaspora, also developed 
other ways of extending their communities' participation within the host society 
through trade and other arrangements with administrative and social institutions.  
Likewise, it is impossible that every member of a Chinese diaspora was engaged 
in trade.  There must have been practitioners of other professions as well as 
women and children who would also have been an important part of the 
community despite having a more restricted role in commerce - the diasporic 
subject typically being gendered as male within this typology. 
 It is not difficult to see the kinds of difficulties that will inevitably arise 
out of this rubric.  Firstly, lists of conditions as proposed by Safran or categories 
attempting to encompass a range of manifestations always have a certain arbitrary 
quality as they are assembled in a particular context, at a particular moment in the 
development of the discipline and with a view to housing those examples of 
diaspora that are given.  That is to say: we create a category of humanity, we 
privilege certain aspects of their experience (to the detriment of others), we break 
it up according to, in this case, vaguely vocational categories and then say we 
have a system for identifying and classifying diasporas - a category we had 
constructed beforehand.  Classification according to a series of characteristics 
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rather than the development of a binary division necessarily spectrifies the 
category and begs the question: why five conditions and not four or six?  Is four 
out of five good enough?  What about two out of five?  Is there such a thing as 
a half-diaspora?   
 Secondly, and more crucially, the a priori designation of diaspora 
communities to be studied means that we are allowing the study to constitute its 
object (Axel 2004).  We are assuming and presupposing the diasporic nature of 
the community as a state of being that can be determined objectively according to 
the above criteria, rather independently of whether the members of this objectified 
community consider those criteria to be the most salient expressions of their 
personal or group identities.  While the pursuit of genes across time and 
geographic space without regard to the feelings and experiences of the organisms 
that transport those genes may be the order of the day in more biologically 
oriented studies of human movements, for the social sciences, where the 
subjectivity of the object is central, the concept of diaspora must be allowed to 
'travel' as Said described and be incorporated into a framework that privileges the 
lived experiences and understanding of the communities in question. 
 
5.3 Toward an Ethnography of Diasporas 
 Recent works have considered the applications and limitations of the 
ethnographic approach to diaspora studies (Appadurai 1996; Axel 2004; Butler 
2001; Levy 2000).  For Levy and Appadurai, the problem is essentially one of 
scope - of attempting to encompass something which is by definition global 
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within a technique that privileges localized experiences and understandings.  
André Levy finds the discipline of anthropology hesitant to engage with the 
notion of diaspora on a theoretical level and that even when anthropologists do 
study diasporic communities they do not study them as diasporas.  Levy 
attributes this reticence to enter the field of diaspora studies to the dominance of 
cultural relativism among anthropologists and the resulting skepticism in 
universalist explanations for human behavior.  Ethnography as traditionally 
practiced may not be ambitious enough an enterprise to capture the global patterns 
of social reality, but fortunately Levy is ready to provide solutions to this problem.  
Among the gems proffered are: "Anthropology could gain by purposefully 
looking for a marginal site, a border, a people out of place, or for margins within a 
specific society." or "Another possibility is to conduct multisited (original italics) 
research.  By so doing ethnographers gain a comparative knowledge, and by 
implication they animate and relativize their assertions regarding a range of 
theoretical notions" (pg. 142).   
 It is difficult to know what to make of these suggestions.  The principles 
and virtues of multi-sited ethnography are widely understood in the 
anthropological community and are in fact quite common in applied and corporate 
anthropology - a fact which might suggest that the financing and logistical 
concerns of the multi-sited approach may be at least as important as the 
generalized distaste for overarching theory that Levy imputes to anthropologists.  
As for the study of marginal people, it would be impractical and unwieldy to list 
here the ethnographies written on minority (or minoritized) groups who inhabit 
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zones peripheral to the centers of power, but suffice it to say that Laura Nader's 
(1969) call for anthropologists to "study up" and develop an anthropology of 
power was, at least in part, an attempt to transform the field of anthropology, 
which had so fully been identified with the study of the margins.  Apart from 
these suggestions for improving the discipline, Levy's approach is problematic 
because it relies on an overlay of geography over social life rather than the other 
way around.  By referring to the diaspora under investigation as the "field site", 
Levy presupposes and imposes the cartographic contours of some pre-selected 
space on the observed configurations of social relations of this pre-identified 
diaspora.  While theoretical profundity with respect to the study of diasporas 
may be as lacking as Levy suggests, it is unlikely that this will be achieved by 
forsaking the small locality of the field site for the large locality of the entire 
community assumed to be a diaspora.  One way or another, a notion of locality 
that flows from the creative power of social praxis rather than the sterile 
delineations of longitude and latitude will be necessary to advance our 
understanding of this phenomenon. 
 Appadurai addresses precisely this problem noting that spatial 
localizations and social scale are not isomorphic and so what is called for is an 
appreciation of the degree to which locality itself cannot be assumed as given 
within the borders of the field site, but rather, how the sense of locality is 
produced, maintained and reproduced by agentive subjects.  Instead of studying 
social practices and interactions within a given and predefined area, 
anthropologists should discover locality through those practices and relations that 
264 
create it.  In Appadurai’s conception, locality is an exceedingly delicate thing 
liable to evaporate without the continuous, deliberate efforts of its denizens to 
produce and reproduce locality through their labors.  The shape of the economy, 
the division and distribution of labor, the allocation of space for the purposes of 
work, play or recreation; the differential access of individuals to these places and 
the ways in which this access is granted, the division between sacred and more 
mundane areas, the ways in which localized notions of group belonging and 
morality are embedded in the historical and mythical terrain of the community, 
are all examples of how human actions and interactions, rather than being bound 
in space, are in fact what create that space. 
 This approach evades the trap of essentializing either the group identity or 
the nature of their locality, and instead allows the two to grow and change over 
time as notions of space, place, homeland and dispersion gather and lose weight 
and import as circumstances change.  The ethnographic approach here is critical 
since ideologies of ethnicity are so frequently couched in historic terms regardless 
of how recently they were formed or how much they may have changed.  The 
Comaroffs’ (1993) study on the historicization of ritualized practices in Africa 
describes in some detail how contemporary conditions reshape the meaning of 
rituals held to be immutable.   
In order to make the break with the ritual-as-content-school of thought, the 
Comaroffs set out to reconceptualize ritual as an active and dynamic process of 
signification that incorporates and produces new referents and symbols as it is 
wielded to engage and shape the public discourse.  In so doing, they make a 
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departure from the traditional view of ritual as a transmitter of cultural 
information and approach ritual as a form of expression, the content of which is 
subject to reanalysis and reinterpretation by both its practitioners and its audience.  
This reformulation of ritual occurs in the context of changing economic, social 
and gender relations and it is at this nexus of tension between formalized behavior 
and the vulgar pursuits of everyday life that ritual is given meaning and rendered 
intelligible.  This take on the study of ritual behavior suggests that one should 
seek to uncover those relations between context and symbolic action that allow 
ritual to mean, rather than look for fossilized nuggets of wisdom to be transferred 
across generations.  In this view, ritual is a dynamic and malleable instrument 
for expression and meaning making that both creates contexts and is responsive to 
them rather than a rigid union of activity and meaning. 
The Chai ceremony of the Imam San (3.4) is another example of what the 
Comaroffs have demonstrated, as are the reinterpretations of Islamic history (2.9) 
that connect the history of the prophet, with the history of the Cham and show 
continuity of mission and spirit.  The creative reuse and repurposing of 
contemporary themes permits these groups to retain a connection to a past, distant 
in both time and space, while at the same time updating themselves so as to 
remain commensurable and legible to their contemporaries.  These negotiations 
have helped define community by defining relations with non-Muslims, other 
Cham, and the national bureaucracy and its version of history. 
 When examining the history of Jewish diasporahood, this continual 
transformation of the symbols and meanings that have produced communal 
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locality over time is especially obvious.  Long presented along the lines of Robin 
Cohen’s victim diasporas, the essentialized narrative of the Jewish diaspora has 
been that of a forcible dispersal, followed by a long period of exile and 
culminating in a glorious return to the land of Israel (Konner 2003).  Yet, this 
narrative, the teleology of which would have appeared absurd until the 20
th 
century, arose only after centuries of impassioned arguments about the nature of 
Jewry - exactly what, if anything, it is that makes a community out of a dispersed 
population, and the appropriate relationship between this group of people known 
as Jews and the rest of the world (Herzl 1933; Herzl 1960; McCoskey 2003; 
Sartre 1954; Zhitlowsky 1945).  
 A quick sketch of 20
th
 century Jewish thought regarding the meaning of 
Jewishness reveals a variety of articulations of Jewish personhood and community 
identity with variable reference to the territory of Palestine.  In the pre WWII 
period we find Jewish autonomism or the notion that Jews should seek autonomy 
within the context of diaspora and not seek to ape other nations in acquiring a 
national territory (Dubnow 1970).  While no longer a viable option in the 
post-Holocaust era, autonomism had enjoyed considerable popularity among the 
political left and the working classes who sought a sort of cultural and moral 
sovereignty within the context of European nation-states.   
 Others sought a feeling of belonging that emphasized certain modernist 
cultural practices such as literature and theatre rather than ancient and even 
backward religious beliefs that would serve to further alienate them from the 
European mainstream.  Instead of defining a bounded community of worship as 
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with certain Hasidic sects (Goldschmidt 2000), Yiddischkeit centered around the 
lifeways of secular Jews who emphasize the use of Yiddish, the dominant 
international language of Jews until the Second World War rather than the newly 
revived Hebrew (Estraikh and Krutikow 1998; Glinert 1999; Isaacs 1999; Kerler 
1998; Sherman 2003).   
 For those who did heed Herzl’s call to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, 
there were a number of open questions (Kaplan 2004; Shavit 1988; Shindler 
1995).  How religiously Jewish it should the new state be?  Will the state of 
Israel be a European transplant in the midst of backward and degenerate Arab 
tribes or would it present an opportunity for Jews to return to their Semitic roots 
after centuries of life in Europe?  Would Jews be a nation of pioneer farmers 
forming a virtuous society by developing the productive relations with the land 
that were forbidden to them in exile or should they recapture the martial spirit of 
the Israelites who resisted Greek and Roman oppression? 
 These divisions between secular and religious Jews, Yiddishists and those 
who supported Hebrew, and labor Zionists and revisionists were constantly being 
recreated in much the same way that Appadurai described the construction of 
locality or the Camaroffs the production of ritualized meaning.  The cursory 
survey of literature above demonstrates the futility of attempting to burden our 
understanding of these particular Jewish groups with the history of exile and 
dislocation which they all presumably share.  For each community, questions of 
belonging, be it to a cult, a culture or a state, were negotiated within a framework 
of political and racial ideologies that formed the backbone of the post-Metternich, 
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pre-war system of nation-states and yet, the resulting multiplicity of solutions to 
the problem of Jewishness would seem to diminish the primacy of diasporic 
victimhood as a dominant or guiding factor.  Although we must consider 
diaspora communities as distinct from their host societies, since otherwise they 
would not be objects of investigation at all, they are not outside of that society, 
nor are they simply the graft of one society onto another.     
 Many of these currents of thought regarding the correct relation between 
in-group and out-group can be taken from the ethnographic accounts of the 
previous chapters.  The quest for autonomism of some form or another is a 
common to all Cham.  Each group seeks in its own way and for their own 
reasons to maintain a life apart from Khmers and other Muslims of different sects.  
While the autonomism of the Imam San derive from a pretention to political 
equality with the Khmers who share their civilizational origins in India, the 
Tabligh and Salafi justification for separation are cast in terms of spiritual purity 
versus pollution – the purity of the faith they cling to versus the pollution which is 
the land they inhabit. 
 Although they offer different solutions to the problem of exile and 
dislocation, each group must contend with many of the same constraints and 
limitations by virtue of the fact that they all live in the Kingdom of Cambodia.  
They also absorb, to varying degrees, the prevailing views in politics, history and 
morality from the wider Khmer society which influence among other things, the 
way they regard the Vietnamese (4.6.3) and the Jarai of the northeastern highlands 
(4.7).  None of these characteristics of identification could be knowable from a 
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single story of how the Cham arrived in Cambodia from their homeland.  None 
of these ways of being is intelligible without giving weight to the conditions of 
their hostland, which is also the only homeland they have ever known.  Like 
European Jewery before the advent of the Zionist movement, there is no call for 
the reversal of exile by returning to the land, instead some form of 
accommodation to political realities must be arrived at.  In both cases the myriad 
of options for accommodation have root in the local and particular character of 
the circumstances in which people found themselves. 
 Further argumentation for the deprivileging of cartography in the field of 
diaspora studies comes from Brian Axel’s (2004) study of the formations of 
diaspora identities through the medium of websites advocating the creation of an 
independent Sikh nation of Khalistan.  Unlike most treatments of diaspora 
communities, Axel does not take a diaspora to merely be an ethnic population 
outside of a homeland, but examines the production of an identity type within the 
context of a diaspora discourse.  For Sikhs outside of the Punjab, the internet, 
with its capacity for the transmission of images and multi-media products, is 
deployed not to recreate a Sikh community in North America or even necessarily 
to sustain particular religious or linguistic practices abroad, but rather, to produce 
very specific and individualized images that in turn stand for a collectivized 
identity.  The images produced and distributed are strongly gendered and cast 
using the images and rhetoric of Sikh hagiography with the amritdhari standing in 
as the ideal Sikh subject.   
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 The amritdhari, the male Sikh who undergoes ritual baptism, is not only a 
powerful symbol of Sikh masculinity, but it also represents a refusal to 
compromise or become invisible to the authority of the Indian state.  Sikh 
baptism into the community of the Khalsa (the pure) entails adoption of the five 
K’s:  
Kesh – unshorn hair and beard representing the physical beauty of god’s 
creation and normally worn in a turban.  
 Kanga – a comb with which to maintain the cleanliness of the hair. 
 Kara – an iron bangle worn on the wrist, representing the unbreakable 
 bond between believer and god as well as among the believers 
 themselves.  
 Kaccha – long shorts worn as an undergarment, symbolizing moral 
 virtue  and mastery over one’s worldly desires.  
 Kirpan – an iron blade to be used in the protection of the weak from 
 the strong. 
 
 These five K’s have deep significance for Sikh believers as they are the 
symbols of the Khalsa, which are both paragons of moral virtue and defenders of 
the community.  Additionally, these symbols are clearly visible identifiers, and a 
Khalsa, with his turban and beard will always stand out in a crowd of Hindus and 
Muslims.  In this way, the Khalsa can be seen as using his body to produce 
boundaries on behalf of the rest of the community, of which the women and 
young children are not obviously distinct from non-Sikhs.  These symbols 
become points of contention as images of Indian police and soldiers tying up Sikh 
prisoners with their own turbans in an effort to humiliate them and demoralize 
their supporters are downloaded by Sikhs around the world. 
 Axel examines how Sikhs – both men and women, young and adult – 
identify with images of martyred Sikh masculinity which define not only the 
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borders of the community but the community itself as the body is transformed 
into the collectivity.  Diasporic subjects are constituted by identifying the self 
with this idealized and gendered representation of community solidarity.  At the 
same time, the homeland, in this case the unrealized Khalistan, emerges as a 
product of that same diasporic subjecthood – a homeland defined through the 
opposition of the purity of the Khalsa against the oppressiveness of the Indian 
state. 
 These mediating images between individual member and wider 
community united by powerful ideals are made much more effective in the age of 
digital communication and relatively cheap and reliable air travel.  Among the 
Cham one finds the impact of a picture of the Ka’ba in Mecca, where the masses 
of pilgrims are evidence of the health of a worldwide community spreading far 
beyond the confines of their own Cambodian existence, and the identical cloth 
sheets worn by pilgrims represent a promise of belonging that renders irrelevant 
their dark skin and non-Arab phenotype (4.3).  The importation of Malay styles 
of dress and even aspects of pop culture such as music (4.5), provide a vision of a 
contemporary Islam to which they should belong and even the more elaborate 
Tabligh outfits are recognizable as a Muslim ideal type even by those who do not 
wear them or who find the wearing of such clothing to be excessive.   
 What Axel highlights in his work is the actual practice of diasporic 
imagination which produces community and homeland within the context of the 
hostland and mediated by technologies of socialization, in this case, the internet.  
By studying diasporas as acts of imagining, one breaks away with what Axel calls 
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the genealogical approach to diasporas, whereby one sees these communities as 
extensions of a homeland and presumes to found understanding of this 
community within the study of the homeland.  In this approach, it is the 
imagination that creates and defines the homeland rather than the other way 
around.  This homeland – its significance, its properties, its distinguishing 
characteristics – is understood through symbols, the sharing of which defines a 
diasporic community. 
Diasporas then, are not a thing at all, but a particular way of imagining a 
community not unlike that which birthed the nation-state (Anderson 1983).  Yet 
there is never a single diaspora.  In the case of Punjabi Sikhs, there are sharp 
distinctions to be drawn between their relocation among Muslims and Hindus on 
the subcontinent (Talbot and Thandi 2004), their emigration and assimilation to 
North American society (Chadney 1984) and their global reconfiguration as an 
embattled religious minority through the medium of the internet.  What there are, 
are a multiplicity of ways of imagining identity and belonging as in some way a 
function of space – space which is imbued with social and moral properties.   
For the 20th century Zionist groups discussed above, divisions regarding 
the meaning of Palestine arose out of the myriad of intellectual currents to which 
they would have been exposed in early and mid-twentieth century Europe.  Each 
of these ideologies - nationalism, socialism, anti-colonialism and race theories 
among others – informed ideas about the state of Israel and the viability of a 
Hebrew nation.  For Cham people in Cambodia, the historicized and 
particularistic discourse of their ethnos confronts the moral and universalist 
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imperatives of their religion and in the process lead to a multiplicity of ways of 
understanding the geographic disposition of the community in moral terms.  It is 
in the process of thinking these thoughts about legitimacy, purity and solidarity 
and then acting them out that Phnom Penh becomes a dangerous place (4.6), Prek 
Pra becomes a sanctuary for the morally afflicted (2.8), and a map of Champa and 
Angkor side by side becomes a roadmap for envisioning a better future (3.6.1) 
 The general trend in the scholarship is to move away from ‘place’ and 
towards an appreciation of ‘placing’ – the active and frequently contentious 
production of a localized situation.  In so doing, we begin to free ourselves from 
the travel agent mentality concerned with the routes, stopovers, final destinations 
and satisfaction with accommodations which so suffuses the approaches advanced 
by Safran and Cohen.  By changing tack and focusing our attention on the native 
understanding of the imagined communities in question we can radically reduce 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for what we consider to qualify for 
diasporahood.  These conditions, namely, a sense of community and a particular 
notion of locality that corresponds with that sense of community, are necessarily 
salient and intelligible to members of the communities themselves and so respond 
to Axel’s critique of the tendency of diaspora studies to construct and impose 
their own categories. 
This development in the theory demands a more complete discussion of 
two intertwined yet distinct problems.  First, there is the question of how human 
actions transform topography into a symbolic landscape legible to members of the 
community as well as outsiders.  This focuses our attention on the manufacture 
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of ethnic boundaries as in Axel’s study, instead of attempting the endless task of 
cataloguing the cultural repertoire of a community (Barth 1969).  Secondly, we 
must examine how these imagined landscapes serve to guide the development of 
socially salient categories and the inscription of self and other with the 
characteristics of belonging or foreignness.  In addition, with regards to the 
second problem, the nature of diaspora locality and how it differs from other types 
of imagined landscapes is also in need of clarification.  What follows is a 
presentation of scholarship that addresses both of these issues, focusing first on 
the formation of identity through sectarian violence in Northern Ireland and then 
by the development of moral cosmologies born out of the violence in southcentral 
Africa.  These discussion of these works and others with similar themes will 
advance our understanding of diaspora communities and the possible location of 
the Cham amongst them.   
 
5.4 Making Space 
 For at least two generations, discussion of Northern Ireland has been 
completely dominated by "the Troubles", the sectarian violence between 
Protestants and Catholics, and the proposed explanations for the origins of the 
conflict.  Traditionally, this has meant examining the history of Great Britain and 
Ireland and finding the source of the structurally unequal relationship between 
both groups.  This history is seen to be punctuated by key events such as the 
Irish Potato Famine or Bloody Sunday, which are incorporated into the discourse 
of opposing factions on either side of the Northern Ireland question.  Rarely 
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however, has the violence itself been taken as an object of study in its own right - 
an object which, although possessed of a particular history, cannot be reduced to 
an epiphenomenon of that history (Venn 2005). 
 Allen Feldman (1991) takes on the notion that the endemic violence in 
Northern Ireland is simply to be understood as a result of perceived historical 
injustices on both sides as well as present-day disparities in political power and 
economic participation.  Instead, he proposes that acts of violence themselves 
serve to continuously recreate the environment in which the use of violence 
appears justified and legitimate.  This is not to say that that Feldman ignores the 
history of British-Irish relations or the prosperity gap between the Protestant and 
Catholic communities, rather he embeds political violence within an overarching 
historicizing discourse, which is itself transformed by that same violence.   
 Central to this ideological conception of violent struggle is the idea of 
space.  In both Nationalist and Unionist rhetoric, Northern Ireland is imagined 
either as a home territory alienated from the Irish people or as an enclave of 
British civilization in an only partially civilized island.  This spatial organization 
of friend and foe in the minds of Nationalists and Unionists is fundamental to the 
mythico-historic narratives within which the violence is understood and 
legitimated.  These imagined spatial relationships are replicated at other levels 
below that of the narrative.  The organization of neighborhoods, the location of 
weapon caches and safehouses, and the performance of resistance within the jail 
cell can only be understood in terms of how these acts deploy notions of space 
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accepted by both Nationalists and Unionists in order to demarcate and extend 
in-group boundaries. 
 Feldman sees militants as establishing sanctuaries within neighborhoods 
surrounded by a frontier zone, a border and finally an unfriendly area.  The 
construction of sanctuaries implies a cult of purity where the sanctity of the 
interior is maintained by not allowing it to come into contact with the other.  
This purity is contested by the state, which launches raids into homes in order to 
find suspected paramilitaries, but also to reinforce and create the power of the 
state in a visible way as the police or army enter into paramilitary sanctuaries.  
These military operations serve to deny the sanctity of these domains and assert 
the authority of the state over the Nationalists.  This also applies, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, to the actions of the inmates as they resist the guards and the 
authority of the penal institution.  By defiling their cells with excreta, prisoners 
deny the authority of the guards to tell them when they can or cannot go to the 
lavatory.  In addition, this creates a noxious environment, which guards will 
avoid until they need to reassert their authority through beatings and inspections 
of the prisoner's body.  Feldman presents the body as the site where the ideology 
of space is restricted to its smallest point - the individual person - and where the 
practices of boundary marking and sanctification are manifest in the way this 
body behaves in the presence of the other. 
 The role of the human body as the locus of political expression and 
resistance is perhaps the most important contribution of this work as it has deep 
implications for our understanding of the performance of space.  Feldman 
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presents a short history of the ideology of the body, in which industrial 
development of a region that had previously been primarily agricultural was 
followed by a new valorization of physical strength.  As machines began to 
replace muscle, blue-collar workers responded by refusing to devalue their bodies 
in the ways that industrial capitalists had.  This gave rise to a culture of pugilism 
and the persona of the hardman.  The hardman could, by virtue of his fighting 
prowess, impose himself as an individual upon other individuals.  He could be 
recognized and known as an individual tied to a certain reputation - an 
individualized history of personalized violence. 
 The gunman, as a descendent of the hardman, is a more recent 
transformation of the physical body.  The gunman is also a violent character, but 
unlike the hardman, he is faceless and cannot be identified as an individual.  The 
gunman in fact, loses his individual identity and becomes a working body on 
behalf of a collective entity.  Feldman's description of the gunman holding a gun 
as "an instrument holding an instrument" speaks to the essence of the 
transformation from hardman to gunman, which involves the loss of agency of the 
character in question.  By transforming himself into an instrument, the gunman 
places himself within the mythico-historical discourse leaving behind both his 
personal identity as well as personal responsibility for the acts committed.   
 If the hardman was a response to the replacement of man by machine, the 
gunman replaces the hardman in the presence of the firearm.  The violence of the 
gunman denies the primacy of the physical body as well as the 
individual-on-individual character of the thumping administered by the hardman.  
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This exaltation of the physical individual is then replaced by submission to a 
cause and the construction of victimhood that is contingent on confessional 
affiliation rather than a particular personal relationship between the two. 
 It is not only the assailant that is transformed and stripped of agency but 
the victim as well.  Feldman remarks that the victim of sectarian violence 
acquires, upon death, an identity that is no longer personal but taxonomical - he is 
not so much a person as a Catholic or a Protestant.  The practice of mutilating 
the body adds to the effect of othering that transforms the corpse into the 
embodiment of violence directed against a group of people.  This tension 
between the individuated identity such as that of the hardman and the collective 
identity of the gunman or the stiff runs through much of Feldman's analysis with 
important implications, particularly for the state, which seeks to enforce its 
authority upon the collectivity through mass arrests only to find itself with a 
judicial and penal system that insists that only the jural individual may become 
the object of sanctions. 
 Feldman weaves together interviews and conversations with paramilitaries 
into a comprehensive narrative of transformative violence and resistance, which 
creates a new historicizing discourse rather than merely being situated within it.  
Paramilitary action and state response together define the boundaries and contours 
of continued interaction, while the ideologies of the body symbolically produce 
the collectivities that inhabit these boundaries.  This understanding of the 
production of locality through the performance of place has important 
implications for the study of groups that more closely fit the model of the 
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conventional diaspora.  Because of the corporal component of this type of 
locality production, there is frequently a racial or racialized element as one finds 
in the different manifestations of African diasporahood. 
 The valorization of the Black body for example, was and continues to be a 
critical ingredient in the Black nationalist and pan-Africanist movements in the 
US, which seek to foster a sense of individual and collective self-worth (Austin 
2006; Porter and Washington 1979).  Black beauty subverts the dominant logics 
of racial aesthetics which assign brutishness, stupidity and servility to dark skin, 
thick lips and kinky hair while exalting White racial characteristics as the standard 
against which both physical beauty and personal virtue should be measured.  For 
Black women, the choice of hair style was transformed into an obvious and at 
times inflammatory political statement (Banks 2000).  Much as Sikh men 
represented the boundary between the community and the Other, Black women 
coiffed in a manner that accents rather than negates the African phenotype create 
divisions, not so much between Whites and Blacks, but between Blacks who 
subscribe to the Africanist aesthetic and those that prefer to straighten or relax 
their hair.  The emergence of the “beautiful Black woman” and the self-assured 
Black man that embraces her has been accompanied by an increasing interest in 
all things African - from fashion to language – and a corresponding disinterest in 
those symbols and practices associated with Whites or assimilationist Blacks.    
 The rôle of the body in defining Muslim space is both strongly gendered 
and obviously ethnic in the Cham context.  Muslim headcoverings on women 
indicate their inadmissibility as romantic partners and remove them from certain 
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social spheres (4.6.2).  They are also emblematic of certain virtues that Muslim 
women are meant to embody – chastity and modesty among them.  In the 
countryside where most everyone is Muslim, these are not thought of more than 
anyone putting on a shirt or pants.  Girls are socialized to cover the hair at very 
early ages and it is not uncommon to find even pre-pubescent girls reflexsively 
placing a scarf or washcloth on their heads.  In the urban context, however, the 
distinction of the Muslim female is an essential element in guarding a woman’s 
honor and by extension her family’s.  The abandonment of such garb and any 
other visible signs of a Muslim identity upon entering the dark underbelly of the 
city is another indicator of how such practices of the body are meant not only to 
deliver a message about the individual, but about the entire community (4.6.3). 
 The extension of this practice also has a political component, since Imam 
San see their exile as a denial of sovereignty, they do what they can to conduct 
traditional practices in their villages and community.  There they can embody 
the customs of the Cham as set out by elders while refraining from other activities, 
such as dancing and drinking.  Upon leaving the community, they will remove 
such garments and are free to dance and maybe even drink.  On the surface this 
appears to be an attempt at assimilation, but this would be incorrect, as the Imam 
San are never perturbed by this state of affairs and never seek to enforce dress and 
behavior standards beyond the community.  Instead, the behavior of the Imam 
San helps define the boundaries of the community and give them force whether 
Khmers are aware of them or not.  Leaving the village remove restrictions, thus 
implying that the community is an area of distinct laws.  Returning to the 
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community brings those rules back into force.  Unlike other Muslims for whom 
characteristically Islamic behavior is a personal affair that makes Muslim space, 
the Imam San use their bodies to indicate cultural authority as they travel through 
otherwise unmarked ethnic topography. 
 These practices of space-making have other manifestations besides the use 
of the body as boundary post.  A study of shack construction and location among 
Jamaican Rastafarians show other strategies for projecting the alternate 
community into the public (Pigou-Dennis 2006).  Rastafarianism, which arose in 
Jamaica as a form of resistance to ideologies of White supremacy, is also strongly 
associated with certain practices of the body such as the growth of dreadlocks and 
a restricted, often vegetarian diet.  These practices exalt the purity and 
naturalness of the body of the original Black man, who allows his hair to grow 
without interference and refuses to contaminate his body with impure foods as 
prescribed in the book of Leviticus – at times going so far as to shun all processed 
and preserved foods as well as metal or plastic cooking implements.  Ultimately, 
Rastafarians find separation from the contamination of Whites and assimilated 
Blacks a necessary prelude to the abandonment of Babylon/Jamaica for a reunion 
in Africa with the messiah Haile Selassie – the last king of Ethiopia (Barret 1997; 
Chevannes 1994).   
The material and musical culture that sprang from this cultural ferment – 
Rasta caps and reggae – is widely regarded in the West as representative of 
Jamaican culture as a whole, yet within Jamaica itself, Rastafarians feel the need 
to express their faith and demonstrate their Rasta lifestyle to non-Rasta Jamaicans.  
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One way to create Rasta spaces within the public domain is the through a distinct 
form of architecture – that of the Rasta shack.  These ramshackle dwellings, 
cobbled together from roughly hewn planks, present an invasion of public space 
by virtue of their locations and adornments.  Shacks are erected on marginal, yet 
highly visible, parcels of land, such as near runoff trenches used as garbage 
dumps or pedestrian thoroughfares between neighborhoods.  The selection of 
undesirable sites mirrors the cultural and social marginality of the Rastas 
themselves, however, the fact that such areas are otherwise unoccupied make the 
shacks stand out to those passing through.  The shoddy arrangement of 
construction materials serves to further highlight the borderline quality of the 
shack’s location.    
 Just as important as location is the intricate symbolism of the decorations 
of the shack.  The red, gold and green colors as well as the image of the Lion of 
Judah of the Ethiopian flag figure prominently – as do images of Haile Selassie 
and Bob Marley.  These symbols, which are fairly standard in Rastafarian 
iconography, are supplemented by personal flourishes and written text on the 
exterior of the shack which transform the inhabitant into an artist communicating 
his moral vision to the rest of the world.  The messages include denunciations of 
White supremacy, the current Jamaican establishment and “false Rastas” who 
appear to take on the trappings of Rastahood without adopting the modus vivendi 
of the true Rastafarian.  These humble shacks intrude into everyday life by 
occupying the frontiers of the public sphere and, from there, projecting images of 
alternative narratives of Africa, Jamaica and the Black diaspora. 
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 Another example of the imposition of community on space is the eruv 
(Cooper 2000; Cousineau 2005; Fonrobert 2005; Fonrobert and Shemtov 2005).  
The enclosure of the eruv need not be a wall or fence – rabbinic decisions have 
judged wires or strings suspended in the air to be acceptable barriers that would 
permit the carrying of objects on the Sabbath and for that reason, one might think 
the eruv of little concern to Gentiles in the vicinity.  However, recent attempts to 
create eruvs that encompass entire neighborhoods in London have met with 
considerable resistance.  Cooper and Cousineau demonstrate how the creation of 
space is always contested and how attempts to perform space occur within the 
context of other ethnic and cultural identities as well as political ideologies which 
claim that same performative space.   
 In London, an Orthodox community seeking to deploy a wire eruv 
between 80 poles, which would be erected for the purpose, have collided with a 
constellation of ethnic and secularist ideologies which find unacceptable the 
insertion of religious symbolism in the public space.  Arguments against the eruv 
are couched in terms of protecting the beauty of public spaces against the 
construction of eyesores, the separation of church and state; of which the public 
space forms a part, and concerns about the danger the wire may pose to birds.  
Each of these ideologies is necessarily invested with a particular notion of space 
and a prioritization of how that space should be allocated, be it to publicly secular 
citizens or wildlife.  Proponents of the strong religion-state divide also voiced a 
fear that the character of he neighborhood would be transformed by the eruv – 
that its presence would result in a neighborhood of Jews becoming a 
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neighborhood for Jews.  Finally, and despite the overwhelmingly 
culturalist-secularist arguments against the eruv, the plan was struck down 
because of environmental concerns - a presumably less inflammatory justification.   
 The dynamic remarking of boundaries of living areas and communal 
facilities has been examined in real time as changing allegiances are inscribed into 
the lived landscapes (4.7).  The separation of Muslim converts from non-Muslim 
former villagers and attempts to refashion an existing village around the 
centerpiece of a mosque are all manifestation of a desire to purify community and 
to have that purity made legible in the topography.  The way in which the 
Tabligh insist that Thursday maghrib prayers should be conducted not at a local 
mosque, but at a merkaz, a Tabligh religious complex, is another example of how 
space (at particular times) can be activated to create a community.  These 
religious divisions are also related, in the minds of people, to the different ways of 
living on the land and participating in the economy, such as when a waterfront 
community of Muslims shares a village with Khmers, who then interact with 
Muslims at the market buying fish.  Fishing and its ancillary activities are 
Muslim professions and so Muslims concentrate themselves in areas where these 
activities are easiest to carry out. 
 Whether we look at Northern Ireland, Black America, Jamaica, London or 
Cambodia, we find ideologies of space made manifest in the practices of the body 
as well as the overt material culture.  These practices have as their target the 
erection and maintenance of boundaries – frontiers of exclusion which necessarily 
defy the dominant paradigms of social geography and citizenship.  One 
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necessary condition for a diaspora is some shared feeling of community and of 
being separate from the wider host society otherwise we would simply be talking 
about the assimilated descendants of immigrants and so these acts of boundary 
building as captured in the above ethnographic accounts are one essential 
component of understanding diasporic communities. 
 
5.5 Putting People in their Place 
 An important aspect of Cham identity is the construction of identity in a 
stateless context.  To address this we may consider the struggles for survival as 
individuals as well as communities of the displaced people of the violence in 
central Africa.  The recent crises in the African Great Lakes region have been 
portrayed in the media as an eruption of ethnic hatreds among the Hutu and Tutsi.  
However, the origin of these divisions and the ways in which they reproduce and 
sustain themselves is rarely discussed.  In Purity and Exile (1995), Malkki 
examines the construction of these ethnic categories and the supposed innateness 
of their mutual hatred.  Engaged in fieldwork with Hutu refugees, Malkki also 
explores issues of nationhood and how they relate to statehood or an inability to 
achieve statehood.  The refugee as a stateless entity engages both the state of 
origin and the state of refuge in a relationship which, nowadays, is frequently 
mediated by third parties in the form of former colonial powers or the UN.  From 
the point of view of the Hutu refugee, these actors need to be incorporated into a 
moral cosmology that defines his new situation as both a transformation and a 
continuation of the old, such that the category of Hutu can be projected into the 
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past and future as needed.  Malkki describes just such a phenomenon in the 
refugee camps of western Tanzania. 
 Malkki compares two different field sites in Tanzania where many of the 
Hutu refugees find themselves.  Mishamo is what typically comes to mind when 
one hears 'refugee camp'.  It is a circumscribed area, constantly under 
surveillance where the Hutu are obliged to deal directly with the Tanzanian 
authorities from a position of dependency as refugees.  Movement in and out of 
the camp is restricted and business transactions, chiefly the sale of produce, must 
be carried out at the camp cooperative.  Isolated from events in Burundi as well 
as the mainstream of Tanzanian society, these Hutu develop an identity that, by 
analogy, extends their existence in Burundi into exile.  From the point of view of 
Hutu refugees, Malkki recounts briefly the history of arrival of the three ethnic 
groups in Burundi - the Tutsi and Hutu plus the numerically minor Twa.  It is 
this mythico-historical narrative that the Hutu reconstruct in exile, this time in the 
context of the refugee camp. 
 The mythico-historical narrative defines Hutu people and Hutuness as a 
structural relation between a parasitic class, the world community and themselves.  
Hutuness is embodied in the activity of cultivation or production.  In Burundi, it 
was the Tutsi, who the Hutu describe as lazy and weak, who lived off the labor of 
the Hutu.  They entered into unequal relationships mediated by livestock with 
the Tutsi, who by malign trickery subjugated the Hutu.  In Tanzania, the Hutu 
refugees often imagine the agents of the Tanzanian state to be exploiters of their 
labor.  By obliging them to sell their produce at the government cooperative and 
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levying taxes, the Tanzanians unwittingly play the role of grasshoppers to the 
Hutu ants.  For Hutu that define their existence in Burundi as a time of servitude 
to the dominant class, Tanzanian authorities are a convenient foil against which to 
recreate that aspect of their identity. 
 Outside of their immediate environment, Malkki explains that the Hutu are 
aware of a wider French and English speaking world represented first by the 
Belgians and then by the UNHCR and other international aid organizations.  In a 
sense, this wider world encapsulates both the Hutu and the Tutsi and in the Hutu 
imagination serves as a venue where the ultimate rightness of the Hutu cause can 
be objectively found to be true.  The Hutu are concerned with the way in which 
the conflict is perceived outside of Africa and derive legitimacy for their claims 
from their contact with international organizations much as, during the colonial 
period, the Belgians imposed a certain equality on the Hutu and Tutsi, thus 
negating any Tutsi claims to superiority for the duration of the colony’s existence. 
 Although the international community may be geographically remote and 
seem peripheral to the Hutu-Tutsi situation, it is in reality a central tenet of the 
social cosmology, since it is not simply a structural inequality between producers 
and consumers that the Hutu imagine themselves in, but also a moral relationship 
vis-à-vis the Tutsi.  In the mythico-historical narrative the position of producer is 
inherently morally superior to the position of consumer.  Moreover, the locus of 
their power is a function of their activity.  The Hutu as producers and cultivators 
derive their power from their work.  The more the Tutsi make them work the 
more powerful they become - until the day when they can challenge the Tutsi 
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themselves.  The strength of the Hutu is internal and can only grow in adversity.  
The Tutsi, on the other hand, find their strength externally - it is in their trickery 
and malevolent cunning that they gain advantage.  Unlike the Hutu, the Tutsi's 
strength, being external, can be neutralized and defeated.   
 In the mythico-historical narrative, it was the Belgians that recognized the 
inner value of the hard-working Hutu and provided them with opportunities for 
social and economic advancement.  With independence, the Tutsi reasserted 
their dominance and blocked the Hutu from entering those fields that might lead 
to their participation in decision-making.  Incidentally, the fact that the 
Tanzanian government encourages refugees to undertake vocational training 
rather than engage in administration or management is seen by the Hutu as a 
continuation of a Tusti-esque policy of intellectual subjugation.  The 
international community, by being external, can be portrayed by the Hutu as an 
impartial arbiter of the moral relationship between the Hutu and those who exploit 
them whether they be Tutsi or Tanzanian. 
 The ultimate result is that by equating Hutu with refugee in the 
mythico-historical analogy, refugeeness becomes a heritable trait, which in turn 
defines the Hutu.  Malkki describes attempts to introduce the Hutu to artisanal 
work in an attempt to develop a material culture which end in failure because, as 
Malkki found, the Hutu have unlinked identity to what most social scientists 
would consider cultural practices.  They are uninterested in making ‘authentic’ 
Hutu baskets, blankets or trinkets and instead focus on their formation as a 
community that was formed at the moment of exile from Burundi through the 
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recognition of the structural nature of their condition.  This experience of 
constituting a unified and pure community among the camp Hutu contrasts 
sharply with Malkki's description of those Hutu who sought refuge in the city of 
Kigoma instead of the camp. 
 Kigoma, a Tanzanian city on Lake Tanganyika, became home to many 
Hutu refugees who, over time, developed a very different way of dealing with 
questions of their identity.  Instead of brandishing the label of refugee as a 
marker of authentic Hutuness, the Kigoma Hutu find various ways of 
downplaying their origins and developing an identity of anonymity by 
situationally deploying the discourse and habits of the unmarked category.  
Kigoma Hutu may marry non-Hutu in order to establish residence, as well as 
acquire documentation which, even if false, enables them to travel and engage in 
commerce.  Islam is another element in mainstream Tanzanian society and Hutu 
may adopt Islam or Muslim names in order to disassociate themselves with 
Burundi and their refugee status.  City Hutu employ these techniques as the 
individual deems necessary and as a result there is less of an overarching 
connection between them.  They do not form a homogeneous discourse of unity 
in the face of the other, but instead seem to reject essentialized categories 
altogether.  Kigoma Hutu have much more positive feelings toward their 
Tanzanian neighbors and while they do not deny being met with insults and 
discrimination upon their arrival, they attribute this to marginal elements in 
Kigoma - drunks and anti-socials.  Significantly, they also develop relationships 
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with Tutsi in Kigoma and accept that they could not possibly be involved in the 
massacres in Burundi. 
 For camp Hutu, this might be a way out of their cycle of perpetual 
oppression by and moral haughtiness toward the Tutsi, but instead the Kigoma 
Hutu only reinforce in the camp Hutu the importance of maintaining the purity of 
their predicament.  The Kigoma Hutu, as merchants and traders in pursuit of 
wealth, are neither true producers nor true consumers and so are at best morally 
ambiguous.  Camp Hutu see them as lost, making fortunes by transporting ivory 
to Burundi while unwittingly supporting the régime that sent them into exile in 
the first place.  If the Tutsi are the adversary of the camp Hutu, then the city 
Hutu are a warning of what may happen if this adversarial relationship is not 
maintained.  After all, what would be of the mythico-historical worldview of the 
Hutu without an exploiter? 
 Malkki presents two very different reactions to exile, brought about to a 
great extent by differential contact with the state and its institutions.  Instead of 
the predatory state which refugees must resist, the situation is one of negotiation 
using social capital at hand to produce an acceptable living environment.  For 
Kigoma Hutu, it is clear that while they fear arrest and being sent to the camps the 
state is still a tool they can employ.  Acquiring false documents may suggest an 
adversarial relationship, but in so doing the city Hutu gains freedom of travel and 
to engage in business - both protected by the state.  In the case of the camp Hutu 
it is less obvious, but it would seem that it is the very 'technology of power' that 
imprisons them that makes their purified Hutu identification possible.  While 
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communication between villages in Burundi was difficult, in the camp, nothing 
escapes the grapevine and the unified mythico-historical discourse that emerges 
and to which the camp Hutu feel so attached is an obvious product of their 
subjection to the panopticon. 
 These diverse strategies revealed by Malkki shed light on some of the 
experience of the Cham, particularly the great divide between the Imam San and 
everyone else.  As a community that still remembers itself as sovereign and still 
possessed of a leadership and unique frameworks of self-governance, the Imam 
San, like the Kigoma Hutu have found ways to engage the Cambodian state on a 
practical as well as a moral level (3.2.1 & 3.4.5).  In doing so, they have become 
contaminated by their association with Brahmanism and other aspects of Khmer 
culture in the eyes of other Muslims (2.4).  The transit from Champa to 
Cambodia spawned a number of meaningful storylines, each with its own 
geographic grounding.  The significance of having an Indian visitor to legitimize 
the practices of the Imam San came about because of a vision of history that 
considered India the source of civilization shared by Chams and Khmers (3.5).   
 For other Muslims, particularly the Tabligh, this same history of migration 
has resulted in both a feeling of permanent displacement as well as a valorization 
of the displacement as a moral barrier, later to be carved into the geography, 
between the believer and the “duniya” – the mundane world.  The idea that 
believers can be part of an Ummah rather than be forced to make community with 
whatever unbelievers might be found in the vicinity enables Muslims to liberate 
themselves from the tyranny of geography which cruelly dictated to them that 
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they should live inn a non-Muslim country, and helps them find meaning in their 
condition of exile. 
 Malkki's ethnographic description of the formation of stateless nationhood, 
is then of great value to our understanding of the Cham, and of some import to 
issues of identity in diasporic communities in general, be they Jews, Rastafarians 
or Palestinians. The main contribution of this work is the notion of the creative 
interaction between the state and the stateless that lead to a spectrum of narratives 
and practices that enable the displaced to imagine the survival of the biological 
person within an imagined space as the survival of the social individual.  Many 
of Malkki's conclusions resonate strongly with Dibyesh Anand's remarks on the 
Tibetan diaspora living in Northern India (2003).  Anand considers how the act 
of choosing exile outside of Tibet create a community of refugees rather than 
refugees from a community.  As refugeeness and dislocation become hallmarks 
of the Tibetan experience and badges of patriotism and dedication to the 
homeland, they neglect to apply for Indian citizenship which would allow them to 
buy property and operate businesses in the community.  The discourse of 
refurgeeness becomes self fulfilling because it stigmatizes exactly those activities 
that would advance the material circumstances of Tibetans in exile and leaves 
Tibetans dislocated both from their homeland as well as their hostland. 
 In the case of the Palestinian diaspora the issue is one of how space is or 
can be configured within the context of an Israeli occupation and how these 
structures enable Palestinians to maintain a sense of connectedness with others in 
the same predicament (Ben-Ze'ev 2005; Hanafi 2005).  Hanafi finds that whether 
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or not particular Palestinian families maintain a diasporic identity have much to 
do with whether or not they are able produce a locality that contains Palestine as a 
central component.  Hanafi shows how the relatively recent classification of the 
Palestinians as a people has made it difficult for many Palestinians in neighboring 
Arab countries to maintain boundaries or to develop an inventory of symbolic acts 
such as those of Rastafarians or Orthodox Jews in order to produce a distinctly 
Palestinian locality in a Jordanian or Lebanese context.  For those Palestinians 
further abroad in North America or Europe, the idea of a homeland in Palestine is 
problematic when relatives remaining in the Middle East are not living within the 
state of Israel or even in the occupied territories but other Arab countries - the 
same countries where Palestinian is not always a viable identity.  In these cases, 
Palestinians outside the region are more of a dispersal than a group of people who 
find solidarity in a common notion of a Palestinian homeland.   
 Here we may see the distinction between the Cham and the non-Cham 
Muslims known as the Chvea.  While the Chvea are Muslims and are subject to 
many of the same restrictions that makes interaction with Buddhists problematic 
they do not maintain a well articulated community identity that could be 
considered commensurate with the Cham.  Although a minority and although 
they are understood to have an origin in the Malay Archipelago, the Chvea have 
never developed a diasporic discourse as they have not kept contact with the 
homeland, either in reality as Hanafi suggests the Palestinians should, or in the 
collective imagination of the community as have the Cham.  This lack of 
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connection to a different moral geography is what makes the minority experience 
of the Chvea so very different from the diasporic experience of the Cham.  
 Palestinians struggle and frequently fail to accomplish both of the tasks 
which this chapter sets forth as indispensable to the creation of diasporic 
consciousness, namely, the transformation of space into locality in a way that 
creates and preserves group boundaries and the deployment of this shared notion 
of locality to inform the moral economy of the community.  The Chvea on the 
other hand are probably not even trying.  If diasporahood is the product of 
diasporic performance rather than a category assumed from the outset, then it 
stands to reason that groups may fail to perform in this way despite a trajectory 
across the globe comparable to other groups classified as diasporas.  In addition 
to this, we should consider that this performance, as an act of manifest 
communitarian imagination, need not necessarily reflect the experience of 
geographical displacement very closely or even at all.  Diasporic discourse can 
be adopted and modified strategically to serve perceived ideological needs. 
 Rastafarians in the Carribean claim an origin in Ethiopia, the only African 
country to preserve its independence against European expansion, rather than the 
slaving centers of the Gold Coast.  In a similar manner, college-age African 
Americans with Pan-Africanist inclinations study the East African language of 
Swahili, for which there are courses and pedagogical materials, rather than Wolof 
or Igbo which are rarely encountered in course catalogs, even if their ancestors 
where much more likely to have hailed from what is today Sénégal or Nigeria 
rather than Kenya or Tanzania.  These transformations of the diaspora narratives 
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for either ideological or pragmatic reasons underscore the primacy of 
contemporary political and social considerations and negate attempts to 
characterize diasporas as a direct and linear function of their origins as described 
in the genealogical understandings of diaspora.  The pragmatism that is apparent 
in these examples as well as the way in which Chams have availed themselves of 
new economic and social opportunities in recent decades suggest that the 
ideologies of identity as described in this dissertation are likely to change in 
response to new realities confronting the Cham. 
 It is the diasporic imagination that imbues certain events, travels and 
travails with genealogical significance and not the other way around.  The Black 
Hebrews of Dimona in the Negev Desert are an example of a radical break with a 
diasporic discourse in favor, not of assimilation, but of an alternate and more 
liberating diasporic identity (Markowitz 2006).  Black Hebrews reject the 
narrative of the pan-Africanist diaspora that places them in exile away from their 
African homeland and spurn the integrationist paradigm that emphasizes the 
Americanness of the descendents of slaves.  Instead, through reinterpretation of 
biblical texts, they style themselves the true and legitimate heirs to the land of 
Israel.  While Black Hebrew Israelites do not deny the history of slavery or that 
their ancestors were taken from West Africa they devalue those events and 
recontextualize them, bookending them between their expulsion from Judea and 
their triumphant return to the land.   
 The imagination of space and the boundaries within it is central to 
communal understandings of locality - the sacred or profane character of certain 
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places in Northern Ireland, the discrimination of friend and foe in Burundi and the 
representation of the boundary-sustaining masculinity of Sikhs in the diaspora are 
all case studies in the production of community.  This two part process of social 
localization, namely the performance of locality that gives rise to community and 
then the situation of that community within the imagined geography, is not 
sequential, as there is a reciprocal relationship between the two and there also 
exist other mitigating factors that reform and reframe narratives that stem from 
exterior political exigencies.  While locality production localizes subjects and 
topographic imagination provides the discursive template for localizing the other, 
no community is inextricably bound to either aspect of this process.  Just as 
European Jews can strategically apply different discourses of Jewishness and 
Black Hebrews can dismiss one established social geography, which centers on an 
experience of humiliation, and replace it with a new narrative, which in the 70's 
tied Black Hebrews in with a reborn and resurgent Israeli state; there is 
considerable flexibility in how these communities are created and sustained 
through imagination and reimagination. 
 
5.6 Diasporas in Time 
Contrary to what Iyer would have us believe, one cannot escape place any 
more than one could escape from one’s shadow.  While an individual may 
abandon a particular space, he will always end up creating a new place to inhabit 
through the cultivation of social relations and the development of new patterns of 
life.  We find that the places people make – their localities – are dependent on 
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natural and urban geography and yet clearly distinct from it.  Central to 
understanding locality as a product of human agency is determining what it is 
above and beyond geographic situation that makes locality as opposed to merely 
location.  One essential ingredient that transforms inert topography into living 
locality is time (Massey 2005). 
 Locality, the series of human and productive relations embedded within an 
imagined space, is defined not only by its topographic contours but also by its 
temporal element.   Since every act of imagining of locality, every conception of 
social order and every notion of community belonging is embedded in a specific 
time, with particular groups of people being present and certain régimes of 
morality and governance in effect, then time is as much an component of the 
imagination as space.  When one considers the longing of social conservatives 
for the "America of the 50's", when gender and family roles were clear and 
uncomplicated, it becomes apparent that the Boston of 50 years ago is imagined 
as a locality distinct from the Boston of today and yet, at the same time, at least in 
principle, this time in the past can be reinstantiated by performing the social and 
moral acts of locality building associated with that time.  Because Islam is an 
Abrahamic religion with a built-in timeline if not a schedule, it is important to 
consider how time, like space, can have a moral dimension. 
 In Charred Lullabies (1996), Valentine Daniel begins an exploration of 
communal violence in Sri Lanka by considering the different ways in which 
history is conceptualized as the crucible of communal identity.  While most 
Westerners are concerned with the Jaffna Tamils and their struggle for an 
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independent state, the Estate Tamils, which consider themselves distinct from the 
Tamils of Jaffna.  Estate Tamils working on the tea plantations are almost 
entirely involved in a hand to mouth existence that depends on their ability to sell 
their labor to plantation overlords, typically Sinhalese or Burghers who style 
themselves as British.  In addition to their limited economic and social mobility, 
their more recent arrival in Sri Lanka from India makes their situation even more 
precarious than other Tamils.  Daniel probes questions of identity and historicity 
in this community, which defy the standard Sinhalese versus Tamil explanation 
for political violence in Sri Lanka.   
 One important and potentially very useful contribution of this work is 
Daniel's elaboration of the distinction between history and heritage.  Daniel 
proposes that with the appearance or arrival of Buddhism and Islam in India, a 
historicizing discourse was developed or, in the case of Islam, imported, where 
events are believed to occur at fixed moments in the past.  All other events can 
be placed according to their temporal relationship with these key moments, such 
as the birth of the Buddha or the revelation of the Qur'an.  This is particularly 
interesting in light of the traditional treatment of Buddhism by scholars of religion 
as a non-linear, cyclical philosophy that contrasts with the Abrahamic faiths, 
which are explicitly goal oriented.   
 Daniel places Buddhism in opposition to Hinduism in this regard, with 
practitioners of the latter having a less developed sense of history and being less 
invested in an identity that derives its legitimacy through historical narrative.  
Tamils instead do not rely on an objectified historical past encompassing those 
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events (independent variables) that give rise to the present condition (the 
dependent variable).  Through his fieldwork, Daniel provides a contrast between 
Sinhalese, who from childhood are acquainted with the genealogy of ancient 
Sinhalese kings and their mythic exploits against the Tamils, and the Tamils 
themselves, for whom the lineage of past kings is rarely invoked to articulate the 
concerns of present-day Tamils.  Instead Tamils understand their situation 
through a series of stories and beliefs whose truth values are not drawn from their 
historical reality but from their moral content.  Daniel refers to these ways of 
locating significant events in time as history and heritage respectively.   
 This is not to say that Tamils do not have history or Sinhalese a sense of 
heritage, but rather, all things being equal, Sinhalese will privilege a historicized 
discourse and Tamils not.  Because of this, Sinhalese define themselves as a 
community in a continuous relationship with the community of the past.  These 
ancient Aryans had particular and definite characteristics.  They were Buddhists, 
of relatively fair complexion and spoke an Aryan language related to Sanskrit and 
the Prakrits.  Not only does this historicizing discourse maintain these criteria for 
Sinhaleseness alive in people's minds, but it also defines the Tamils as well.  
Sinhalese can know through their invocation of history that Tamils are a 
Dravidian people and that they are Hindus, thus associating them with the 
mainland of the subcontinent in the past and the modern state of India in the 
present - in both cases they represent foreignness.  They also know that Tamils 
invaded the kingdom of the Sinhalese and plundered their temples - that they were 
an enemy in the past and that that condition has not essentially changed. 
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 Among the Cham there are multiple recapitulations of history that then 
serve as the basis for justifying social and political behavior today.  This may be 
the connection to the Cambodian monarchy felt by the Imam San (3.2 & 3.2.1), 
the desire for a kind of structural homologization of the Cham with the 
institutions of other Indic peoples (3.6), the doctrine of personal discipline 
through faith as vehicle for world transformation (2.9), or the disdain with which 
the mortal enemy – the Vietnamese – are held (3.4, 4.5 & 4.6.3).  the moral 
imagination of Muslims needs to be understood in terms of a very well defined 
teleology that includes an ideal past, a corrupt present and a redemptive future, 
about which the main uncertainty is who will find god’s favor in the end of time.  
As with Valentine’s work, this moralization of time is rather at odds with the 
more cyclical notion of time understood by Khmers, who unlike Christians and 
their competing eschatology, are completely outside the temporal morality that 
upholds geographic morality of Muslims.  The wrongness of the now and the 
moral imperative to effect a new order is difficult to translate from Cham to 
Khmer. 
 One place where we consistently find an identity discourse which is 
overtly premised on the injustice of the contemporary time-space of morality is in 
indigenous communities.  James Clifford (1997) notes that indigenous and 
minority discourse has begun to be replaced and supplemented by diaspora 
discourse and that this is becoming an articulation of dispossession that places 
stress on the empowering potential of global networks instead of the isolating 
siege mentality of minority discourse.  The question then is how we can consider 
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these groups in relation to other diasporic groups and how consideration of the 
diasporic qualities of fourth world communities can shed light on the issue of 
diasporas more generally.   
 Much has been made of the notion of sacred space in Native American 
and Aboriginal Australian societies (Bell 2001; Clarke 2003; Fouberg 2000; 
González and Cook-Lynn 1999; Lazarus 1991; Rumsey and Weiner 2001).  Yet 
controversies that crystallize around the sites, such as Ayer's Rock (Uluru) or the 
Black Hills of South Dakota are not simply conflicts between real estate agents 
and aboriginal worshippers.  These are examples of a wider discourse in which 
native communities are wronged because of their alienation from those elements 
of the land that were incorporated into the social and productive relations at some 
point in the remembered/imagined past.  They are arguments that link the 
injustice of the present to a different socio-moral configuration within a more just 
time-space.  This makes indigenous movements more similar to Zionist or 
Pan-Africanist ideologies as well as the ideologies of Chamness described here 
than transnational communities of Chinese merchants or Israeli expats and so 
gives us a new way to approach the terminological problem that current use of the 
word 'diaspora' presents. 
 If we accept that "all communities are imagined communities, but only 
communities imagined in particular ways are diasporas" (Butler 2001), then what 
exactly a diaspora is should be understood through consideration of communal 
imagination and not by plotting points on a map marking the passage of the 
community from one place to another.  If allowed to travel, the concept of 
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diaspora can, despite André Levy's reservations, be quite handsomely adapted to 
the discipline of anthropology and its most powerful investigative tool - the 
ethnography.  By understanding 'diaspora' as a communal discourse of 
displacement that implicitly and explicitly demands the restoration of a moral 
geography, we can dispense with issues of slave diasporas versus trade diasporas, 
or questions of dispersal conditions and demographic patterns and focus on the 
problem for which ethnographic magic is most suited - examining the production 
of belief.  The Cham of Cambodia, as described in the ethnographic record can 
best be understood in terms of these ideologies of moral meaning-making 
manifest in a geographic logic than as simply a religious minority or a temporarily 
displaced people. 
 Certainly, this definition of the term will exclude many groups that, for 
reasons of convention, have tended to be discussed as diasporas and compared to 
other diasporic communities.  It will also include groups which hitherto have not 
been considered diasporas for the mere reason that they have not moved anywhere 
- a problem easily solved if we consider that geographic movement is not 
necessary for the experience of moral dislocation.  These recategorizations are 
not unreasonable, however.   It makes more sense to appreciate communities, 
diasporas or otherwise, within the contexts in which they see themselves, than it 
does to try to impose a vague category on disparate peoples and then rework that 
classification with duct tape and bailing wire as new candidates present 
themselves.  The methods of anthropologists and ethnographers are particularly 
applicable to this problem of understanding a form of communitarian organization 
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that produces not merely locality, but a dialectic between locality and dislocality 
instead which, among other groups, now serves to define the Cham community of 
Cambodia. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
 While it is common to speak of the Cham as a community or ethnic group 
in Cambodia and Việt Nam, once immersed among them the contours of their 
identity become less clear.  What is at issue here is not so much whether certain 
members belong in the group or not, as is a contentious issue in many Native 
American communities where questions of blood quanta and tribal enrollement 
result in people being excluded and unrecognized as members.  The divisions 
found in the Cham community are less about hwere the group boundaries are and 
more about how those boundaries should be respected, crossed or protected. 
 The Cham, although they are divided into various communities, whose 
practices of identity-making take different forms, do all recognize each other, 
however vehemently they may disagree on religion and identity, as being Cham.  
Each group has had to come to terms with and derive meaning from a moment in 
the past when the Cham, once like the Khmer the Vietnamese or the Thais, 
became unlike them in a fundamental way.  By losing their country, the Cham 
failed to develop a state, and yet by having had a country, they feel a sense of 
cultural esteem which places them between the nation-states of the region and the 
indigenous people, who now live in states but only because the extension of 
civilization has enveloped them. 
 The chasm between the possession of a certain degree of civilization and 
the inability to realize a social environment under their control is what frustrates 
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the hopes of Imam San who would like to reinstate some form of autonomy or 
other Muslims who would wish to make human interactions more shari’ah 
compliant as has been possible in Malaysia, where the Muslims did not lose their 
country.  The Cham have found several ways to lighten the weight of this 
historical shame.  For some, like the Imam San, pre-existing symbolic 
relationships with the Cambodian monarchy and state presented the option of 
maintaining the status with which they entered the country – guests of the 
Cambodian king, loyal and true to his interests and standing besides (but separate 
from) Khmers as they confront shared challenges.   
 Others could not avail themselves of these connections to the structures of 
their hostland, and as a result the memories of their own history could not be 
deployed in the same way as a vehicle for making sense of their current condition.  
For those who held that the events of the past along with its stories and traditions, 
the Tabligh movement with its relatively indulgent attitude toward folk customs 
that arise around the practice of Islam, became an attractive option.  For others 
less convinced that historical developments of a particularistic character can 
usefully inform the orthopraxy of a universalizing religion revealed in history, but 
not in any history that had Cham people in it, the Salafi movement may be a more 
comfortable fit. 
 This has not been a uni-directional influence from historical consciousness 
to choice of religious affiliation however.  Being part of one of these groups also 
encourages one to think in the terms described here.  A young person whose 
village accepts a donation from Malaysia will likely install a Tabligh imam, 
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receive tabligh missionaries, and be introduced to the religion with a particular 
way of viewing identity and history.  An orphan accepted into an RIHS school is 
going to encounter not just an educational curriculum, but a series of claims and 
presuppositions about the world that curriculum is meant to prepare him for. 
 The Cham can be seen as consisting of those that view themselves a a 
civilization of India, akin to Khmers and Thais and who therefore consider it 
proper to forge relationships of symbolic equality with the Khmers among which 
they live, and those Cham who see their religion as the paramount marked of 
identity, both personal and communal, and so find it difficult to make fast 
relationships with the Khmers that encircle them.  For this second, and far more 
numerous group, it is by reaching out to the Ummah that they escape the exile of 
the Cambodian state and reimagine themselves a valued constituent in a complete 
whole. 
 The act of imagining here is central because as a minority they can do 
relatively little to bring about change in public life or law.  Moreover, few 
Khmers would have any idea what is meant by these distinctions in what they 
regard as an undifferentiated mass of Muslims.  The Imam San efforts to ally 
themselves to Cambodia’s monarchy and Khmer culture goes completely 
unrecognized by Khmers who are rather unaware of the details of their culture or 
history.  Much in the same way that attempts to divide the hilltribes into Khmer 
Leu and Cham Leu go unnoticed by Khmers, relatively few of these social and 
ideational changes among the Cham have had any real impact on their relations 
with Khmers.  They are however seen, understood and then applauded or 
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rejected by other Cham.  While these changing practices often appear to be 
attempts to assert themselves in Khmer society they are in reality performances 
meant to be seen by other Cham. 
 This is inteligible because for all their apparent diversity of thought and 
action, each group of Cham can agree that the present state of affairs is somehow 
wrong and unjust.  It is a corruption of a once better condition which must be 
recovered through words and deeds.  For this reason, the discourse of the Cham 
minority is always carried by a moralizing current that integrates visions of purity 
and contamination, order and anarchy, goodness and perversion, into their 
assertions about what is to be done.  Although the Cham are a demographic 
minority in every polity they now reside in, our understanding of the Cham 
communities, and in particular the wide range of ethnicizing practices, would be 
incomplete if we were to only consider them as an ethnic, racial or religious 
minority.  The spectrum of performances that can potentially express Chamness 
must be understood as part of a moral discourse of placing and placemaking that 
is grounded in spatial and temporal imaginaries. 
 This core of unresolved injustice at the heart of a communitarian ideology 
is the sine qua non of diasporic consciousness, and the rhetorical mortar that binds 
what at first appear to be self-contained and wholly independent membership 
groups.  The heterogeneity of Cham discourses, which each in their own way 
acknowledge and contend with the shared elements of the community’s historic 
and material circumstances in the kingdom, brings into focus the mundane and 
pragmatic mechanisms for generating ideal social types.  Understanding how 
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these ideas take form as well as how they incorporate elements of their cultural 
and political superstrate, which in this case are the wider Khmer society and the 
Cambodian state, places this diasporic communities squarely within the hostland 
where these views on self and other, desires for justice and redemption, and 
efforts toward mobilization and accommodation are born.  The field of diaspora 
studies, as well as Islamic studies, could profit from considering the Cham and 
their religio-historical discourses of social idealism and transnational belonging as 
they endeavor to make themselves some space and then live in it. 
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